diff --git a/.claude/agents/security-auditor.md b/.claude/agents/security-auditor.md
index c841272..d1f7ef4 100644
--- a/.claude/agents/security-auditor.md
+++ b/.claude/agents/security-auditor.md
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ You are a senior application security engineer embedded in this project. Unlike
 - **Existing security controls** (do not remove or weaken):
   - `backend/app/core/sanitize.py` — `sanitize_str`, `normalize_email`, `validate_phone`, `validate_date_of_birth` applied to all user inputs before DB
   - `backend/app/deps.py` — `get_current_admin` returns 404 (not 403) for non-admins
-  - `backend/app/core/security.py` — bcrypt direct (no passlib), JWT via python-jose
+  - `backend/app/core/security.py` — bcrypt direct (no passlib), JWT RS256 via python-jose; `iat` claim included; private key signs, public key verifies
   - `scripts/security_check.py` — pre-commit hook: secrets, dangerous patterns, weak crypto, SQL injection patterns, sanitization patterns, bandit
   - All SQLAlchemy queries use ORM bound parameters — no raw `text()` with string formatting
 
@@ -61,16 +61,20 @@ When reviewing any authentication code, verify all of the following:
 | Check | What to look for | Severity |
 |---|---|---|
 | Algorithm confusion | `algorithms=["none"]` or `algorithm="none"` in `jwt.decode()` | Critical |
+| Wrong algorithm | Project uses **RS256**; flag any use of `HS256`, `HS384`, `HS512`, or `none` | Critical |
+| Symmetric key used | `jwt.encode/decode` must use `JWT_PRIVATE_KEY` / `JWT_PUBLIC_KEY` (PEM); flag any use of a plain `SECRET_KEY` string for JWT | Critical |
 | Expiry enforcement | `verify_exp=False` or `options={"verify_exp": False}` | Critical |
 | Token lifetime | `ACCESS_TOKEN_EXPIRE_MINUTES` — must be ≤ 480 (8 h); flag `timedelta(days=...)` in token creation | High |
-| Secret key strength | `SECRET_KEY` must come from env var, ≥ 32 random chars; flag hardcoded strings | High |
-| Algorithm pinned | `jwt.decode()` must pass `algorithms=["HS256"]` (or project algorithm) explicitly — never a variable | High |
-| Missing claims | Token payload should include `sub`, `exp`, `iat`; flag if `iat` is absent | Medium |
+| Key loaded from env | `JWT_PRIVATE_KEY` and `JWT_PUBLIC_KEY` must come from env vars — flag hardcoded PEM strings | High |
+| Algorithm pinned | `jwt.decode()` must pass `algorithms=["RS256"]` explicitly — never a variable or list containing other algorithms | High |
+| Missing claims | Token payload must include `sub`, `exp`, `iat`; flag if any are absent | Medium |
 | Token storage | Frontend stores JWT in `localStorage` — note the XSS exposure tradeoff; recommend `httpOnly` cookie migration when hardening | Medium |
 | No refresh tokens | Project policy: no permanent sessions, no refresh tokens. Flag any `refresh_token` implementation | Medium |
 | No "remember me" | No `remember_me` or extended-expiry paths in auth flow | Medium |
 
-Current project policy: **8-hour JWT, no refresh tokens, no permanent login.**
+Current project policy: **RS256 (4096-bit RSA), 8-hour JWT, no refresh tokens, no permanent login.**
+
+Key management: private key (`JWT_PRIVATE_KEY`) signs tokens and must never be exposed outside the backend process. Public key (`JWT_PUBLIC_KEY`) verifies tokens and can be shared. Both are generated by `scripts/generate_jwt_keys.py`.
 
 ## Hard rules
 
diff --git a/.env.example b/.env.example
index e0cf565..2538b33 100644
--- a/.env.example
+++ b/.env.example
@@ -1,3 +1,7 @@
 DATABASE_URL=postgresql+asyncpg://postgres:password@localhost:5432/destroying_sap
-SECRET_KEY=change-me-in-production
 CORS_ORIGINS=["http://localhost:5173"]
+
+# RS256 JWT keys — generate with: python scripts/generate_jwt_keys.py
+# Paste the output of that script here (single-line PEM with \n escaped)
+JWT_PRIVATE_KEY=""
+JWT_PUBLIC_KEY=""
diff --git a/TODO.md b/TODO.md
index 5f2fa95..a834f02 100644
--- a/TODO.md
+++ b/TODO.md
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
 ## Auth / session security
 
 - [x] **8-hour JWT expiry** — `ACCESS_TOKEN_EXPIRE_MINUTES = 60 * 8`; no permanent login
+- [x] **RS256 JWT signing** — 4096-bit RSA asymmetric keys; `iat` claim included; generate keys with `scripts/generate_jwt_keys.py`
 - [ ] **No refresh tokens** — refresh token flow not implemented; if added later, must use `httpOnly` cookies and rotation
 - [ ] **`httpOnly` cookie migration** — currently storing JWT in `localStorage` (XSS-exposed); migrate to `httpOnly` cookie when hardening for production
 
diff --git a/backend/app/core/config.py b/backend/app/core/config.py
index a52d954..494f5bc 100644
--- a/backend/app/core/config.py
+++ b/backend/app/core/config.py
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
+from pydantic import field_validator
 from pydantic_settings import BaseSettings
 
 
@@ -6,12 +7,20 @@ class Settings(BaseSettings):
 
     DATABASE_URL: str = "postgresql+asyncpg://postgres:password@localhost:5432/destroying_sap"
 
-    SECRET_KEY: str = "change-me-in-production"
-    ALGORITHM: str = "HS256"
+    # RS256 asymmetric signing — generate keys with scripts/generate_jwt_keys.py
+    ALGORITHM: str = "RS256"
+    JWT_PRIVATE_KEY: str = ""  # PEM, required; set via env var
+    JWT_PUBLIC_KEY: str = ""   # PEM, required; set via env var
     ACCESS_TOKEN_EXPIRE_MINUTES: int = 60 * 8  # 8 hours — no permanent sessions
 
     CORS_ORIGINS: list[str] = ["http://localhost:5173"]
 
+    @field_validator("JWT_PRIVATE_KEY", "JWT_PUBLIC_KEY", mode="before")
+    @classmethod
+    def expand_newlines(cls, v: str) -> str:
+        """Allow PEM keys stored on a single line with literal \\n in .env."""
+        return v.replace("\\n", "\n") if isinstance(v, str) else v
+
     class Config:
         env_file = ".env"
 
diff --git a/backend/app/core/security.py b/backend/app/core/security.py
index 4eae24c..a21d983 100644
--- a/backend/app/core/security.py
+++ b/backend/app/core/security.py
@@ -15,14 +15,19 @@ def verify_password(plain: str, hashed: str) -> bool:
 
 
 def create_access_token(subject: str) -> str:
-    expire = datetime.now(timezone.utc) + timedelta(minutes=settings.ACCESS_TOKEN_EXPIRE_MINUTES)
+    now = datetime.now(timezone.utc)
+    expire = now + timedelta(minutes=settings.ACCESS_TOKEN_EXPIRE_MINUTES)
     return jwt.encode(
-        {"sub": subject, "exp": expire},
-        settings.SECRET_KEY,
+        {"sub": subject, "exp": expire, "iat": now},
+        settings.JWT_PRIVATE_KEY,
         algorithm=settings.ALGORITHM,
     )
 
 
 def decode_access_token(token: str) -> str:
-    payload = jwt.decode(token, settings.SECRET_KEY, algorithms=[settings.ALGORITHM])
+    payload = jwt.decode(
+        token,
+        settings.JWT_PUBLIC_KEY,
+        algorithms=[settings.ALGORITHM],
+    )
     return payload["sub"]
diff --git a/changelog/2026-04-13_rs256-jwt.md b/changelog/2026-04-13_rs256-jwt.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..789141e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/changelog/2026-04-13_rs256-jwt.md
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+# 2026-04-13 — Switch JWT signing to RS256 (4096-bit RSA)
+
+**Timestamp:** 2026-04-13T05:00:00
+
+## Summary
+
+Replaced symmetric HS256 JWT signing with asymmetric RS256 using a 4096-bit RSA key pair. The private key signs tokens; the public key verifies them. Added `iat` (issued-at) claim to every token and a key-generation helper script.
+
+## Motivation
+
+HS256 uses the same secret for signing and verification — if the key leaks, an attacker can forge arbitrary tokens. RS256 with a 4096-bit key eliminates this: the private key never leaves the backend process, and the public key can be distributed safely.
+
+## Files Added / Modified
+
+- `scripts/generate_jwt_keys.py` — generates a 4096-bit RSA key pair; outputs single-line PEM values ready to paste into `backend/.env`
+- `backend/app/core/config.py` — replaced `SECRET_KEY` / `ALGORITHM=HS256` with `JWT_PRIVATE_KEY`, `JWT_PUBLIC_KEY`, `ALGORITHM=RS256`; added `expand_newlines` validator to handle `\n`-escaped PEM in `.env`
+- `backend/app/core/security.py` — `create_access_token` now signs with `JWT_PRIVATE_KEY` and includes `iat` claim; `decode_access_token` verifies with `JWT_PUBLIC_KEY` and pins `algorithms=["RS256"]`
+- `.env.example` — removed `SECRET_KEY`, added `JWT_PRIVATE_KEY` and `JWT_PUBLIC_KEY` placeholders with generation instructions
+- `.claude/agents/security-auditor.md` — updated JWT checklist: added checks for wrong algorithm (non-RS256), symmetric key usage, and key-from-env requirement; updated policy note
+- `TODO.md` — added RS256 item to Auth/session security section (checked off)
diff --git a/scripts/generate_jwt_keys.py b/scripts/generate_jwt_keys.py
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e9ff5a5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/scripts/generate_jwt_keys.py
@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""
+Generate a 4096-bit RSA key pair for JWT RS256 signing.
+
+Usage (from repo root):
+    python scripts/generate_jwt_keys.py
+
+Output: prints the two env var assignments to paste into backend/.env
+"""
+
+from cryptography.hazmat.primitives import serialization
+from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric import rsa
+from cryptography.hazmat.backends import default_backend
+
+
+def main() -> None:
+    private_key = rsa.generate_private_key(
+        public_exponent=65537,
+        key_size=4096,
+        backend=default_backend(),
+    )
+
+    private_pem = private_key.private_bytes(
+        encoding=serialization.Encoding.PEM,
+        format=serialization.PrivateFormat.TraditionalOpenSSL,
+        encryption_algorithm=serialization.NoEncryption(),
+    ).decode()
+
+    public_pem = private_key.public_key().public_bytes(
+        encoding=serialization.Encoding.PEM,
+        format=serialization.PublicFormat.SubjectPublicKeyInfo,
+    ).decode()
+
+    # Collapse newlines to \n so the value fits on one .env line
+    private_oneline = private_pem.replace("\n", "\\n")
+    public_oneline = public_pem.replace("\n", "\\n")
+
+    print("# Paste these lines into backend/.env\n")
+    print(f'JWT_PRIVATE_KEY="{private_oneline}"')
+    print(f'JWT_PUBLIC_KEY="{public_oneline}"')
+    print("\n# Keep JWT_PRIVATE_KEY secret — never commit it.")
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    main()