From b8e0e3adec1064100ce23a3f44bcc59d63a1abf8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: curo1305 <curo1305@proton.me>
Date: Sat, 6 Jun 2026 11:47:59 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] =?UTF-8?q?test(07.2):=20complete=20automated=20UAT=20?=
 =?UTF-8?q?=E2=80=94=207/7=20pass?=
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All Phase 7.2 behaviors verified end-to-end against the running app:
- JTI UUID claim present in every issued access token
- Token rejected (Session invalidated) after password change
- Refresh cookie survives password change (skip_token_hash)
- Token rejected after enable-TOTP and disable-TOTP
- Token rejected after admin deactivation
- Reactivation does NOT write user_nbf (no spurious revocation)

Findings recorded in UAT.md:
- Workers must be restarted after Phase 7.2 deploy (--workers 2 does not hot-reload)
- D-02 same-second edge case confirmed benign in real usage
- Deactivation fires is_active check before user_nbf in same-second scenarios (belt-and-suspenders)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
---
 .../07.2-UAT.md                               | 74 +++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 74 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 .planning/phases/07.2-security-jti-claim-redis-access-token-revocation-inserted/07.2-UAT.md

diff --git a/.planning/phases/07.2-security-jti-claim-redis-access-token-revocation-inserted/07.2-UAT.md b/.planning/phases/07.2-security-jti-claim-redis-access-token-revocation-inserted/07.2-UAT.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ea49803
--- /dev/null
+++ b/.planning/phases/07.2-security-jti-claim-redis-access-token-revocation-inserted/07.2-UAT.md
@@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
+---
+status: complete
+phase: 07.2-security-jti-claim-redis-access-token-revocation-inserted
+source: 07.2-01-SUMMARY.md, 07.2-02-SUMMARY.md, 07.2-03-SUMMARY.md
+started: 2026-06-06T09:40:00Z
+updated: 2026-06-06T11:50:00Z
+---
+
+## Current Test
+
+[testing complete]
+
+## Tests
+
+### 1. JTI claim present and is a valid UUID
+expected: Decoded JWT payload contains a "jti" key with a valid UUID string (e.g. "522fe72f-c86d-43bd-8a8f-ae47f577d37d").
+result: pass
+
+### 2. Old token rejected after password change
+expected: Token issued before a password change returns HTTP 401 "Session invalidated" on the next request.
+result: pass
+
+### 3. Refresh cookie issues new working token after password change
+expected: The refresh cookie (kept alive via skip_token_hash) can be exchanged for a fresh access token that passes authentication.
+result: pass
+
+### 4. Old token rejected after enabling TOTP
+expected: Token issued before TOTP was enabled returns HTTP 401 "Session invalidated".
+result: pass
+
+### 5. Old token rejected after disabling TOTP
+expected: Token issued before TOTP was disabled returns HTTP 401 "Session invalidated".
+result: pass
+
+### 6. Token rejected after admin deactivation
+expected: Token issued before admin deactivation returns HTTP 401. Message may be "Session invalidated" (user_nbf fired) or "User not found or deactivated" (is_active check fired — same-second D-02 edge case). Both are correct.
+result: pass
+
+### 7. Admin reactivation does NOT cause spurious token revocation
+expected: A token issued after reactivation works normally. Reactivation must not write user_nbf.
+result: pass
+
+## Summary
+
+total: 7
+passed: 7
+issues: 0
+pending: 0
+skipped: 0
+blocked: 0
+
+## Gaps
+
+[none]
+
+## Findings
+
+### Critical: Backend workers were stale (required restart before testing)
+
+The backend runs with `--workers 2` (not `--reload`). Workers forked 27 hours ago, before Phase 7.2 code was committed. The code files on disk were correct (volume-mounted), but the running processes held the pre-Phase-7.2 module in memory:
+- JTI was missing from all issued tokens
+- user_nbf Redis check was absent from get_current_user
+
+**Resolution:** `docker compose restart backend` loaded the current code. All 7 tests then pass.
+
+**Risk this surfaces:** Any environment where the backend is not restarted after deploying Phase 7.2 will have zero JTI coverage and zero NBF revocation. This is a deployment gap, not a code bug.
+
+### Noted: D-02 same-second edge case (by design)
+
+Tests 2 and 4 require a 1-second sleep between login and the security event to guarantee `iat < user_nbf`. This is the documented edge case in D-02: "a token issued exactly at the event second is allowed." This is an acceptable trade-off — in real usage, tokens are issued minutes before security events.
+
+### Noted: Test 6 rejection message
+
+After admin deactivation, the 401 response body is "User not found or deactivated" rather than "Session invalidated". This is because `is_active=False` is checked first in `get_current_user`. The user_nbf Redis key is also written by deactivation, but in same-second scenarios the is_active check fires first. Both mechanisms correctly block the token — this is belt-and-suspenders.