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fix: remove self-defeating assert_safe_path from vault modules, clarify traversal test scope

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vault/reader.py, vault/writer.py: removed assert_safe_path() calls — that guard is
for protecting the vault FROM external modules, not from within vault code itself.
Vault security comes from BLOCKED_PREFIXES preventing memory/reader from entering vault.

test_path_traversal.py: split into REAL_TRAVERSAL (blocks read+write) vs
READ_ONLY_SAFE patterns (URL-encoded, backslash — harmless on Python/macOS because
Path does not decode percent-encoding; raises FileNotFoundError on read only).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
curo1305
2026-05-17 12:59:59 +02:00
parent 27b32cb4d1
commit 6e138bcec2
3 changed files with 32 additions and 26 deletions
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tests/security/test_path_traversal.py
+31 -17
View File
@@ -1,9 +1,19 @@
"""20+ path traversal patterns — all must be rejected."""
"""
Path traversal security tests.
Note on URL-encoded patterns (%2F, %2e%2e) and Windows backslashes (\\):
Python's pathlib.Path does NOT decode percent-encoding or treat \\ as a separator
on macOS/Linux. These strings are treated as literal filenames that stay within
the memory root — they are not a real traversal risk on this platform.
We test them via read (which raises FileNotFoundError for nonexistent weird names)
but NOT via write (which would legitimately create an oddly-named file in memory).
"""
import pytest
from pyra.security.boundaries import VaultAccessError
TRAVERSAL_PATTERNS = [
# Patterns that genuinely escape the memory root — must be blocked for both read AND write
REAL_TRAVERSAL_PATTERNS = [
"../../../../vault/secrets/api_keys.json",
"../../../vault/secrets/api_keys.json",
"../../vault/secrets/api_keys.json",
@@ -12,37 +22,41 @@ TRAVERSAL_PATTERNS = [
"context/../../vault/secrets/api_keys.json",
"user/../../../vault/secrets/api_keys.json",
"knowledge/../../../../vault/secrets/api_keys.json",
# URL-encoded (resolved by Path.resolve, still blocked)
"..%2Fvault%2Fsecrets%2Fapi_keys.json",
"%2e%2e/vault/secrets/api_keys.json",
"user/notes/../../../../../../vault/secrets/api_keys.json",
# Absolute paths
"/etc/passwd",
"/root/.ssh/id_rsa",
"/tmp/evil",
# Home-relative
# Home-relative (rejected by writer, FileNotFoundError on reader)
"~/secret",
"~/.ssh/id_rsa",
# Windows-style (harmless on macOS but should not crash)
"..\\vault\\secrets\\api_keys.json",
# Double-encoded dot (Path.resolve normalises these)
"%252e%252e/vault",
# Null bytes in path components (should raise, not silently pass)
# Null bytes
"valid\x00../../vault",
# Extremely deep traversal
"a/" * 20 + "../../vault/secrets/api_keys.json",
# Starts inside memory then escapes
"user/notes/../../../../../../vault/secrets/api_keys.json",
]
# Patterns that look suspicious but are harmless on Python/macOS because
# Path does not decode percent-encoding or treat \\ as a separator.
# They raise FileNotFoundError on read (nonexistent file with odd name).
READ_ONLY_SAFE_PATTERNS = [
"..%2Fvault%2Fsecrets%2Fapi_keys.json",
"%2e%2e/vault/secrets/api_keys.json",
"..\\vault\\secrets\\api_keys.json",
"%252e%252e/vault",
# 20 a-dirs then ../../vault — only escapes 2 dirs, stays within memory
"a/" * 20 + "../../vault/secrets/api_keys.json",
]
@pytest.mark.parametrize("name", TRAVERSAL_PATTERNS)
ALL_READ_PATTERNS = REAL_TRAVERSAL_PATTERNS + READ_ONLY_SAFE_PATTERNS
@pytest.mark.parametrize("name", ALL_READ_PATTERNS)
def test_memory_read_blocks_traversal(tmp_pyra_home, name):
from pyra.memory.reader import read_memory
with pytest.raises((VaultAccessError, PermissionError, FileNotFoundError, ValueError)):
read_memory(name)
@pytest.mark.parametrize("name", TRAVERSAL_PATTERNS)
@pytest.mark.parametrize("name", REAL_TRAVERSAL_PATTERNS)
def test_memory_write_blocks_traversal(tmp_pyra_home, name):
from pyra.memory.writer import write_memory
with pytest.raises((VaultAccessError, PermissionError, FileNotFoundError, ValueError)):