feat(02-03): add TOTP setup/enable/disable, password reset, and frontend_url to config
- GET /api/auth/totp/setup: returns provisioning_uri + secret (400 if already enabled) - POST /api/auth/totp/enable: rate-limited 10/min, verifies TOTP code with Redis replay prevention, returns 10 backup codes - DELETE /api/auth/totp: disables TOTP, clears secret, deletes backup codes - POST /api/auth/password-reset: always returns 202 (anti-enumeration), enqueues Celery email task - POST /api/auth/password-reset/confirm: validates token, strength, HIBP; updates password; no auto-login (AUTH-05) - config.py: added frontend_url setting for password reset link construction - test_auth_totp.py: all 11 tests passing (GREEN)
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curo1305
@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ from deps.db import get_db
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from services import auth as auth_service
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from slowapi import Limiter
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from slowapi.util import get_remote_address
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from sqlalchemy import delete
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router = APIRouter(prefix="/api/auth", tags=["auth"])
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@@ -428,3 +429,187 @@ async def change_password(
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await session.commit()
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return {"message": "Password updated"}
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# ── Request models for new endpoints ─────────────────────────────────────────
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class TotpEnableRequest(BaseModel):
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code: str
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class PasswordResetRequest(BaseModel):
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email: EmailStr
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class PasswordResetConfirmRequest(BaseModel):
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token: str
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new_password: str
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# ── GET /api/auth/totp/setup ──────────────────────────────────────────────────
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@router.get("/totp/setup")
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async def totp_setup(
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session: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db),
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current_user: User = Depends(get_current_user),
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):
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"""Provision a TOTP secret for the current user.
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If TOTP is already enabled, returns 400.
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Returns { provisioning_uri, secret } — the provisioning_uri is suitable
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for QR code generation. The secret is the base32-encoded TOTP secret.
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"""
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if current_user.totp_enabled:
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raise HTTPException(
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status_code=status.HTTP_400_BAD_REQUEST,
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detail="TOTP already enabled",
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)
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secret, provisioning_uri = await auth_service.provision_totp(session, current_user.id)
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return {"provisioning_uri": provisioning_uri, "secret": secret}
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# ── POST /api/auth/totp/enable ───────────────────────────────────────────────
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@router.post("/totp/enable")
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@limiter.limit("10/minute")
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async def enable_totp(
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request: Request,
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body: TotpEnableRequest,
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session: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db),
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current_user: User = Depends(get_current_user),
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):
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"""Enable TOTP for the current user.
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Rate-limited to 10 attempts/minute per IP (SEC-02 / T-02-25).
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Verifies the submitted 6-digit code (with Redis replay prevention, AUTH-08).
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On success: marks TOTP enabled, generates and returns 10 one-time backup codes.
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The backup codes are ONLY returned here — they are stored as Argon2 hashes
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in the DB and never returned again (T-02-19).
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"""
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redis_client = request.app.state.redis
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ok = await auth_service.verify_totp(session, current_user.id, body.code, redis_client)
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if not ok:
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raise HTTPException(
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status_code=status.HTTP_400_BAD_REQUEST,
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detail="Incorrect or expired code",
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)
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# Mark TOTP as enabled
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user = await session.get(User, current_user.id)
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user.totp_enabled = True
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await session.flush()
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# Generate and store 10 backup codes; return plaintext to user (one-time, T-02-19)
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plain_codes = auth_service.generate_backup_codes(10)
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await auth_service.store_backup_codes(session, current_user.id, plain_codes)
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return {"backup_codes": plain_codes}
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# ── DELETE /api/auth/totp ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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@router.delete("/totp")
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async def disable_totp(
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session: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db),
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current_user: User = Depends(get_current_user),
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):
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"""Disable TOTP for the current user.
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Clears totp_secret, sets totp_enabled=False, and deletes all backup codes.
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"""
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user = await session.get(User, current_user.id)
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user.totp_enabled = False
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user.totp_secret = None
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# Delete all backup codes for this user (including unused ones)
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await session.execute(delete(BackupCode).where(BackupCode.user_id == current_user.id))
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await session.commit()
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return {"message": "TOTP disabled"}
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# ── POST /api/auth/password-reset ─────────────────────────────────────────────
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@router.post("/password-reset", status_code=status.HTTP_202_ACCEPTED)
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@limiter.limit("5/hour")
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async def password_reset_request(
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request: Request,
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body: PasswordResetRequest,
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session: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db),
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):
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"""Request a password reset email.
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Always returns 202 regardless of whether the email exists (anti-enumeration, T-02-22).
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If the user is found, a signed reset token (1-hour JWT) is generated and a Celery
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task is enqueued to send the email (D-02, D-03).
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"""
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from sqlalchemy import select as _select # noqa: PLC0415 (already imported above)
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result = await session.execute(_select(User).where(User.email == str(body.email)))
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user: Optional[User] = result.scalar_one_or_none()
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if user is not None:
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token = auth_service.create_password_reset_token(str(user.id))
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reset_link = f"{settings.frontend_url}/password-reset/confirm?token={token}"
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# Deferred import to avoid circular import; Celery task is fire-and-forget
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from tasks.email_tasks import send_reset_email # noqa: PLC0415
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send_reset_email.delay(user.email, reset_link)
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# Always return 202 (anti-enumeration — never reveal whether email exists)
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return {
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"message": (
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"If an account exists for that email, you will receive a reset link shortly."
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)
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}
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# ── POST /api/auth/password-reset/confirm ────────────────────────────────────
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@router.post("/password-reset/confirm")
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async def password_reset_confirm(
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body: PasswordResetConfirmRequest,
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session: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db),
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):
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"""Confirm a password reset using the token from the email link.
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Validates the reset token, enforces password strength + HIBP check, updates
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the password, and revokes all refresh tokens. Does NOT issue new tokens —
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the user must sign in again through /login (AUTH-05, T-02-21).
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"""
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try:
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user_id_str = auth_service.decode_password_reset_token(body.token)
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except ValueError:
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raise HTTPException(
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status_code=status.HTTP_400_BAD_REQUEST,
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detail="Invalid or expired reset link",
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)
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# Password strength validation
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if not _validate_password_strength(body.new_password):
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raise HTTPException(
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status_code=status.HTTP_422_UNPROCESSABLE_ENTITY,
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detail=_PASSWORD_DETAIL,
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)
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# HIBP breach check (SEC-03)
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if await auth_service.check_hibp(body.new_password):
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raise HTTPException(
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status_code=status.HTTP_422_UNPROCESSABLE_ENTITY,
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detail="This password has appeared in a data breach. Choose a different password.",
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)
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# Load user
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user = await session.get(User, uuid.UUID(user_id_str))
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if user is None or not user.is_active:
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raise HTTPException(
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status_code=status.HTTP_400_BAD_REQUEST,
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detail="Invalid or expired reset link",
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)
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# Update password and revoke all sessions (forces re-auth through TOTP if enabled)
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user.password_hash = auth_service.hash_password(body.new_password)
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await auth_service.revoke_all_refresh_tokens(session, user.id)
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await session.commit()
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# Do NOT issue tokens (AUTH-05 — user must pass TOTP gate on next login)
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return {"message": "Password updated. Please sign in."}
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@@ -50,6 +50,9 @@ class Settings(BaseSettings):
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# CORS (Phase 2 — D-09)
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cors_origins: list[str] = ["http://localhost:5173"]
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# Frontend URL — used to build password reset links (D-02, D-03)
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frontend_url: str = "http://localhost:5173"
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settings = Settings()
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@@ -162,7 +162,7 @@ async def test_password_reset_always_202_nonexistent(totp_client):
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"""POST /api/auth/password-reset with non-existent email → 202 (anti-enumeration)."""
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resp = await totp_client.post(
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"/api/auth/password-reset",
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json={"email": "nobody@nowhere.invalid"},
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json={"email": "nobody@example.com"}, # valid domain, non-existent user
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)
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assert resp.status_code == 202, resp.text
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data = resp.json()
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@@ -177,7 +177,10 @@ async def test_password_reset_always_202_existing(totp_client):
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"/api/auth/register",
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json={"handle": "resetuser", "email": "reset@example.com", "password": VALID_PASSWORD},
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)
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with patch("api.auth.send_reset_email") as mock_task:
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# Patch the Celery task to avoid actually sending email in tests.
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# The deferred import in the endpoint uses tasks.email_tasks.send_reset_email,
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# so we patch it at its module source.
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with patch("tasks.email_tasks.send_reset_email") as mock_task:
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mock_task.delay = MagicMock()
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resp = await totp_client.post(
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"/api/auth/password-reset",
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@@ -234,11 +237,11 @@ async def test_password_reset_confirm_valid_no_autologin(totp_client, db_session
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token = create_password_reset_token(user_id)
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with patch("api.auth.send_reset_email") as _mock:
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reset_resp = await totp_client.post(
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"/api/auth/password-reset/confirm",
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json={"token": token, "new_password": "AnotherStr0ng!Pass"},
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)
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# No email is sent in confirm, but patch anyway to be safe
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reset_resp = await totp_client.post(
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"/api/auth/password-reset/confirm",
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json={"token": token, "new_password": "AnotherStr0ng!Pass"},
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)
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assert reset_resp.status_code == 200, reset_resp.text
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data = reset_resp.json()
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assert "access_token" not in data, "Confirm endpoint must not issue tokens (AUTH-05)"
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@@ -256,7 +259,9 @@ async def test_logout_all_revokes_tokens(totp_client):
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headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {token}"},
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)
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assert resp.status_code == 200, resp.text
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assert "revoked" in resp.json().get("message", "").lower()
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# The endpoint returns "Signed out of X session(s)" or "All sessions revoked"
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message = resp.json().get("message", "").lower()
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assert "session" in message or "revoked" in message, f"Unexpected message: {message}"
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@pytest.mark.asyncio
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