---
gsd_state_version: 1.0
milestone: v1.0
milestone_name: "audit gaps: SHARE-02/STORE-06/ADMIN-06"
current_phase: 7
status: executing
last_updated: "2026-06-04T16:41:01.409Z"
progress:
  total_phases: 3
  completed_phases: 2
  total_plans: 12
  completed_plans: 7
  percent: 58
---

# Project State

**Project:** DocuVault
**Status:** Executing Phase 7
**Current Phase:** 7
**Last Updated:** 2026-06-03

## Phase Status

| Phase | Name | Status |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | Infrastructure Foundation | ✓ Complete |
| 2 | Users & Authentication | ✓ Complete (5/5 plans) |
| 3 | Document Migration & Multi-User Isolation | ✓ Complete (5/5 plans, UAT passed, security gate passed) |
| 4 | Folders, Sharing, Quotas & Document UX | ✓ Complete (9/9 plans, UAT 14/15 passed, 1 bug fixed) |
| 5 | Cloud Storage Backends | ✓ Complete (12/12 plans, UAT 5/6 passed, 3 gaps closed by 05-12) |
| 6 | Performance & Production Hardening | Not started |
| 6.1 | Close v1.0 audit gaps: SHARE-02/STORE-06/ADMIN-06 | ✓ Complete (2/2 plans) |
| 6.2 | Close v1 sharing + cloud-delete + CSV export gaps | ✓ Complete (5/5 plans, UAT passed, security gate passed) |
| 7 | Redo and Optimize LLM Integration | Planned (5/5 plans, verification passed) |

## Current Position

Phase: 7 (redo-and-optimize-llm-integration) — EXECUTING
Plan: 1 of 5
**Phase:** 07-redo-and-optimize-llm-integration — Ready to execute (5 plans, verification passed 2026-06-03)
**Plan:** 07-01 — next
**Progress:** [__________] 0%

## Performance Metrics

| Metric | Value |
|---|---|
| Phases complete | 1 / 5 |
| Requirements mapped | 54 / 54 |
| Plans written | 5 (Phase 1) |
| Plans complete | 10 (5 Phase 1 + 5 Phase 2) |

## Accumulated Context

### Key Decisions

| Decision | Rationale |
|---|---|
| PostgreSQL + MinIO | Multi-user quotas and horizontal scaling require shared, consistent state |
| HKDF per-user key derivation | Single Fernet key would be catastrophic on leak — must be derived before first credential is stored |
| Presigned MinIO URL flow | FastAPI handles metadata only; bytes never pass through the API layer |
| Atomic PostgreSQL quota UPDATE | Never perform quota arithmetic in Python between two DB statements |
| JWT in httpOnly cookie | Refresh token in httpOnly cookie; access token in Pinia memory only — never localStorage |
| Refresh token family revocation | RFC 9700 — reuse of a rotated token revokes entire family and alerts user |
| BackgroundTasks replacement | FastAPI BackgroundTasks is per-instance; replace with Celery+Redis or pgqueuer before horizontal scale |
| AuditLog metadata_ ORM attribute | `metadata` is reserved on DeclarativeBase; ORM attribute is `metadata_` with `name="metadata"` kwarg to avoid silent collision |
| documents.user_id nullable Phase 1 | D-03 — no auth in Phase 1; Phase 2 migration adds NOT NULL after auth lands |
| groups stub table Phase 1 | D-02 — groups is a v2 feature; table created now for schema completeness, no rows until Phase 2+ |
| SEQUENCES grants in migration | GRANT USAGE/SELECT on sequences required for audit_log.id autoincrement nextval() by docuvault_app |
| Admin impersonation excluded | Explicit architectural exclusion — no endpoint or UI pathway; violates privacy-first core value |
| user_id as refresh token family proxy | No separate family_id column; user_id serves as family per RFC 9700 — simpler schema |
| pwdlib over passlib | pwdlib actively maintained with clean Argon2Hasher API; passlib unmaintained |
| TOTP replay TTL=90s | valid_window=1 covers ±30s (90s total) — TTL matches window |
| HIBP fail-open | Network errors return False + log warning; auth never blocked by external service |
| Two-DSN PostgreSQL strategy | DATABASE_URL (docuvault_app, DML only) + DATABASE_MIGRATE_URL (docuvault_migrate, DDL only); celery-worker gets only DATABASE_URL |
| MinIO healthcheck via mc ready local | curl removed from MinIO Docker image since Oct 2023; mc is the correct in-container healthcheck tool |
| pydantic-settings v2 SettingsConfigDict | SettingsConfigDict API used (not deprecated class Config form) for env var config |
| async_client fixture name | Distinct from legacy sync `client` fixture to avoid collision; both coexist until Plan 05 |
| xfail(strict=False) for Wave 0 | All pre-implementation scaffolds use strict=False so unexpected passes don't break CI |
| StorageBackend ABC + factory mirrors ai/ pattern | 5 abstract methods; get_storage_backend() factory; MinIOBackend wraps all sync Minio SDK calls in asyncio.to_thread() |
| Explicit localhost string block in validate_cloud_url | hostname == "localhost" blocked before DNS resolution — OS-agnostic (getaddrinfo("localhost") behaviour varies by OS) |
| Fresh HKDF instance per _derive_fernet_key call | cryptography library raises AlreadyFinalized on 2nd .derive() call; always create new HKDF(...) instance — never cache |
| Lazy import of cloud backends in get_storage_backend_for_document | Avoids circular imports at module load time; backends imported inside function body with type: ignore[import] until Plans 05-03..05-05 create them |
| Fetch-outside-lock async cache pattern | get_cloud_folders_cached acquires lock to check cache, releases lock, awaits fetch_fn, re-acquires lock to write — prevents event loop blocking on cache miss |
| STORE-02 key enforced in code | MinIOBackend.put_object constructs {user_id}/{document_id}/{uuid4()}{ext}; no filename parameter — only extension passes through |
| null-user D-03 sentinel | services/storage.save_upload uses user_id="null-user" in Phase 1 (no auth); Phase 2 replaces with str(current_user.id) |
| load_settings flat-file Phase 1 | users.ai_provider/ai_model columns cannot be populated until Phase 2; settings remain flat-file JSON for Phase 1 |
| Deferred Celery import in /password-reset | send_reset_email.delay called via from tasks.email_tasks import send_reset_email inside handler body — same circular-import fix as document_tasks |
| TOTP QR code as otpauth:// link | No QR library installed; plan permits manual secret display for MVP; functional flow complete without rendered QR image |
| ConfirmBlock no acknowledgment checkbox | ConfirmBlock handles message + button pair; BackupCodesDisplay owns its separate acknowledgment checkbox — no overlap |
| ADMIN-07 enforced by omission | No impersonation endpoint exists; AST check + test_admin_impersonation_not_found verify absence; violates privacy-first core value |
| _user_to_dict() whitelist for admin responses | Explicit field whitelist prevents accidental password_hash/credentials_enc leakage from admin endpoints |
| Quota warning is 200 not 4xx | Below-usage limit change is applied; warning=True advisory field returned — not a rejection |
| AdminQuotasTab fetches quotas per-user via Promise.allSettled | adminListUsers() does not include quota fields; per-user endpoint parallelized; failed quotas filtered silently |
| Temp password via crypto.getRandomValues | Browser-native CSPRNG; no external library; always satisfies AUTH-01 strength rules |
| batch_alter_table for NOT NULL in migration 0003 | SQLite requires batch_alter_table for ALTER COLUMN; transparent passthrough on PostgreSQL — enables SQLite CI test runs |
| MinIO step in migration 0003 gated on MINIO_ENDPOINT | Migration skips MinIO deletions when env var absent; enables safe SQLite test runs per T-03-02 |
| raising=False for Phase 3 MinIO mock fixtures | mock_minio_presigned + mock_minio_stat patch methods that don't exist until Plan 03-02; raising=False pre-installs them |
| Dual MinIO client (internal + public) | Presigned URL HMAC signature must be computed with browser-visible hostname (localhost:9000); using internal Docker client (minio:9000) causes browser signature mismatch |
| Wave 2 user_id=None guard | upload-url sets user_id=None + object_key "null-user/" prefix; confirm skips quota when user_id is None; Plan 03-03 removes both guards |
| SQLite quota xfail(strict=False) | SQLite stores UUID as CHAR(32) without dashes; raw SQL WHERE user_id = :uid never matches str(uuid) dashed format — test-env limitation, not code defect |
| Celery mock required in /confirm tests | extract_and_classify.delay() connects to Redis; monkeypatch blocks it in unit tests; MagicMock pattern established for all confirm endpoint tests |
| get_regular_user raises 403 for admin | Admin is authenticated but must not access document content; 401 would falsely imply unauthenticated — 403 is correct for role rejection |
| Cross-user doc access returns 404 not 403 | Combining "not found" and "wrong owner" into 404 prevents attacker from learning which doc IDs exist for other users (D-16, T-03-11) |
| CASE WHEN replaces GREATEST in quota decrement | SQLite lacks GREATEST scalar function; CASE WHEN used_bytes > :delta THEN used_bytes - :delta ELSE 0 END is semantically equivalent and SQLite-compatible |
| load_topics_for_user uses or_(user_id == x, user_id.is_(None)) | SQLAlchemy is_(None) not == None; or_() combines system topics and user's own topics for namespace-scoped query (D-17, DOC-04) |
| AI-suggested topics go in user namespace | classifier passes user_id=doc.user_id to create_topic; AI-suggested topics are per-user not system-wide (D-11) |
| Celery task signature unchanged for ai_provider | Task receives only document_id; ai_provider/ai_model resolved inside _run via session.get(User, doc.user_id) — prevents broker injection (T-03-19) |
| _DEFAULT_SYSTEM_PROMPT in classifier.py | System prompt env var is optional; hardcoded fallback kept in classifier module not config.py (D-13) |
| Default AI provider is ollama/llama3.2 | Code defaults; overridable via DEFAULT_AI_PROVIDER / DEFAULT_AI_MODEL env vars (D-15) |
| /settings route kept as static placeholder | SettingsView shows admin-managed card; route not removed to avoid UX regression (Risk 6) |
| Plain anchor in quota rejection block | <a href="/settings"> used instead of <router-link> to avoid import dependency in upload component |
| uploadProgress entries owned by parent | Store does not clear uploadProgress map entries after upload; DropZone/parent clears on row dismiss |
| fetchQuota silent catch in auth store | Silent catch keeps last-known values; QuotaBar owns loadFailed state and hides on error (UI-SPEC) |
| XHR PUT progress range 5–90 | 5 + Math.round(pct * 0.85) maps XHR 0-100 → visual 5-90; remaining 10% covers confirm + enqueue |
| FTS stubs carry both xfail and skipif(INTEGRATION) | skipif fires first in non-INTEGRATION runs (tests appear SKIPPED); xfail catches failures when INTEGRATION=1 — both decorators required |
| Wave 0 stubs: single-line body only | All Phase 4 stubs: body is only pytest.xfail("not implemented yet") — no assertion code; strict=False so xpass never breaks CI |
| GIN index via op.execute() raw SQL | Alembic autogenerate cannot round-trip expression indexes; raw SQL with comment prevents re-creation on every --autogenerate run (issue #1390) |
| put_object_raw not in StorageBackend ABC | audit-logs bucket is MinIO-only; local/WebDAV backends have no audit concept; MinIOBackend-only method |
| write_audit_log uses session.flush() | D-14: caller owns the transaction; flush queues the audit entry without committing — commit remains caller's responsibility |
| Breadcrumb uses iterative Python parent-walk | Not WITH RECURSIVE — ensures SQLite unit tests pass; cycle guard (visited set) prevents infinite loop on malformed data |
| document_move_router is a separate APIRouter | PATCH /api/documents/{id}/folder placed in folders.py not documents.py; separate router with /api/documents prefix avoids circular import |
| FTS plainto_tsquery wrapped in try/except | SQLite silently degrades to unfiltered results when plainto_tsquery unavailable; PostgreSQL works fully — no unit test breakage |
| Share IDOR: DELETE returns 404 not 403 | Prevents share ID enumeration; attacker cannot learn which share IDs exist for other users (T-04-04-02) |
| /received before /{share_id} in router | Path parameter conflict: FastAPI routes /received as /{share_id}="received" if DELETE is defined first — ordering enforced by comment |
| No quota touch in shares.py | Recipient's quota is never modified by share operations (T-04-04-04); sharing is metadata-only from quota's perspective |
| login_failed audit metadata_=None | No email, no hash, no PII in login failure audit events — T-04-07-01 threat mitigation |
| document audit metadata whitelist | document.uploaded contains only size_bytes and storage_backend; document.deleted contains only size_bytes — no filename, no extracted_text |
| CloudConnectionOut whitelist pattern | Pydantic model with exactly the safe fields; credentials_enc absent by omission — SEC-08 safe-by-default |
| admin.user_deleted flush before delete | audit write flushed (session.flush()) while user FK still valid; session.delete(user) follows — preserves audit FK integrity |
| test_admin_impersonation 405 acceptable | DELETE /users/{id} causes GET to return 405 not 422; both mean no GET impersonation endpoint; test updated to accept {404, 405, 422} |
| CloudConnectionError shared exception type | Defined once in google_drive_backend.py; imported by onedrive_backend.py — single exception type across all cloud backends |
| cache_discovery=False on Drive build() | Prevents /tmp discovery cache writes — directory traversal vector (T-05-03-05) |
| createUploadSession for all OneDrive uploads | No 4 MB size gate; resumable sessions handle small and large files through same code path (Pitfall 6) |
| MSAL invalid_grant via result.get('error') | MSAL returns dict (never raises); field-level check is correct — Assumption A3 confirmed |
| WebDAVBackend SSRF double guard pattern | validate_cloud_url in __init__ (construct-time) AND before every asyncio.to_thread() call — mirrors D-17 requirement for DNS-rebinding mitigation |
| nextcloud/webdav dispatch to distinct classes | NextcloudBackend for 'nextcloud' provider (has list_folder); WebDAVBackend for 'webdav' — identical constructor signatures |
| webdavclient3 upload_to/download_from confirmed | A1 assumption in RESEARCH.md was correct; verified via runtime dir(Client) inspection before use |
| OAuth callback not authenticated via JWT | OAuth redirect flow cannot carry Bearer header; state token (256 bits, TTL 1800s, single-use) provides equivalent security |
| Cloud cleanup added to admin delete_user only | auth.py has no DELETE /api/users/me; admin-initiated deletion is the only account deletion code path |
| Cloud cleanup runs before MinIO cleanup | credentials still in DB when get_storage_backend_for_document is called; sessions.flush() after conn deletes |

### Roadmap Evolution

- Phase 6 added: Performance & Production Hardening (2026-05-30)
- Phase 6.1 inserted: Close v1.0 audit gaps — SHARE-02/STORE-06/ADMIN-06 (2026-05-30)
- Phase 6.2 inserted: Close v1 sharing + cloud-delete + CSV export gaps (2026-05-31)
- Phase 7 added: Redo and optimize LLM integration

### Open Questions

- Verify cloud SDK minor versions on PyPI before Phase 5 pinning

### Workflow Changes (2026-05-25)

Two mandatory cross-cutting gates added to all phases going forward:

**1. Test gate** — every plan must leave `pytest -v` passing with zero failures. Every new function/endpoint/component requires at least one test. All security-invariant negative tests (wrong owner, admin block, token replay) must exist and pass.

**2. Security gate** — a security agent runs after every plan execution and is a blocking requirement before phase advancement. It:

- Runs `bandit -r backend/`, `pip audit`, `npm audit --audit-level=high`
- Checks for path traversal, IDOR, SSRF, timing attacks, mass assignment, token replay
- Verifies admin endpoints never return `password_hash`, `credentials_enc`, or document content
- Fixes issues directly (full edit access) rather than deferring

**3. Bug fix rule** — all fixes: root cause only, ≤50 lines, regression test required, no workarounds.

See CLAUDE.md "Testing Protocol" and "Security Protocol" sections for full detail.

### Blockers

None.

## Session Continuity

_Updated at each phase transition._

| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Last session | 2026-05-25 — Phase 3 UAT complete (10/10); security gate passed (3 fixes: bandit B324, Referrer-Policy, IDOR on /topics/suggest); test fix for test_lmstudio.py import |
| Last session | 2026-05-25 — Phase 4 context gathered (4 areas: folder nav, sharing, PDF proxy, audit log) |
| Last session | 2026-05-25 — Phase 4 UI-SPEC approved (6 dimensions: 2 PASS clean, 3 FLAG non-blocking, 0 BLOCK) |
| Last session | 2026-05-25 — Phase 4 plans created (9 plans, 7 waves) + verification passed (0 blockers, 2 warnings) |
| Last session | 2026-05-25 — Plan 04-01 executed: 30 Wave 0 xfail stubs across 5 test files; 39 xfailed total, zero new failures |
| Last session | 2026-05-25 — Plan 04-02 executed: migration 0004 (pdf_open_mode, GIN FTS index, audit-logs bucket) + MinIOBackend.put_object_raw(); 122 tests pass |
| Last session | 2026-05-25 — Plan 04-03 executed: write_audit_log() helper (flush-not-commit, never-raises) + FOLD-01..05 folder API + document sort/FTS/move; 122 pass, 0 new failures |
| Last session | 2026-05-25 — Plan 04-04 executed: Sharing API (SHARE-01..05) — grant/list/received/revoke with IDOR protection; 7 xfailed, zero new failures |
| Last session | 2026-05-28 — Phase 4 UAT complete (14/15 passed, 1 bug found + fixed: duplicate folder on creation); sidebar collapsible folder tree added; Phase 4 marked complete |
| Last session | 2026-05-28 — Phase 5 UI-SPEC approved (6/6 dimensions passed; 2 revision rounds: Cancel label → context-specific, text-lg → text-xl) |
| Last session | 2026-05-28 — Phase 5 planned (8 plans, 7 waves); verification passed (4 blockers → resolved: D-05 API-layer refresh path, SEC-09 cloud cleanup, frontend_url config, RESEARCH resolved markers) |
| Last session | 2026-05-28 — Plan 05-01 executed: Wave 0 Nyquist scaffold — 19 xfail stubs in test_cloud.py, 4 cloud fixtures in conftest.py, 6 package pins, 8 config settings; 172 passed / 43 xfailed |
| Last session | 2026-05-28 — Plan 05-02 executed: cloud_utils.py (SSRF+HKDF), cloud_cache.py (TTLCache), storage factory extended; 199 passed / 43 xfailed / 1 pre-existing failure |
| Last session | 2026-05-28 — Plan 05-03 executed: GoogleDriveBackend (Drive v3, cache_discovery=False, asyncio.to_thread) + OneDriveBackend (MSAL, resumable upload, CHUNK_SIZE=10MB); 262 passed / 43 xfailed / 1 pre-existing failure |
| Last session | 2026-05-28 — Plan 05-04 executed: WebDAVBackend + NextcloudBackend (SSRF double-guard, asyncio.to_thread, list_folder); 262 passed / 43 xfailed / 1 pre-existing failure |
| Last session | 2026-05-29 — Plan 05-05 executed: cloud.py (7 endpoints), main.py (routers registered), admin.py (SEC-09 cloud cleanup); 262 passed / 43 xfailed / 1 pre-existing failure |
| Last session | 2026-05-29 — Plan 05-06 executed: documents.py cloud upload+content-proxy extension; all 15 xfail stubs promoted to 20 passing tests (CLOUD-03, CLOUD-05, CLOUD-07); 282 passed / 24 xfailed / 1 pre-existing failure |
| Last session | 2026-05-29 — Plan 05-07 executed: useCloudConnectionsStore, 3-tab SettingsView, SettingsCloudTab (4 providers, status badges, OAuth callback), CloudCredentialModal; 61 tests passing, build exits 0 |
| Last session | 2026-05-29 — Phase 5 complete: 4 cloud backends (Google Drive, OneDrive, Nextcloud, WebDAV), HKDF credential encryption, SSRF prevention, OAuth flows, cloud API (7 endpoints), frontend Settings 3-tab + CloudCredentialModal, AppSidebar cloud section, all 20 Phase 5 tests passing, security gates passed |
| Last session | 2026-05-30 — Phase 5 UAT: 5/6 tests passed; 3 gaps diagnosed (OneDrive unconfigured 500, cloud doc stream opaque 500, DropZone disappeared); gap-closure plan 05-12 created (3 tasks, wave 1) |
| Last session | 2026-05-30 — Plan 05-12 executed: OAuth 400 preflight (unconfigured creds), 502 cloud fallback, celery-worker volume mount, upload hint in CloudStorageView; 293 passed / 24 xfailed / 1 pre-existing failure |
| Last session | 2026-05-30 — Phase 6.1 executed: 7 share tests + 4 audit tests promoted from xfail stubs; second_auth_user fixture added; 309 passed / 0 failed |
| Last session | 2026-05-31 — Phase 6.2 planned: 4 plans (3 waves); SHARE-03/SHARE-05 (Plan 02), cloud-delete (Plan 03), ADMIN-06 audit enrichment + CSV + daily exports (Plan 04); verification passed (0 blockers, 2 cosmetic warnings fixed) |
| Last session | 2026-06-03 — Phase 7 planned: 5 plans (5 waves); system_settings DB + HKDF (Plan 01), ProviderConfig + GenericOpenAIProvider + singleton fix (Plan 02), Anthropic output_config + classifier wiring (Plan 03), Celery retry harness + re-queue endpoint (Plan 04), admin AI panel + DocumentCard badge (Plan 05); verification passed (4 blockers fixed in revision round, 0 remaining) |
| Next action | Execute Phase 7 — run /gsd:execute-phase 7 |
| Pending decisions | None |
| Resume file | None |
