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+---
+phase: "06.2"
+audited_at: "2026-05-31"
+asvs_level: L1
+threats_total: 16
+threats_closed: 16
+threats_open: 0
+result: SECURED
+---
+
+# Security Audit — Phase 06.2
+## close-v1-sharing-cloud-delete-csv-export-gaps
+
+**Auditor:** gsd-security-auditor  
+**ASVS Level:** L1  
+**block_on:** HIGH  
+**Threats Closed:** 16 / 16  
+**Result: SECURED**
+
+---
+
+## Threat Verification
+
+| Threat ID | Category | Disposition | Status | Evidence |
+|-----------|----------|-------------|--------|----------|
+| T-06.2-01-01 | Tampering | accept | CLOSED | All three xfail stubs promoted to real tests in Plans 02–04; no stub logic leaked into production code paths. Acceptance rationale sound: stub-only plan cannot add attack surface. |
+| T-06.2-02-01 | Elevation of Privilege | mitigate | CLOSED | `backend/api/shares.py:264` — `if share is None or share.owner_id != current_user.id: raise HTTPException(status_code=404, ...)` in `update_share_permission`. Returns 404, not 403, preventing share ID enumeration. Pattern mirrors `revoke_share` at line 295. |
+| T-06.2-02-02 | Tampering | mitigate | CLOSED | `backend/api/shares.py:54–58` — `SharePermissionPatch.validate_permission` field_validator enforces `v not in {"view", "edit"} → ValueError`. No arbitrary string can pass through to the ORM. |
+| T-06.2-02-03 | Tampering | mitigate | CLOSED | `backend/api/shares.py:43–48` — `ShareCreate.validate_permission` applies the same `{"view", "edit"}` allowlist. Default `"view"` is server-enforced via Pydantic default; client cannot inject other values. |
+| T-06.2-02-SC | Tampering | accept | CLOSED | Plan 02 SUMMARY confirms no new npm/pip packages installed. Acceptance rationale sound. |
+| T-06.2-03-01 | Tampering | mitigate | CLOSED | `backend/api/documents.py:654` — `ok = await storage.delete_document(session, doc_id, skip_quota=is_cloud)` where `is_cloud = doc.storage_backend != "minio"`. `backend/services/storage.py:167` — `if not skip_quota:` gates the quota decrement block. Cloud doc deletes never underflow quota. |
+| T-06.2-03-02 | Information Disclosure | mitigate | CLOSED | `backend/api/documents.py:642–652` — `except Exception as exc:` catches the provider error; `print(f"[cloud-delete] provider error: {exc}", file=sys.stderr)` logs to stderr only; JSON response body contains only the fixed string `"Cloud provider delete failed. You can remove from app only."` — `str(exc)` is never serialised into the response. |
+| T-06.2-03-03 | Elevation of Privilege | accept | CLOSED | `backend/api/documents.py:629` — `if doc is None or doc.user_id != current_user.id: raise HTTPException(404, ...)` executes before the `remove_only` branch at line 637–638. Ownership is always asserted regardless of query param value. Acceptance rationale sound. |
+| T-06.2-03-04 | Spoofing | mitigate | CLOSED | `backend/api/documents.py:638–641` — `if is_cloud and not remove_only:` block calls `get_storage_backend_for_document(doc, current_user, session)` which returns the cloud backend; `storage.delete_document()` is only reached after cloud routing is complete (or after `remove_only=true` skips the cloud call). MinIO is never called for cloud docs. |
+| T-06.2-03-SC | Tampering | accept | CLOSED | Plan 03 SUMMARY confirms no new npm/pip packages installed. Acceptance rationale sound. |
+| T-06.2-04-01 | Tampering | mitigate | CLOSED | `backend/api/audit.py:216` — `if not re.fullmatch(r"\d{4}-\d{2}-\d{2}", date): raise HTTPException(status_code=404, ...)` executes before `key = f"audit-logs/{date}.csv"` at line 220. Any non-date string (including path traversal sequences) is rejected with 404. |
+| T-06.2-04-02 | Elevation of Privilege | mitigate | CLOSED | `backend/api/audit.py:170` — `list_daily_exports` uses `_admin: User = Depends(get_current_admin)`; line 205 — `download_daily_export` uses the same dependency. Both new endpoints require admin authentication. Regular users receive 403; unauthenticated requests receive 401. |
+| T-06.2-04-03 | Information Disclosure | mitigate | CLOSED | `frontend/src/api/client.js:398–427` — `adminExportAuditLogCsv()` uses `fetch()` with `Authorization: Bearer ${authStore.accessToken}` header and `res.text()` → Blob → `<a>.click()` pattern. `window.location.href` is absent from `frontend/src/components/admin/AuditLogTab.vue` (confirmed: no match). |
+| T-06.2-04-04 | Information Disclosure | accept | CLOSED | User handles are already public within the platform (visible in sharing UI). Admin view of handles is consistent with existing admin privileges. Acceptance rationale sound; no mitigation code is required or expected. |
+| T-06.2-04-05 | Denial of Service | mitigate | CLOSED | `backend/api/audit.py:198` — `items = await asyncio.to_thread(_list)` wraps the synchronous `list_objects()` iterator for `list_daily_exports`; line 231 — `csv_bytes = await asyncio.to_thread(_get)` wraps `get_object()` for `download_daily_export`. Both synchronous MinIO SDK calls are offloaded from the async event loop. |
+| T-06.2-04-SC | Tampering | accept | CLOSED | Plan 04 SUMMARY confirms no new npm/pip packages installed. Acceptance rationale sound. |
+
+---
+
+## Accepted Risk Log
+
+The following threats are accepted per plan-time decisions. No mitigation code is present or required.
+
+| Threat ID | Rationale |
+|-----------|-----------|
+| T-06.2-01-01 | Wave 0 stub plan cannot introduce production attack surface; stubs contain only `pytest.xfail()` calls and were verified to be fully promoted (no stubs remain) by Plans 02–04. |
+| T-06.2-02-SC | No new packages installed in Plan 02. Supply-chain risk unchanged from baseline. |
+| T-06.2-03-03 | Ownership check at `documents.py:629` unconditionally precedes the `remove_only` branch — privilege escalation via the query param is structurally impossible. |
+| T-06.2-03-SC | No new packages installed in Plan 03. Supply-chain risk unchanged from baseline. |
+| T-06.2-04-04 | User handles are public within the platform. Admin audit access to handles is consistent with the broader admin privilege model already in place. |
+| T-06.2-04-SC | No new packages installed in Plan 04. Supply-chain risk unchanged from baseline. |
+
+---
+
+## Unregistered Flags
+
+None. No `## Threat Flags` sections were present in any of the four SUMMARY.md files. No new attack surface was flagged by executors during implementation.
+
+---
+
+## Verification Commands Run
+
+```
+grep -n "share.owner_id != current_user.id" backend/api/shares.py
+# → lines 264, 295 (update_share_permission + revoke_share — both entry points covered)
+
+grep -n "field_validator" backend/api/shares.py
+# → lines 43, 54 (both ShareCreate and SharePermissionPatch)
+
+grep -n "skip_quota" backend/services/storage.py
+# → lines 143, 150, 167 (signature, docstring, guard)
+
+grep -n "cloud_delete_failed\|sys.stderr" backend/api/documents.py
+# → lines 644, 649 (stderr log, fixed-string response)
+
+grep -n "re.fullmatch" backend/api/audit.py
+# → line 216
+
+grep -n "get_current_admin" backend/api/audit.py
+# → lines 170, 205 (both new daily-export endpoints)
+
+grep -n "asyncio.to_thread" backend/api/audit.py
+# → lines 198, 231
+
+grep -n "adminExportAuditLogCsv\|adminListDailyExports\|adminDownloadDailyExport" frontend/src/api/client.js
+# → lines 398, 435, 460
+
+grep "window.location.href" frontend/src/components/admin/AuditLogTab.vue
+# → (no output — absent)
+```