docs(05): create UAT gap closure plans 09-11

Three new plans address all 6 diagnosed gaps from 05-UAT.md:

- 05-09: cloud document open (fetch+Blob URL), re-analyze (cloud-aware
  Celery task), and edit (PATCH /api/documents/{id})
- 05-10: OAuth initiate JSON response fix, Nextcloud custom endpoint
  edit round-trip, Edit button on ERROR rows, confirmation text overflow
- 05-11: admin hard-delete with admin-password confirmation (backend
  UserDeleteConfirm model + frontend inline panel)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

.planning/ROADMAP.md

@@ -219,7 +219,7 @@ Before any phase is marked complete, all three gates must pass:
 4. A user can disconnect a cloud backend; credentials are permanently deleted from the DB and a subsequent attempt to use that backend returns an appropriate error — no orphaned data remains
 5. An admin API response for a user's cloud connections returns only `provider, display_name, connected_at, status` — the `credentials_enc` column is never present in any serialized response
 
-**Plans**: 8 plans
+**Plans**: 11 plans (8 original + 3 UAT gap closure)
 
 **Wave 1** — Test scaffold + dependencies
 
@@ -250,11 +250,18 @@ Before any phase is marked complete, all three gates must pass:
 
 - [x] 05-08-PLAN.md — AppSidebar cloud section + CloudProviderTreeItem + CloudFolderTreeItem + human checkpoint
 
+**Wave 8** — UAT gap closure (parallel, all independent)
+
+- [ ] 05-09-PLAN.md — Cloud document open/re-analyze/edit: authenticated fetch+Blob URL, cloud-aware Celery task, PATCH /api/documents/{id}
+- [ ] 05-10-PLAN.md — OAuth initiate fix (JSON response), Nextcloud custom endpoint edit round-trip, Edit button on ERROR rows, confirmation text overflow
+- [ ] 05-11-PLAN.md — Admin hard-delete with password confirmation: UserDeleteConfirm backend model + inline frontend panel
+
 **Phase gates (must pass before Phase 5 is complete):**
 
 - [x] `pytest -v` — zero failures; SSRF prevention on WebDAV/Nextcloud user-supplied URLs; credential encryption/decryption round-trip; admin response never exposes `credentials_enc`; OAuth invalid_grant handling
 - [x] Security agent: SSRF allowlist verification; credential key derivation correctness; connection status never leaks raw credential values
 - [x] Bandit + pip audit + npm audit all clean
+- [ ] UAT gaps 05-09, 05-10, 05-11 resolved and re-tested
 
 **UI hint**: yes
 
@@ -268,4 +275,4 @@ Before any phase is marked complete, all three gates must pass:
 | 2. Users & Authentication | 5/5 | Complete | 2026-05-22 |
 | 3. Document Migration & Multi-User Isolation | 5/5 | Complete | 2026-05-25 |
 | 4. Folders, Sharing, Quotas & Document UX | 9/9 | Complete | 2026-05-28 |
-| 5. Cloud Storage Backends | 8/8 | Complete | 2026-05-29 |
+| 5. Cloud Storage Backends | 8/11 | UAT gap closure in progress | — |

.planning/phases/05-cloud-storage-backends/05-09-PLAN.md

@@ -0,0 +1,187 @@
+---
+phase: 05-cloud-storage-backends
+plan: 09
+type: execute
+wave: 1
+depends_on: []
+files_modified:
+  - backend/api/documents.py
+  - backend/tasks/document_tasks.py
+  - frontend/src/api/client.js
+  - frontend/src/components/documents/DocumentPreviewModal.vue
+  - frontend/src/views/DocumentView.vue
+  - backend/tests/test_cloud.py
+autonomous: true
+requirements: [CLOUD-03, CLOUD-05, CLOUD-07]
+gap_closure: true
+
+must_haves:
+  truths:
+    - "Opening a cloud document proxies bytes through the backend and renders without 401"
+    - "Re-analyzing a cloud document retrieves file bytes from the cloud backend, not MinIO"
+    - "PATCH /api/documents/{id} accepts filename and folder_id and persists the change"
+    - "Frontend fetch-with-blob-URL approach works in DocumentPreviewModal and DocumentView"
+  artifacts:
+    - path: "backend/api/documents.py"
+      provides: "PATCH /{doc_id} endpoint accepting {filename, folder_id}"
+    - path: "backend/tasks/document_tasks.py"
+      provides: "Cloud-aware re-analyze: routes to correct backend by doc.storage_backend"
+    - path: "frontend/src/components/documents/DocumentPreviewModal.vue"
+      provides: "Authenticated fetch + Blob URL for document preview"
+    - path: "frontend/src/views/DocumentView.vue"
+      provides: "Authenticated fetch + Blob URL for document open"
+  key_links:
+    - from: "frontend/src/components/documents/DocumentPreviewModal.vue"
+      to: "/api/documents/{id}/content"
+      via: "fetch with Authorization header → Blob URL"
+    - from: "backend/tasks/document_tasks.py"
+      to: "get_storage_backend_for_document"
+      via: "doc.storage_backend != 'minio' branch"
+---
+
+<objective>
+Fix three independent root causes that prevent cloud documents from being opened, re-analyzed, or edited.
+
+Purpose: Cloud-stored documents are inaccessible after upload because (1) the preview uses an unauthenticated iframe src, (2) the Celery re-analyze task hardcodes MinIO, and (3) no PATCH endpoint exists for document metadata.
+
+Output: All three flows work end-to-end for cloud documents. Three new/updated tests pass.
+</objective>
+
+<execution_context>
+@$HOME/.claude/get-shit-done/workflows/execute-plan.md
+@$HOME/.claude/get-shit-done/templates/summary.md
+</execution_context>
+
+<context>
+@.planning/PROJECT.md
+@.planning/ROADMAP.md
+@.planning/STATE.md
+@.planning/phases/05-cloud-storage-backends/05-UAT.md
+</context>
+
+<interfaces>
+<!-- Key types the executor needs. Extracted from existing codebase. -->
+
+From backend/api/documents.py:
+- router = APIRouter(prefix="/api/documents")
+- get_regular_user dep: rejects admins (403), requires active user
+- Document ORM fields: id, user_id, filename, folder_id, storage_backend, object_key
+- Ownership check pattern: `if doc.user_id != current_user.id: raise HTTPException(404)`
+- Existing PATCH for folder move lives in backend/api/folders.py with separate router
+
+From backend/tasks/document_tasks.py:
+- `_run(document_id)` calls `get_storage_backend()` unconditionally (returns MinIO backend)
+- `doc.storage_backend` column holds "minio" | "google_drive" | "onedrive" | "nextcloud" | "webdav"
+- Session is opened fresh per task: `async with AsyncSessionLocal() as session:`
+- User is fetched: `user = await session.get(User, doc.user_id)`
+- `get_storage_backend_for_document(doc, user, session)` already exists in storage/__init__.py
+
+From backend/storage/__init__.py (inferred from documents.py usage):
+- `get_storage_backend_for_document(doc, user, session)` → returns correct backend instance
+
+From frontend/src/api/client.js:
+- `request(path, options)` injects Authorization: Bearer header automatically
+- Returns parsed JSON; for binary responses a different approach is needed
+- `getDocumentContentUrl(docId)` currently returns a plain URL string (no auth)
+</interfaces>
+
+<tasks>
+
+<task type="auto" tdd="true">
+  <name>Task 1: Add PATCH /api/documents/{doc_id} endpoint + cloud-aware Celery re-analyze</name>
+  <files>backend/api/documents.py, backend/tasks/document_tasks.py, backend/tests/test_cloud.py</files>
+  <behavior>
+    - PATCH /api/documents/{doc_id} with body {filename?: str, folder_id?: uuid | null} returns 200 with updated document dict; non-owner gets 404; admin gets 403 (get_regular_user).
+    - PATCH with only filename updates filename, folder_id unchanged.
+    - PATCH with folder_id=null moves document to root (no folder).
+    - Re-analyze task: when doc.storage_backend != "minio", calls get_storage_backend_for_document(doc, user, session) instead of get_storage_backend(); if user is None returns {"status": "missing_user"}; on CloudConnectionError returns {"status": "extract_failed", "error": "cloud backend error"}.
+    - Re-analyze task: MinIO path (storage_backend == "minio") unchanged.
+  </behavior>
+  <action>
+    In backend/api/documents.py, add a DocumentPatch Pydantic model with optional fields `filename: Optional[str] = None` and `folder_id: Optional[uuid.UUID] = None` — use a sentinel default of `_UNSET = object()` or `Optional[uuid.UUID]` with a custom flag; the cleanest approach for nullable-vs-absent folder_id is to use `model_fields_set` to distinguish "not provided" from "set to null". Accept the body and update only the fields present in `model_fields_set`. Validate that at least one field is provided (422 if body is empty). Apply ownership guard (doc.user_id != current_user.id → 404). Return the updated document dict using the same shape as GET /api/documents/{id} (call `storage.get_metadata(session, doc_id)` after commit).
+
+    In backend/tasks/document_tasks.py, in `_run()`, replace the unconditional `backend = get_storage_backend()` block with:
+    - If `doc.storage_backend` is None or `doc.storage_backend == "minio"`: use `get_storage_backend()` (existing MinIO path).
+    - Else: use `get_storage_backend_for_document(doc, user, session)`. If user is None (doc.user_id is None), return `{"document_id": document_id, "status": "missing_user"}`. Import `get_storage_backend_for_document` at the top of `_run()` using a deferred import (same pattern as other imports in this file: `from storage import get_storage_backend_for_document`). Catch `CloudConnectionError` from the get_object call and return `{"document_id": document_id, "status": "extract_failed", "error": "cloud backend error"}` (do NOT include the raw provider error message).
+
+    In backend/tests/test_cloud.py, add three tests:
+    1. `test_patch_document_filename` — create a document, PATCH with {filename: "renamed.pdf"}, assert 200 and updated filename.
+    2. `test_patch_document_wrong_owner` — create two users, try to PATCH user A's document as user B, assert 404.
+    3. `test_reanalyze_cloud_document_routes_to_cloud_backend` — mock `get_storage_backend_for_document` to return an AsyncMock backend, set doc.storage_backend="nextcloud", call `_run(doc_id)` directly, assert the mock backend's `get_object` was called and MinIO backend's `get_object` was NOT called.
+  </action>
+  <verify>
+    <automated>cd /Users/nik/Documents/Progamming/document_scanner/backend && python -m pytest tests/test_cloud.py::test_patch_document_filename tests/test_cloud.py::test_patch_document_wrong_owner tests/test_cloud.py::test_reanalyze_cloud_document_routes_to_cloud_backend -v</automated>
+  </verify>
+  <done>Three tests pass. PATCH /api/documents/{id} returns 200 for valid owner, 404 for wrong owner. Re-analyze task uses cloud backend for cloud documents.</done>
+</task>
+
+<task type="auto">
+  <name>Task 2: Authenticated document preview — fetch-with-Blob-URL in frontend</name>
+  <files>frontend/src/api/client.js, frontend/src/components/documents/DocumentPreviewModal.vue, frontend/src/views/DocumentView.vue</files>
+  <action>
+    In frontend/src/api/client.js, add a new exported function `fetchDocumentContent(docId)` that calls `fetch(/api/documents/${docId}/content, { headers: { Authorization: Bearer ${authStore.accessToken} }, credentials: "include" })`. On 401, attempt one refresh via `authStore.refresh()` and retry (same pattern as `request()`). Return the raw `Response` object (not parsed JSON) so callers can call `.blob()` on it. Do NOT use the existing `request()` helper because it calls `res.json()` unconditionally.
+
+    In frontend/src/components/documents/DocumentPreviewModal.vue:
+    - Remove the computed `proxyUrl` that returns a raw URL string.
+    - Add reactive state: `blobUrl = ref(null)`, `loadError = ref(null)`, `loading = ref(true)`.
+    - On `onMounted` (and watch `props.doc.id` for changes), call `fetchDocumentContent(props.doc.id)` from the API client, then `response.blob()`, then `URL.createObjectURL(blob)` and assign to `blobUrl`.
+    - In the template, change `iframe :src="proxyUrl"` to `iframe :src="blobUrl"` with a `v-if="blobUrl"`.
+    - Show a loading spinner while `loading` is true and `blobUrl` is null.
+    - Show an error message if `loadError` is set.
+    - On `onUnmounted`, call `URL.revokeObjectURL(blobUrl.value)` to release the object URL.
+
+    In frontend/src/views/DocumentView.vue:
+    - Locate any `window.open()` call that opens `/api/documents/{id}/content` directly.
+    - Replace it with: call `fetchDocumentContent(docId)`, get the blob, create an object URL, then `window.open(objectUrl)`. After a short delay (e.g. `setTimeout(() => URL.revokeObjectURL(objectUrl), 60000)`), revoke the URL.
+    - Import `fetchDocumentContent` from the API client.
+
+    Note: the `request()` helper in client.js already handles 401 → refresh → retry. The new `fetchDocumentContent` must replicate only the auth injection + single retry, not the JSON parsing. Keep it simple: use the `useAuthStore` lazy import pattern already in `request()`.
+  </action>
+  <verify>
+    <automated>cd /Users/nik/Documents/Progamming/document_scanner/frontend && npm run build 2>&1 | tail -5</automated>
+  </verify>
+  <done>Frontend build passes with zero errors. DocumentPreviewModal and DocumentView use fetchDocumentContent. No unauthenticated src= URLs remain for the /content endpoint.</done>
+</task>
+
+</tasks>
+
+<threat_model>
+## Trust Boundaries
+
+| Boundary | Description |
+|----------|-------------|
+| frontend→/api/documents/{id}/content | Previously browser-navigated; now fetch() with Bearer — closes the unauthenticated access gap |
+| PATCH /api/documents/{id} body | User-supplied filename and folder_id — validated via Pydantic; ownership enforced |
+| Celery task → cloud backend | Task now instantiates cloud backend inside worker process using DB-resident credentials |
+
+## STRIDE Threat Register
+
+| Threat ID | Category | Component | Disposition | Mitigation Plan |
+|-----------|----------|-----------|-------------|-----------------|
+| T-05-09-01 | Spoofing | PATCH /documents/{id} | mitigate | get_regular_user enforced; admin → 403; wrong owner → 404 |
+| T-05-09-02 | Information Disclosure | PATCH response | mitigate | storage.get_metadata() whitelist used for response — no credentials_enc or password_hash |
+| T-05-09-03 | Tampering | Celery task cloud credentials | mitigate | get_storage_backend_for_document loads credentials from DB inside task's own session — no credentials in broker message |
+| T-05-09-04 | Information Disclosure | fetchDocumentContent Blob URL | accept | Blob URL is same-origin, revoked on unmount — no persistent exposure |
+| T-05-09-SC | Tampering | npm/pip installs | mitigate | No new packages installed in this plan |
+</threat_model>
+
+<verification>
+After both tasks complete:
+- `pytest backend/tests/test_cloud.py -v` — all three new tests pass, no regressions
+- `npm run build` — zero errors
+- Manual: open a cloud document in the app — preview loads without 401
+- Manual: re-analyze a cloud document — task completes without NoSuchKey error
+- Manual: rename a cloud document — PATCH returns 200 with updated filename
+</verification>
+
+<success_criteria>
+- PATCH /api/documents/{id} is callable with {filename} or {folder_id} and returns the updated document
+- Re-analyze Celery task calls the cloud backend for cloud documents (not MinIO)
+- DocumentPreviewModal uses fetch + Blob URL, no unauthenticated iframe src
+- DocumentView uses fetch + Blob URL, no window.open with raw /content URL
+- All three new pytest tests pass; full suite has zero new failures
+</success_criteria>
+
+<output>
+Create `.planning/phases/05-cloud-storage-backends/05-09-SUMMARY.md` when done
+</output>

.planning/phases/05-cloud-storage-backends/05-10-PLAN.md

@@ -0,0 +1,218 @@
+---
+phase: 05-cloud-storage-backends
+plan: 10
+type: execute
+wave: 1
+depends_on: []
+files_modified:
+  - backend/api/cloud.py
+  - frontend/src/components/settings/SettingsCloudTab.vue
+  - frontend/src/components/cloud/CloudCredentialModal.vue
+  - frontend/src/components/ui/ConfirmBlock.vue
+  - backend/tests/test_cloud.py
+autonomous: true
+requirements: [CLOUD-01, CLOUD-04]
+gap_closure: true
+
+must_haves:
+  truths:
+    - "Clicking Connect on Google Drive or OneDrive initiates OAuth without a 401"
+    - "Nextcloud custom endpoint is preserved when re-editing an existing connection"
+    - "Edit button appears on ERROR-state Nextcloud/WebDAV rows"
+    - "Disconnect confirmation text renders fully within its container without overflow"
+  artifacts:
+    - path: "backend/api/cloud.py"
+      provides: "oauth_initiate returns JSON {url} (200) instead of RedirectResponse (302)"
+    - path: "frontend/src/components/settings/SettingsCloudTab.vue"
+      provides: "handleConnect uses fetch() + Bearer header; Edit button in ERROR template block"
+    - path: "frontend/src/components/cloud/CloudCredentialModal.vue"
+      provides: "watch handler detects custom endpoint on edit and repopulates showAdvanced + customEndpoint"
+    - path: "frontend/src/components/ui/ConfirmBlock.vue"
+      provides: "break-words on message paragraph"
+  key_links:
+    - from: "frontend/src/components/settings/SettingsCloudTab.vue"
+      to: "/api/cloud/oauth/initiate/{provider}"
+      via: "fetch() with Authorization header → data.url → window.location.href"
+    - from: "backend/api/cloud.py"
+      to: "oauth_initiate handler"
+      via: "returns JSONResponse({url: authorization_url}) status 200"
+---
+
+<objective>
+Fix four cloud settings UI gaps: OAuth initiate 401, Nextcloud custom endpoint lost on edit, missing Edit button on ERROR rows, and confirmation text overflow.
+
+Purpose: Users cannot connect OAuth providers (Google Drive/OneDrive) due to a bare browser navigation that carries no auth header. Nextcloud connections with custom endpoints lose their configuration on re-edit. ERROR-state connections cannot be edited without removing first.
+
+Output: OAuth flow initiates correctly, Nextcloud edit round-trips custom endpoint, ERROR rows have Edit button, confirmation text wraps.
+</objective>
+
+<execution_context>
+@$HOME/.claude/get-shit-done/workflows/execute-plan.md
+@$HOME/.claude/get-shit-done/templates/summary.md
+</execution_context>
+
+<context>
+@.planning/PROJECT.md
+@.planning/ROADMAP.md
+@.planning/STATE.md
+@.planning/phases/05-cloud-storage-backends/05-UAT.md
+</context>
+
+<interfaces>
+<!-- Key contracts the executor needs. -->
+
+From backend/api/cloud.py (current oauth_initiate):
+- Route: GET /api/cloud/oauth/initiate/{provider}
+- Currently returns: RedirectResponse(url=authorization_url, status_code=302)
+- Requires: Depends(get_regular_user)
+- State token stored in Redis; OAuth URL constructed from google/onedrive SDKs
+- Change: return JSONResponse({"url": authorization_url}) with status 200
+
+From frontend/src/components/settings/SettingsCloudTab.vue (current handleConnect):
+- OAUTH_PROVIDERS = new Set(['google_drive', 'onedrive'])
+- Currently: window.location.href = `/api/cloud/oauth/initiate/${provider.key}`
+- Change: fetch with Authorization header, then window.location.href = data.url
+
+From frontend/src/api/client.js:
+- The `request()` function is JSON-only (calls res.json()). For OAuth initiate, we want JSON back (the {url} object), so `request()` can be used directly.
+- Export: `initiateOAuth(provider)` → calls request(`/api/cloud/oauth/initiate/${provider}`)
+
+From frontend/src/components/cloud/CloudCredentialModal.vue (watch handler, lines 191-209):
+- Nextcloud edit: extracts only hostname with regex match[1], clears customEndpoint
+- Bug: if stored server_url does NOT match /remote.php/dav/files/{username}/ pattern, the custom endpoint is silently lost
+- Fix: compare resolvedServerUrl (auto-constructed) to existing.server_url; if they differ, populate customEndpoint with the stored URL and set showAdvanced=true
+
+From frontend/src/components/settings/SettingsCloudTab.vue (ERROR template, lines 88-96):
+- Only has Remove button
+- Add Edit button identical to the one in the ACTIVE block (same v-if guard: !OAUTH_PROVIDERS.has(provider.key))
+
+From frontend/src/components/ui/ConfirmBlock.vue:
+- The message <p> has class "text-sm text-gray-700" — add "break-words" to it
+- The wrapper div in SettingsCloudTab.vue (lines 100-113) needs "w-full overflow-hidden" on the outer div
+</interfaces>
+
+<tasks>
+
+<task type="auto" tdd="true">
+  <name>Task 1: Fix OAuth initiate — return JSON URL instead of 302 redirect</name>
+  <files>backend/api/cloud.py, backend/tests/test_cloud.py</files>
+  <behavior>
+    - GET /api/cloud/oauth/initiate/google_drive with valid Bearer token returns 200 JSON {url: "https://accounts.google.com/..."}.
+    - GET /api/cloud/oauth/initiate/onedrive with valid Bearer token returns 200 JSON {url: "https://login.microsoftonline.com/..."}.
+    - GET /api/cloud/oauth/initiate/invalid_provider returns 400 (unchanged).
+    - GET /api/cloud/oauth/initiate/google_drive with no auth returns 401 or 403 (unchanged behavior — get_regular_user enforces this).
+  </behavior>
+  <action>
+    In backend/api/cloud.py, change the `oauth_initiate` handler:
+    - Remove `response_class=RedirectResponse` from the `@router.get` decorator.
+    - Replace the two `return RedirectResponse(url=authorization_url, status_code=302)` statements (one for google_drive, one for onedrive) with `from fastapi.responses import JSONResponse` (already imported via fastapi) and return `JSONResponse({"url": authorization_url})`.
+    - The state token generation, Redis storage, and authorization URL construction are unchanged.
+    - Update the return type annotation if present.
+
+    In backend/tests/test_cloud.py, add test `test_oauth_initiate_returns_json_url`:
+    - Creates a regular user + token.
+    - Mocks Redis setex (the app state redis client).
+    - For google_drive provider: mocks `google_auth_oauthlib.flow.Flow.from_client_config` to return a mock whose `authorization_url` returns ("https://accounts.google.com/test", "state123").
+    - Calls GET /api/cloud/oauth/initiate/google_drive with Bearer header.
+    - Asserts response.status_code == 200.
+    - Asserts response.json()["url"].startswith("https://accounts.google.com/").
+    - Also adds `test_oauth_initiate_requires_auth`: calls without token, asserts 401 or 403.
+  </action>
+  <verify>
+    <automated>cd /Users/nik/Documents/Progamming/document_scanner/backend && python -m pytest tests/test_cloud.py::test_oauth_initiate_returns_json_url tests/test_cloud.py::test_oauth_initiate_requires_auth -v</automated>
+  </verify>
+  <done>Both tests pass. oauth_initiate returns 200 JSON {url}. No RedirectResponse in handler.</done>
+</task>
+
+<task type="auto">
+  <name>Task 2: Frontend OAuth fetch, Nextcloud edit fix, Edit on ERROR, text overflow</name>
+  <files>frontend/src/components/settings/SettingsCloudTab.vue, frontend/src/components/cloud/CloudCredentialModal.vue, frontend/src/components/ui/ConfirmBlock.vue, frontend/src/api/client.js</files>
+  <action>
+    ### 1. client.js — add initiateOAuth helper
+    Export `initiateOAuth(provider)` that calls `request(`/api/cloud/oauth/initiate/${provider}`)`. This uses the existing `request()` helper which injects the Bearer header and handles 401 → refresh → retry.
+
+    ### 2. SettingsCloudTab.vue — fix handleConnect for OAuth providers
+    Replace the current `window.location.href = /api/cloud/oauth/initiate/${provider.key}` line in `handleConnect` with:
+    ```
+    const data = await initiateOAuth(provider.key)
+    window.location.href = data.url
+    ```
+    Import `initiateOAuth` from `../../api/client.js`. Wrap in try/catch; on error show a toast or set a reactive `oauthError` ref displayed above the provider list.
+
+    ### 3. SettingsCloudTab.vue — add Edit button to ERROR template block
+    In the `<!-- ERROR -->` template block (currently lines 88-96), add an Edit button before the Remove button, mirroring the ACTIVE block exactly:
+    ```html
+    <button
+      v-if="!OAUTH_PROVIDERS.has(provider.key)"
+      @click="handleEdit(provider)"
+      class="text-sm px-3 py-2 border border-gray-300 rounded-lg hover:bg-gray-50 text-gray-700 transition-colors"
+    >
+      Edit
+    </button>
+    ```
+
+    ### 4. SettingsCloudTab.vue — fix confirmation wrapper overflow
+    Add `w-full overflow-hidden` to the outer `<div>` that wraps the `<ConfirmBlock>` component (the div at the current line starting `v-if="confirmRemoveId === connectionFor(provider.key)?.id"`). This div needs to break out of the flex row — it is already rendered outside the `flex items-center` row as a sibling block, so adding `w-full` and `overflow-hidden` is sufficient.
+
+    ### 5. CloudCredentialModal.vue — fix Nextcloud edit custom endpoint pre-population
+    In the watch handler on `props.show`, after the existing logic that sets `serverBase.value` by extracting the hostname:
+    - Compute what the auto-constructed URL would be using the extracted hostname and `existing.connection_username`:
+      `const autoUrl = match ? \`${match[1]}/remote.php/dav/files/${encodeURIComponent(existing.connection_username ?? '')}/\` : ''`
+    - If `existing.server_url !== autoUrl` (the stored URL doesn't match the auto-constructed pattern) AND `existing.server_url` has a path beyond just the hostname, then:
+      - Set `showAdvanced.value = true`
+      - Set `customEndpoint.value = existing.server_url`
+    - Otherwise leave `showAdvanced.value = false` and `customEndpoint.value = ''` (existing behavior).
+
+    ### 6. ConfirmBlock.vue — add break-words to message paragraph
+    Change `<p class="text-sm text-gray-700">` to `<p class="text-sm text-gray-700 break-words">`.
+  </action>
+  <verify>
+    <automated>cd /Users/nik/Documents/Progamming/document_scanner/frontend && npm run build 2>&1 | tail -5</automated>
+  </verify>
+  <done>Frontend build passes with zero errors. All four UI changes are applied: OAuth uses fetch, ERROR rows have Edit button, Nextcloud watch handler preserves custom endpoint, ConfirmBlock message has break-words.</done>
+</task>
+
+</tasks>
+
+<threat_model>
+## Trust Boundaries
+
+| Boundary | Description |
+|----------|-------------|
+| frontend→/api/cloud/oauth/initiate | Now goes through fetch() with Bearer header instead of bare browser navigation |
+| OAuth URL returned to frontend | URL is generated by the backend OAuth library and stored state in Redis — frontend only receives the URL string |
+
+## STRIDE Threat Register
+
+| Threat ID | Category | Component | Disposition | Mitigation Plan |
+|-----------|----------|-----------|-------------|-----------------|
+| T-05-10-01 | Spoofing | oauth_initiate auth | mitigate | get_regular_user still enforced — only authenticated users receive the OAuth URL |
+| T-05-10-02 | Information Disclosure | OAuth URL in JSON response | accept | URL is a standard OAuth authorization URL with CSRF state token — no credentials in the URL |
+| T-05-10-03 | Tampering | OAuth state token | mitigate | State token generated server-side (secrets.token_urlsafe(32)), stored in Redis with TTL 1800, single-use (deleted in callback) — unchanged from original design |
+| T-05-10-04 | Spoofing | Nextcloud custom endpoint re-edit | accept | Pre-populated values come from encrypted DB credentials decrypted server-side and returned as server_url field — not user-alterable before display |
+| T-05-10-SC | Tampering | npm/pip installs | mitigate | No new packages installed in this plan |
+</threat_model>
+
+<verification>
+After both tasks complete:
+- `pytest backend/tests/test_cloud.py::test_oauth_initiate_returns_json_url backend/tests/test_cloud.py::test_oauth_initiate_requires_auth -v`
+- `npm run build` — zero errors
+- Manual: click Connect on Google Drive — browser navigates to accounts.google.com (not localhost 401)
+- Manual: edit Nextcloud connection with custom endpoint — Advanced section opens with endpoint pre-filled
+- Manual: connection in ERROR state — Edit button is visible
+- Manual: disconnect confirmation text wraps within its container
+</verification>
+
+<success_criteria>
+- oauth_initiate returns 200 JSON {url} (not 302 redirect)
+- Two new pytest tests pass for OAuth initiate
+- handleConnect in SettingsCloudTab uses fetch() + initiateOAuth(); no window.location.href to /api path
+- ERROR status template block has Edit button for non-OAuth providers
+- CloudCredentialModal watch handler repopulates customEndpoint and showAdvanced when stored URL differs from auto-constructed pattern
+- ConfirmBlock message paragraph has break-words class
+- Full frontend build and pytest suite have zero new failures
+</success_criteria>
+
+<output>
+Create `.planning/phases/05-cloud-storage-backends/05-10-SUMMARY.md` when done
+</output>

.planning/phases/05-cloud-storage-backends/05-11-PLAN.md

@@ -0,0 +1,265 @@
+---
+phase: 05-cloud-storage-backends
+plan: 11
+type: execute
+wave: 1
+depends_on: []
+files_modified:
+  - backend/api/admin.py
+  - frontend/src/api/client.js
+  - frontend/src/components/admin/AdminUsersTab.vue
+  - backend/tests/test_admin.py
+autonomous: true
+requirements: [ADMIN-02, SEC-09]
+gap_closure: true
+
+must_haves:
+  truths:
+    - "Admin can permanently delete a non-admin user after entering their own admin password"
+    - "Backend verifies the admin password before executing the delete"
+    - "Delete purges cloud connections + MinIO objects + all DB rows (existing SEC-09 code runs)"
+    - "Frontend presents an inline confirmation panel with admin password field before calling DELETE"
+    - "Incorrect admin password returns 403 without deleting the user"
+  artifacts:
+    - path: "backend/api/admin.py"
+      provides: "UserDeleteConfirm Pydantic model; delete_user handler reads admin_password from body and verifies it"
+    - path: "frontend/src/api/client.js"
+      provides: "adminDeleteUser(id, adminPassword) calling DELETE /api/admin/users/{id}"
+    - path: "frontend/src/components/admin/AdminUsersTab.vue"
+      provides: "Inline delete confirmation panel with admin password field, mirroring confirmDeactivate pattern"
+  key_links:
+    - from: "frontend/src/components/admin/AdminUsersTab.vue"
+      to: "DELETE /api/admin/users/{id}"
+      via: "adminDeleteUser(id, adminPassword)"
+    - from: "backend/api/admin.py delete_user"
+      to: "services.auth.verify_password"
+      via: "verify_password(body.admin_password, admin.password_hash)"
+---
+
+<objective>
+Add admin hard-delete with password confirmation: a backend body model that verifies the admin's own password before permanent deletion, and a frontend inline confirmation panel with password field.
+
+Purpose: The backend delete endpoint exists and correctly purges all user data, but it accepts no authentication proof for the destructive action. There is also no frontend UI to trigger it.
+
+Output: Admin can initiate deletion from the Users tab, enter their password in an inline panel, and the backend verifies the password before deleting. Incorrect password is rejected with 403.
+</objective>
+
+<execution_context>
+@$HOME/.claude/get-shit-done/workflows/execute-plan.md
+@$HOME/.claude/get-shit-done/templates/summary.md
+</execution_context>
+
+<context>
+@.planning/PROJECT.md
+@.planning/ROADMAP.md
+@.planning/STATE.md
+@.planning/phases/05-cloud-storage-backends/05-UAT.md
+</context>
+
+<interfaces>
+<!-- Key contracts the executor needs. -->
+
+From backend/api/admin.py:
+- Existing delete_user handler: DELETE /api/admin/users/{user_id}, status 204, no request body
+- Already purges cloud connections + MinIO objects, writes audit log (SEC-09 — do NOT change this logic)
+- Uses Depends(get_current_admin) → resolves to User ORM instance as `_admin`
+- verify_password not currently imported; services.auth exports it: `from services.auth import verify_password`
+- The handler must add: parse body as UserDeleteConfirm, call verify_password(body.admin_password, _admin.password_hash), raise 403 on failure
+
+From services/auth.py (existing pattern from admin.py imports):
+- `hash_password(plain: str) -> str`
+- `verify_password(plain: str, hashed: str) -> bool` — uses pwdlib Argon2
+
+From frontend/src/components/admin/AdminUsersTab.vue (confirmDeactivate pattern to mirror):
+- `confirmDeactivate = ref(null)` tracks which user ID is awaiting confirmation
+- `startDeactivate(id)` sets confirmDeactivate = id
+- Inline panel in <td> renders when `confirmDeactivate === user.id`
+- Panel has confirm + cancel buttons
+- Model to follow: add parallel state `confirmDelete = ref(null)`, `deletePassword = ref('')`, `deleteError = ref(null)`
+
+From frontend/src/api/client.js:
+- All admin functions follow: request(`/api/admin/users/${id}/...`, { method, headers, body })
+- DELETE with body: `request(\`/api/admin/users/${id}\`, { method: "DELETE", headers: { "Content-Type": "application/json" }, body: JSON.stringify({ admin_password: adminPassword }) })`
+</interfaces>
+
+<tasks>
+
+<task type="auto" tdd="true">
+  <name>Task 1: Backend — UserDeleteConfirm model + password verification in delete_user</name>
+  <files>backend/api/admin.py, backend/tests/test_admin.py</files>
+  <behavior>
+    - DELETE /api/admin/users/{id} with correct admin_password in body returns 204 and user is deleted.
+    - DELETE /api/admin/users/{id} with wrong admin_password returns 403 {"detail": "Invalid admin password"} and user is NOT deleted.
+    - DELETE /api/admin/users/{id} with no body returns 422 (Pydantic validation).
+    - Cannot delete admin accounts (existing guard: 400 "Cannot delete admin accounts") — unchanged.
+    - Cannot delete non-existent user (existing guard: 404) — unchanged.
+    - Audit log entry written for successful delete (existing code) — unchanged.
+    - Cloud credentials purged before DB delete (existing SEC-09 code) — unchanged.
+  </behavior>
+  <action>
+    In backend/api/admin.py:
+    1. Add `UserDeleteConfirm` Pydantic model in the Request models section:
+       ```python
+       class UserDeleteConfirm(BaseModel):
+           admin_password: str
+       ```
+    2. Add `from services.auth import verify_password` to the existing imports from services.auth (currently imports `hash_password, revoke_all_refresh_tokens`).
+    3. Modify the `delete_user` handler signature to accept the body:
+       - Change `async def delete_user(user_id, request, session, _admin)` to also accept `body: UserDeleteConfirm`.
+       - FastAPI will parse the JSON body automatically.
+    4. Add password verification BEFORE any deletion logic (fail fast):
+       ```python
+       if not verify_password(body.admin_password, _admin.password_hash):
+           raise HTTPException(
+               status_code=status.HTTP_403_FORBIDDEN,
+               detail="Invalid admin password",
+           )
+       ```
+    5. All existing deletion logic (cloud purge, MinIO purge, audit log, session.delete) is unchanged.
+
+    In backend/tests/test_admin.py, add three tests:
+    1. `test_delete_user_correct_password` — create admin + regular user, call DELETE with correct admin password, assert 204, assert user no longer in GET /admin/users.
+    2. `test_delete_user_wrong_password` — same setup, call DELETE with wrong password, assert 403, assert user still in GET /admin/users (not deleted).
+    3. `test_delete_user_no_body` — call DELETE with no body (or empty body), assert 422.
+
+    Use the existing `_create_user_and_token(session, role="admin")` pattern from test_cloud.py (or the conftest admin_user fixture if available).
+  </action>
+  <verify>
+    <automated>cd /Users/nik/Documents/Progamming/document_scanner/backend && python -m pytest tests/test_admin.py::test_delete_user_correct_password tests/test_admin.py::test_delete_user_wrong_password tests/test_admin.py::test_delete_user_no_body -v</automated>
+  </verify>
+  <done>Three tests pass. Delete with correct password returns 204. Delete with wrong password returns 403 and user survives. Delete with no body returns 422.</done>
+</task>
+
+<task type="auto">
+  <name>Task 2: Frontend — adminDeleteUser API function + inline delete confirmation panel</name>
+  <files>frontend/src/api/client.js, frontend/src/components/admin/AdminUsersTab.vue</files>
+  <action>
+    ### 1. client.js — add adminDeleteUser
+    Export `adminDeleteUser(id, adminPassword)`:
+    ```javascript
+    export function adminDeleteUser(id, adminPassword) {
+      return request(`/api/admin/users/${id}`, {
+        method: 'DELETE',
+        headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
+        body: JSON.stringify({ admin_password: adminPassword }),
+      })
+    }
+    ```
+
+    ### 2. AdminUsersTab.vue — add delete confirmation state
+    In `<script setup>`, add alongside the existing `confirmDeactivate` state:
+    - `const confirmDelete = ref(null)` — holds the user ID awaiting delete confirmation
+    - `const deletePassword = ref('')` — the admin password input
+    - `const deleteError = ref(null)` — error message for wrong password
+
+    Add functions:
+    - `startDelete(id)`: sets `confirmDelete.value = id`, clears `deletePassword.value` and `deleteError.value`, and sets `confirmDeactivate.value = null` (cannot have both panels open at once).
+    - `cancelDelete()`: sets `confirmDelete.value = null`, clears password + error.
+    - `confirmDoDelete(id)`: sets `pendingAction[id] = true`, calls `await api.adminDeleteUser(id, deletePassword.value)`, on success removes the user from `users.value` and calls `cancelDelete()`. On error, sets `deleteError.value = e.message`. Always clears `pendingAction[id]` in finally.
+
+    ### 3. AdminUsersTab.vue — template: Delete button in action column
+    In the `<template v-else-if="user.is_active">` block (the normal active user actions), add a Delete button after the Deactivate button:
+    ```html
+    <span class="text-gray-300">·</span>
+    <button
+      @click="startDelete(user.id)"
+      class="text-red-800 hover:text-red-900 text-sm font-semibold"
+    >
+      Delete
+    </button>
+    ```
+    For deactivated users (the `<template v-else>` block), also add a Delete button after Reactivate, using the same markup.
+
+    ### 4. AdminUsersTab.vue — template: inline delete confirmation panel
+    Replace the existing `<div v-if="confirmDeactivate === user.id">` inline panel pattern: add a second conditional panel for delete below it (as a sibling `<div>` within the `<td>`):
+    ```html
+    <div v-if="confirmDelete === user.id" class="space-y-2">
+      <p class="text-xs text-red-700 font-semibold">
+        Permanently delete <span class="font-bold">{{ user.email }}</span>?
+        This will erase all their documents, cloud connections, and quota data. This cannot be undone.
+      </p>
+      <div>
+        <label class="block text-xs text-gray-700 mb-1 font-semibold">Your admin password to confirm</label>
+        <input
+          v-model="deletePassword"
+          type="password"
+          autocomplete="current-password"
+          placeholder="Admin password"
+          class="block w-full rounded-lg px-2 py-1.5 text-xs border border-red-300 focus:outline-none focus:ring-2 focus:ring-red-500 focus:border-red-500 transition-colors"
+          @keydown.enter.prevent="confirmDoDelete(user.id)"
+        />
+      </div>
+      <p v-if="deleteError" class="text-xs text-red-600">{{ deleteError }}</p>
+      <div class="flex items-center gap-2">
+        <button
+          @click="confirmDoDelete(user.id)"
+          :disabled="pendingAction[user.id] || !deletePassword"
+          class="text-red-700 hover:text-red-800 text-sm font-semibold disabled:opacity-50"
+        >
+          <span v-if="pendingAction[user.id]" class="flex items-center gap-1">
+            <span class="animate-spin rounded-full border-2 border-current border-t-transparent w-3 h-3"></span>
+            Deleting…
+          </span>
+          <span v-else>Delete permanently</span>
+        </button>
+        <span class="text-gray-300">·</span>
+        <button @click="cancelDelete" class="text-gray-500 hover:text-gray-700 text-sm">
+          Cancel
+        </button>
+      </div>
+    </div>
+    ```
+    The delete panel and deactivate panel are mutually exclusive: `startDelete` clears `confirmDeactivate`, and `startDeactivate` should also clear `confirmDelete` (add `confirmDelete.value = null` to `startDeactivate`).
+  </action>
+  <verify>
+    <automated>cd /Users/nik/Documents/Progamming/document_scanner/frontend && npm run build 2>&1 | tail -5</automated>
+  </verify>
+  <done>Frontend build passes with zero errors. AdminUsersTab has Delete button and inline confirmation panel with password field. adminDeleteUser exported from client.js.</done>
+</task>
+
+</tasks>
+
+<threat_model>
+## Trust Boundaries
+
+| Boundary | Description |
+|----------|-------------|
+| DELETE /api/admin/users/{id} body | Admin password sent in JSON body — verified server-side with Argon2 before any deletion |
+| admin password in transit | Sent over HTTPS (production); never stored, logged, or returned in any response |
+
+## STRIDE Threat Register
+
+| Threat ID | Category | Component | Disposition | Mitigation Plan |
+|-----------|----------|-----------|-------------|-----------------|
+| T-05-11-01 | Elevation of Privilege | DELETE /admin/users/{id} | mitigate | Requires get_current_admin (admin role) AND correct admin password verification via pwdlib Argon2 — two-factor confirmation |
+| T-05-11-02 | Information Disclosure | Wrong password error message | mitigate | 403 "Invalid admin password" — does not confirm whether user exists (user existence already checked first but 403 is returned regardless to prevent oracle) |
+| T-05-11-03 | Tampering | admin_password in request body | mitigate | Pydantic UserDeleteConfirm validates presence; verify_password uses constant-time Argon2 comparison (pwdlib) |
+| T-05-11-04 | Repudiation | User deletion audit trail | mitigate | write_audit_log("admin.user_deleted") written before session.delete — existing code preserved unchanged |
+| T-05-11-05 | Denial of Service | Repeated wrong-password delete attempts | accept | Admin endpoints already rate-limited at application level; admin accounts are trusted actors |
+| T-05-11-SC | Tampering | npm/pip installs | mitigate | No new packages installed in this plan |
+</threat_model>
+
+<verification>
+After both tasks complete:
+- `pytest backend/tests/test_admin.py::test_delete_user_correct_password backend/tests/test_admin.py::test_delete_user_wrong_password backend/tests/test_admin.py::test_delete_user_no_body -v`
+- `npm run build` — zero errors
+- Full pytest suite: `pytest -v` — zero new failures
+- Manual: open Admin panel → Users tab, confirm Delete button visible per user row
+- Manual: click Delete, enter correct admin password → user removed from list
+- Manual: click Delete, enter wrong password → error message shown, user not removed
+- Security: verify admin_password not present in any audit log entry
+</verification>
+
+<success_criteria>
+- UserDeleteConfirm model added to admin.py
+- delete_user verifies admin password via verify_password before proceeding
+- Wrong password returns 403 without deleting user
+- adminDeleteUser(id, adminPassword) exported from client.js
+- AdminUsersTab has Delete button on active and deactivated rows
+- Inline password confirmation panel appears on Delete click, mutually exclusive with deactivate panel
+- Three new backend tests pass; full test suite has zero new failures; frontend build clean
+</success_criteria>
+
+<output>
+Create `.planning/phases/05-cloud-storage-backends/05-11-SUMMARY.md` when done
+</output>