diff --git a/.claude/agents/security-auditor.md b/.claude/agents/security-auditor.md
index 6f81158..c841272 100644
--- a/.claude/agents/security-auditor.md
+++ b/.claude/agents/security-auditor.md
@@ -54,6 +54,24 @@ Systematically review in this order:
 6. CORS configuration (`app/main.py`)
 7. Frontend — token storage, XSS vectors, any `dangerouslySetInnerHTML`
 
+## JWT security checklist
+
+When reviewing any authentication code, verify all of the following:
+
+| Check | What to look for | Severity |
+|---|---|---|
+| Algorithm confusion | `algorithms=["none"]` or `algorithm="none"` in `jwt.decode()` | Critical |
+| Expiry enforcement | `verify_exp=False` or `options={"verify_exp": False}` | Critical |
+| Token lifetime | `ACCESS_TOKEN_EXPIRE_MINUTES` — must be ≤ 480 (8 h); flag `timedelta(days=...)` in token creation | High |
+| Secret key strength | `SECRET_KEY` must come from env var, ≥ 32 random chars; flag hardcoded strings | High |
+| Algorithm pinned | `jwt.decode()` must pass `algorithms=["HS256"]` (or project algorithm) explicitly — never a variable | High |
+| Missing claims | Token payload should include `sub`, `exp`, `iat`; flag if `iat` is absent | Medium |
+| Token storage | Frontend stores JWT in `localStorage` — note the XSS exposure tradeoff; recommend `httpOnly` cookie migration when hardening | Medium |
+| No refresh tokens | Project policy: no permanent sessions, no refresh tokens. Flag any `refresh_token` implementation | Medium |
+| No "remember me" | No `remember_me` or extended-expiry paths in auth flow | Medium |
+
+Current project policy: **8-hour JWT, no refresh tokens, no permanent login.**
+
 ## Hard rules
 
 - Never weaken an existing security control
diff --git a/TODO.md b/TODO.md
index 53ad84a..5f2fa95 100644
--- a/TODO.md
+++ b/TODO.md
@@ -8,6 +8,12 @@
 - [ ] **Decide on UI component library** — shadcn/ui (recommended: Tailwind-based, unstyled accessible primitives, white-label friendly) vs MUI vs other; decision affects both Penpot design system and frontend implementation
 - [ ] **Connect ux-designer agent** — confirm Penpot API reachable, provide instance URL + token to agent at session start
 
+## Auth / session security
+
+- [x] **8-hour JWT expiry** — `ACCESS_TOKEN_EXPIRE_MINUTES = 60 * 8`; no permanent login
+- [ ] **No refresh tokens** — refresh token flow not implemented; if added later, must use `httpOnly` cookies and rotation
+- [ ] **`httpOnly` cookie migration** — currently storing JWT in `localStorage` (XSS-exposed); migrate to `httpOnly` cookie when hardening for production
+
 ## App permissions
 
 - [ ] **Permissions registry** — admin-managed table that controls which apps each user can access. Schema: `user_app_permissions (user_id FK, app_key)`. Admin UI lets the admin grant/revoke per-app access per user. The Apps page only shows apps the current user has been granted access to.
diff --git a/backend/app/core/config.py b/backend/app/core/config.py
index 7ecd576..a52d954 100644
--- a/backend/app/core/config.py
+++ b/backend/app/core/config.py
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ class Settings(BaseSettings):
 
     SECRET_KEY: str = "change-me-in-production"
     ALGORITHM: str = "HS256"
-    ACCESS_TOKEN_EXPIRE_MINUTES: int = 60 * 24  # 1 day
+    ACCESS_TOKEN_EXPIRE_MINUTES: int = 60 * 8  # 8 hours — no permanent sessions
 
     CORS_ORIGINS: list[str] = ["http://localhost:5173"]
 
diff --git a/changelog/2026-04-13_jwt-expiry.md b/changelog/2026-04-13_jwt-expiry.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..347f3dc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/changelog/2026-04-13_jwt-expiry.md
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+# 2026-04-13 — JWT token expiry hardened to 8 hours
+
+**Timestamp:** 2026-04-13T04:00:00
+
+## Summary
+
+Reduced JWT token lifetime from 24 hours to 8 hours with no permanent session option. Added JWT vulnerability detection to the pre-commit security check and a JWT security checklist to the security-auditor agent. Updated TODO with auth/session security items.
+
+## Files Modified
+
+- `backend/app/core/config.py` — `ACCESS_TOKEN_EXPIRE_MINUTES` changed from `60 * 24` to `60 * 8`; added comment "no permanent sessions"
+- `scripts/security_check.py` — added `JWT_PATTERNS` category: algorithm confusion (`none`), disabled expiry verification, multi-day token lifetime, oversized EXPIRE_MINUTES, hardcoded secret; wired into `ALL_PATTERNS` and updated docstring
+- `.claude/agents/security-auditor.md` — added JWT security checklist table covering algorithm confusion, expiry enforcement, token lifetime, secret key strength, missing claims, localStorage storage, no refresh tokens policy
+- `TODO.md` — added "Auth / session security" section: 8-hour JWT checked off, refresh token and httpOnly cookie migration as future items
diff --git a/scripts/security_check.py b/scripts/security_check.py
index 703db38..2e288e4 100644
--- a/scripts/security_check.py
+++ b/scripts/security_check.py
@@ -9,8 +9,9 @@ Checks:
   3. Weak cryptography (MD5, SHA1 for passwords, DES)
   4. SQL injection risk (f-strings / .format() / % in execute/query/text())
   5. Missing input sanitization (raw request attributes passed to DB)
-  6. Debug/development flags left in code
-  7. bandit static analysis on Python files
+  6. JWT vulnerabilities (algorithm=none, verify_exp=False, long-lived tokens)
+  7. Debug/development flags left in code
+  8. bandit static analysis on Python files
 """
 
 import os
@@ -74,6 +75,28 @@ SANITIZATION_PATTERNS = [
      "raw request attribute passed to DB — route through a Pydantic schema first"),
 ]
 
+JWT_PATTERNS = [
+    # Algorithm confusion attack — accepting 'none' algorithm
+    (r'algorithms?\s*=\s*\[.*["\']none["\']',
+     "JWT algorithm 'none' accepted — algorithm confusion attack (Critical)"),
+    (r'algorithm\s*=\s*["\']none["\']',
+     "JWT algorithm set to 'none' — algorithm confusion attack (Critical)"),
+    # Disabling expiry verification
+    (r'verify_exp\s*[=:]\s*False',
+     "JWT expiry verification disabled — tokens never expire (Critical)"),
+    (r'options\s*=\s*\{[^}]*["\']verify_exp["\'].*False',
+     "JWT expiry verification disabled in options dict (Critical)"),
+    # Long-lived tokens: timedelta(days=...) in JWT context is suspicious
+    (r'timedelta\s*\(\s*days\s*=\s*[1-9]',
+     "JWT token with multi-day expiry — use hours, not days (High)"),
+    # Overly large EXPIRE_MINUTES constant (>9999 min ≈ 7 days)
+    (r'EXPIRE_MINUTES\s*[=:]\s*[1-9]\d{4,}',
+     "JWT EXPIRE_MINUTES value > 9999 (> 7 days) — reduce token lifetime (High)"),
+    # Hardcoded JWT secret
+    (r'SECRET_KEY\s*=\s*["\'][a-zA-Z0-9_\-]{4,}["\'](?!.*env|.*change)',
+     "possible hardcoded JWT secret — use env var (High)"),
+]
+
 DEBUG_PATTERNS = [
     (r'\bdebug\s*=\s*True\b', "debug=True left in code"),
     (r'print\s*\(.*password', "possible password printed to stdout"),
@@ -85,6 +108,7 @@ ALL_PATTERNS = (
     + [("CRYPTO", p, m) for p, m in WEAK_CRYPTO_PATTERNS]
     + [("SQLINJ", p, m) for p, m in SQL_INJECTION_PATTERNS]
     + [("SANIT",  p, m) for p, m in SANITIZATION_PATTERNS]
+    + [("JWT",    p, m) for p, m in JWT_PATTERNS]
     + [("DEBUG",  p, m) for p, m in DEBUG_PATTERNS]
 )