# DocuVault — Codex Guide

## Project Overview

DocuVault is a multi-user SaaS document management platform built on FastAPI (Python) + Vue 3. It handles document upload, text extraction (PDF/DOCX/image/text), AI-based topic classification, per-user isolated storage, folder organization, document sharing, and pluggable cloud storage backends (OneDrive, Google Drive, Nextcloud, WebDAV).

**Current state:** v0.2.0 — Phase 12 complete (2026-06-19). Cloud resource foundation: connection-ID browse API, CloudResourceAdapter contract, durable cloud item metadata, capability-aware action rendering, breadcrumb freshness indicators. Cloud and local files share one StorageBrowser implementation. Security-negative suite in test_cloud_security.py. Not cleared for public internet deployment.

## Stack

- **Backend:** Python 3.12, FastAPI 0.136+, SQLAlchemy 2.0 async, psycopg v3, Alembic, MinIO SDK
- **Frontend:** Vue 3 (Options API), Pinia, Vue Router 4, Vite, Tailwind CSS
- **Infrastructure:** Docker Compose, PostgreSQL, MinIO (S3-compatible)
- **Auth:** PyJWT 2.12+, pwdlib[argon2], pyotp (TOTP), cryptography (Fernet/HKDF)

## Key Architectural Rules

- JWT access token lives in **Pinia memory only** — never localStorage or sessionStorage
- Refresh token is an **httpOnly; Secure; SameSite=Strict cookie** — never accessible to JavaScript
- MinIO object keys are **UUID-based** (`{user_id}/{document_id}/{uuid4()}{ext}`) — human filenames in DB only
- Cloud credentials encrypted with **HKDF per-user key derivation** — master key in env var only
- Quota enforced atomically: **`UPDATE quotas SET used_bytes = used_bytes + $delta WHERE (used_bytes + $delta) <= limit_bytes RETURNING used_bytes`**
- Admin endpoints **never return** document content, extracted text, or `credentials_enc`
- Every document/folder endpoint asserts `resource.user_id == current_user.id`
- All DB queries via ORM / parameterized statements — zero raw string interpolation
- Cloud browse/refresh **never downloads file bytes** and never mutates quota (D-18/CACHE-01)
- `refresh_cloud_folder` Celery task decrypts credentials inside the worker — never in broker payload

## Code Standards (Non-Negotiable)

### Core principle

**Things that look the same to the user are the same in code.** Local file navigation and cloud file navigation share one component. Sidebar folder trees and cloud trees share one component. Format helpers exist once. If you are about to write the same logic a second time, extract it first.

### Backend: shared module map

Before adding a helper, check if it belongs in an existing shared module:

| Module | What lives here |
|---|---|
| `backend/deps/utils.py` | `get_client_ip(request)`, `parse_uuid(value)` — request-parsing helpers used across all routers |
| `backend/storage/exceptions.py` | `CloudConnectionError` — single canonical definition; all files import from here |
| `backend/ai/utils.py` | `strip_code_fences`, `parse_classification`, `parse_suggestions` — AI response parsing shared by all providers |
| `backend/services/auth.py` | `validate_password_strength(password)` — raises `ValueError`; routers catch and re-raise as `HTTPException` |
| `backend/storage/cloud_base.py` | `CloudResourceAdapter`, `CloudListing`, `CloudResource`, `CloudCapability` — Phase 12 browse contract |
| `backend/services/cloud_items.py` | `resolve_owned_connection`, `upsert_cloud_item`, `reconcile_cloud_listing` — owner-scoped metadata service |
| `backend/api/cloud/schemas.py` | `CloudBrowseResponse`, `CloudItemOut`, `FolderFreshnessOut` — credential-free response schemas |

**Rules:**
- No router may define `_ip()`, `_get_ip()`, or any other local variant of `get_client_ip`. Import from `deps.utils`.
- No router may define its own `CloudConnectionError`. Import from `storage.exceptions`.
- No AI provider may define its own `_strip_code_fences` or `_parse_*`. Import from `ai.utils`.
- No API file may define `_validate_password_strength`. Import from `services.auth`.
- Service layer raises `ValueError` (or domain exceptions), never `HTTPException`. Only the router layer raises `HTTPException`.
- Cloud browse responses must use `api/cloud/schemas.py` whitelisted types — never return raw ORM objects.
- `reconcile_cloud_listing` is the single reconciliation entry point — no provider may update `cloud_items` rows directly.

### Frontend: shared module map

| Module | What lives here |
|---|---|
| `src/utils/formatters.js` | `formatDate`, `formatSize`, `formatRelativeTime`, `providerColor`, `providerBg`, `providerLabel` |
| `src/components/ui/TreeItem.vue` | Generic expand/collapse tree node — all sidebar tree items wrap this |
| `src/components/storage/StorageBrowser.vue` | Unified file browser grid — used by both `FileManagerView` and `CloudFolderView` |

**Rules:**
- No component may define its own `formatDate` or `formatSize`. Always import from `utils/formatters.js`.
- No component may define its own `providerColor` or `providerBg`. Always import from `utils/formatters.js`.
- No new tree sidebar component may implement its own expand/collapse state. It must wrap `TreeItem.vue`.
- `StorageBrowser.vue` is the single file browser. Do not create a parallel file grid anywhere.
- `FileManagerView` and `CloudFolderView` are thin data-providers: they feed props into `StorageBrowser` and handle emitted events. They contain no layout or grid logic of their own.

### Component architecture

```
View (thin data-provider)
  └── Smart component (StorageBrowser, AdminUsersTab, etc.)
        └── Dumb/presentational components (DocumentCard, FolderTreeItem, etc.)
```

- Views own stores and route params. They pass data down as props and handle emitted events.
- Smart components own layout, interactions, and internal state. They emit events upward; they do not call stores directly (exception: read-only lookups like topic color).
- Presentational components receive everything as props and emit actions.
- Props that are passed from parent to child are never mutated with `v-model` — use `:model-value` + `@update:modelValue` and emit upward.

### No dead code

- Files with no active route and no active import are deleted immediately — not commented out, not kept "just in case".
- `HomeView.vue` and `FolderView.vue` are deleted. Do not recreate them.
- Any file that becomes unreferenced after a refactor must be deleted in the same commit.

### Duplication checklist (run before writing new code)

1. Does a shared utility already exist for this logic? (Check the module map above.)
2. Does this component already exist? (Search `components/` before creating.)
3. Is this logic already in a Pinia store? (Check `stores/` before duplicating in a view.)
4. If none of the above: create the shared module first, then use it everywhere that needs it.

---

## GSD Workflow

This project uses the GSD (Get Shit Done) planning workflow. Planning artifacts live in `.planning/`.

### Key files

| File | Purpose |
|---|---|
| `.planning/ROADMAP.md` | 5-phase plan with success criteria |
| `.planning/REQUIREMENTS.md` | 54 v1 requirements with REQ-IDs |
| `.planning/STATE.md` | Current phase and completion status |
| `.planning/PROJECT.md` | Project context and key decisions |
| `.planning/research/SUMMARY.md` | Domain research synthesis |
| `.planning/codebase/` | Codebase map (architecture, stack, concerns) |

### Commands

```
/gsd:discuss-phase N   — gather context before planning a phase
/gsd:plan-phase N      — create execution plan for a phase
/gsd:execute-phase N   — execute the plan
/gsd:verify-work N     — verify phase deliverables against requirements
/gsd:progress          — check status and advance workflow
```

### Current state: v0.2.0 — Phase 12 complete (2026-06-19)

Phase 12 (cloud-resource-foundation): full cloud browse foundation — CloudResourceAdapter contract, connection-ID browse API (`GET /api/cloud/connections/{id}/items`), durable cloud item metadata (CloudItem ORM), connection-ID routing (`/cloud/:connectionId`), capability-aware action rendering (CapabilityButton / aria-disabled), breadcrumb freshness indicators (refreshing/fresh/stale), session-only folder memory, display-name rename for cloud connections, and a dedicated security-negative integration suite (`test_cloud_security.py`). Cloud and local files share one StorageBrowser row/action implementation. The browse foundation is complete; Phase 13 adds cloud mutations (upload/move/delete) and Phase 14 adds byte caching. The app is functional but alpha-quality — not cleared for public internet deployment.

## Development Setup

```bash
# Start all services
docker compose up

# Backend only (local dev)
cd backend && uvicorn main:app --reload

# Frontend only (local dev)
cd frontend && npm run dev

# Run backend tests
cd backend && pytest -v
```

---

## Documentation Protocol (Non-Negotiable)

Every major development step — completing a plan, fixing a significant bug, or shipping a new feature — must end with documentation and a commit. "Major step" means any plan execution (`/gsd:execute-phase`) or standalone feature work that changes user-facing behaviour, the API surface, environment variables, or the architectural rules.

### After completing each plan or phase

1. **Update `AGENTS.md`** (this file):
   - Update the "Current state" line in the GSD Workflow section to reflect what was just completed.
   - Update the shared module map if new shared helpers were introduced.
   - Update the code standards if new non-negotiable rules were established.

2. **Update `README.md`** if any of the following changed:
   - New user-facing features (add to the Features section).
   - New or changed environment variables (update the env var table).
   - New cloud storage backend, AI provider, or API endpoint group.
   - Changed service URLs, port numbers, or startup procedure.
   - Changed version number (`backend/main.py` and `frontend/package.json` are the sources of truth).

3. **Version bump rule**: increment the patch segment of the version in `backend/main.py` and `frontend/package.json` after every plan that ships user-facing changes (e.g. `0.1.0` → `0.1.1`). Increment the minor segment after completing a full phase (e.g. `0.1.0` → `0.2.0`). Do not jump to `1.0.0` until the project owner explicitly signs off on a production-ready release.

---

## Git Protocol (Non-Negotiable)

After every major development step, save the work to the repository with an atomic commit and push. Do not accumulate multiple plan's changes into one commit — each plan gets its own commit.

### Commit sequence

```bash
# 1. Stage all changed files (be explicit — avoid -A when sensitive files may exist)
git add backend/ frontend/ AGENTS.md README.md RUNBOOK.md SECURITY.md docker-compose.yml

# 2. Commit with a descriptive message following this format:
#    <type>(<scope>): <short summary>
#    where type = feat | fix | docs | refactor | test | chore | security
git commit -m "feat(phase-N): short description of what was shipped"

# 3. Push to the remote repository immediately
git push origin main
```

### Commit types

| Type | When to use |
|------|-------------|
| `feat` | New user-facing feature or endpoint |
| `fix` | Bug fix (root-cause, ≤50 lines) |
| `docs` | AGENTS.md, README.md, RUNBOOK.md, or SECURITY.md only |
| `refactor` | Internal restructuring with no behaviour change |
| `test` | Adding or fixing tests only |
| `chore` | Dependencies, CI, build config |
| `security` | Security hardening, CVE fixes, auth changes |

### When to commit

| Event | Action |
|-------|--------|
| Plan execution complete (`/gsd:execute-phase`) | Commit + push immediately after tests pass |
| Documentation update (AGENTS.md / README.md) | Commit + push in the same operation as the code it documents |
| Bug fix during a phase | Commit the fix separately before continuing the plan |
| Security gate findings resolved | Commit + push before marking the phase complete |
| Version bump | Part of the plan's commit — not a separate commit |

### Commit message examples

```bash
git commit -m "feat(07-ai): GenericOpenAIProvider + Anthropic json_schema + Celery retry backoff"
git commit -m "fix(quota): atomic decrement on document delete — regression test added"
git commit -m "docs(readme): add cloud storage backend table + alpha status warning"
git commit -m "security(headers): add X-Correlation-ID + Referrer-Policy to SecurityHeadersMiddleware"
git commit -m "chore(deps): bump PyMuPDF to 1.26.7 — resolves read-only filesystem issue"
```

---

## Testing Protocol (Non-Negotiable)

Every feature, function, and bug fix requires tests. No phase or plan may advance until all tests pass.

### Rules

- **Coverage**: Every new function, endpoint, and UI component must have at least one test — unit for isolated logic, integration for DB/service boundaries, E2E for critical user flows
- **Gate**: `pytest -v` (backend) and frontend test suite must pass with zero failures before marking a plan complete or advancing to the next phase
- **Bug fixes**: Must fix the root cause, not work around it. Maximum 50 lines of changed code per fix. If a fix requires more, it is scope-creep and must be broken into a separate plan
- **No workarounds**: `# type: ignore`, `noqa`, skipping a test, or adding a `try/except` that silently swallows an error are prohibited as bug fixes
- **Regression**: Any time a bug is fixed, a test must be added that would have caught it

### Test types per layer

| Layer | Required test type |
|---|---|
| Service / business logic | Unit tests with mocked dependencies |
| DB queries / ORM | Integration tests against real PostgreSQL (not SQLite for quota/UUID tests) |
| API endpoints | `httpx.AsyncClient` integration tests with real DB fixtures |
| Auth flows | Full round-trip tests (register → login → TOTP → refresh → revoke) |
| Security invariants | Dedicated negative tests (wrong owner → 403/404, admin → 403, replay → 401) |
| Frontend | Vitest unit tests for stores/composables; Playwright or Cypress for critical flows |

---

## Security Protocol (Non-Negotiable)

A dedicated **security agent** runs after every plan execution and before any phase is marked complete. This agent has full read/write/edit access to the entire codebase and is the final gate before advancement.

### Security agent mandate

The security agent must check — and fix — every class of vulnerability listed below. It may not flag and defer; it must resolve or escalate blocking issues.

#### OWASP Top 10 + auth-specific

| Threat | Required mitigation |
|---|---|
| SQL injection | All queries via ORM or parameterized statements — zero raw string interpolation |
| XSS | CSP headers, `httpOnly` cookies, no `innerHTML` with user data, Vue template auto-escaping never bypassed |
| CSRF | `SameSite=Strict` cookie + `Origin`/`Referer` header validation on all state-changing endpoints |
| Broken auth | Short-lived JWT (≤15 min), refresh rotation, family revocation on reuse, constant-time comparison |
| IDOR / broken access control | Every resource endpoint asserts `resource.user_id == current_user.id`; admin blocked from document content |
| Security misconfiguration | No debug mode in production, no stack traces in API responses, no default credentials |
| Sensitive data exposure | Passwords hashed Argon2id, PII fields encrypted at rest, `credentials_enc` never in API responses |
| Insecure deserialization | No `pickle`, no `eval`, no dynamic `__import__`; all user-supplied data validated via Pydantic |
| Vulnerable dependencies | `pip audit` / `npm audit` run; critical/high CVEs blocked |
| Insufficient logging | All auth events, quota violations, and admin actions written to audit log without document content |

#### Advanced threats

- **Path traversal**: All file path construction uses `os.path.basename` / `pathlib` — never joins user-supplied strings directly
- **SSRF**: All outbound HTTP (HIBP, cloud OAuth) via an allowlisted client; user-supplied URLs for WebDAV/Nextcloud must pass hostname allowlist
- **Timing attacks**: `hmac.compare_digest` / `secrets.compare_digest` for all token, TOTP, and backup-code comparison — no `==`
- **Race conditions / TOCTOU**: Quota enforcement via single atomic `UPDATE … RETURNING` — never read-then-write in Python
- **Mass assignment**: Pydantic models explicitly declare every accepted field; no `**kwargs` passthrough from request body to ORM
- **Privilege escalation**: `get_regular_user` and `get_current_admin` deps checked on every endpoint; no role elevation path exists
- **Token replay**: JTI stored in DB; used TOTP codes invalidated within the 90 s window; refresh token family revocation on reuse

#### Zero-day / defense-in-depth

- **Minimal attack surface**: Every endpoint that is not needed is absent — no commented-out code, no `TODO: remove` endpoints left alive
- **Principle of least privilege**: `docuvault_app` DB role has DML only; `docuvault_migrate` has DDL; MinIO bucket policy denies public access
- **Secrets in env only**: No credentials, API keys, or signing secrets in code, commits, or `.env` files checked in; `.gitignore` enforces this
- **Dependency pinning**: `requirements.txt` and `package-lock.json` pin exact versions; no floating `>=` for security-critical packages (PyJWT, pwdlib, cryptography)
- **Container hardening**: Non-root user in Dockerfile, read-only filesystem where possible, no `--privileged` containers
- **Header hardening**: `X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff`, `X-Frame-Options: DENY`, `Referrer-Policy: strict-origin-when-cross-origin` on every response

### Database user table encryption

Sensitive user PII (email, display name) must be encrypted at the application layer before storage:

- Encryption: AES-256-GCM via `cryptography` library, per-row nonce, master key from env var
- Key derivation: HKDF-SHA256 with `purpose=b"user-pii"` salt — same pattern as cloud credentials
- Admin queries: never return plaintext PII for users other than the requesting user
- Indexing: email lookup uses a deterministic HMAC-SHA256 index (`email_hmac` column) — the encrypted column is never used for WHERE clauses

### Login token hardening (state of the art)

- **Algorithm**: ES256 (ECDSA P-256) — asymmetric; the private key signs, the public key verifies; a leaked public key cannot forge tokens
- **Access token TTL**: 15 minutes maximum
- **Refresh token**: 30-day httpOnly Strict cookie; rotated on every use; reuse of a rotated token revokes entire family and fires a security alert email
- **JTI claim**: Every token has a unique `jti`; revoked JTIs stored in Redis with TTL matching the token lifetime
- **Token binding**: Access token embeds a `fgp` (fingerprint) claim = HMAC of `User-Agent + Accept-Language`; backend validates on every request
- **Rotation on privilege change**: Password change, TOTP enroll/revoke, and account deactivation immediately revoke all active sessions

### Security gate checklist (must all pass before phase advances)

- [ ] `bandit -r backend/` — zero HIGH severity findings
- [ ] `pip audit` — zero critical/high CVEs
- [ ] `npm audit --audit-level=high` — zero high/critical vulnerabilities
- [ ] All security-invariant tests pass (wrong owner, admin block, token replay, CSRF)
- [ ] No new `# noqa: S` suppressions without a documented justification comment
- [ ] Admin endpoints verified to never return `password_hash`, `credentials_enc`, or document content
- [ ] No hardcoded secrets detected by `git secrets` / `trufflehog`

---

## Security Requirements (Non-Negotiable)

- Rate limiting on all auth endpoints (login, register, password reset, TOTP)
- Constant-time comparison for all token/code verification
- CSRF protection on all state-changing endpoints
- Content-Security-Policy headers on all responses
- HaveIBeenPwned API check on registration and password change
- TOTP replay prevention (mark used codes in DB within validity window)
- Refresh token family revocation on token reuse detection
- Admin impersonation is an explicit architectural exclusion — no endpoint or code path may exist
