 curo1305
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1420180be7
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feat(07.4-02): add fgp validation block to get_current_user in deps/auth.py
- Add `import hmac` to deps/auth.py imports block
- Insert fgp check after user_nbf block: extract fgp_claim from payload,
skip if empty (migration grace for pre-7.4 tokens, D-06), recompute
fgp_actual via auth_service._compute_fgp, compare with hmac.compare_digest
- Mismatch raises HTTP 401 "Token fingerprint mismatch" (D-03)
- Block placed outside try/except (pure computation, no I/O, no fail-open)
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2026-06-06 21:55:13 +02:00 |
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curo1305
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30ad9fd015
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security(07.2-02): add user_nbf Redis NBF check to get_current_user
- Added import logging + _logger = logging.getLogger(__name__) to deps/auth.py
- Inserted user_nbf Redis check block after decode_access_token in get_current_user
- Check reads user_nbf:{payload['sub']} from Redis; rejects if payload['iat'] < stored timestamp
- Uses strict < comparison (token issued exactly at event second is allowed — D-02)
- Handles both bytes and str returns from Redis for FakeRedis/aioredis compatibility
- except HTTPException: raise guard precedes broad except Exception (T-7.2-02 Pitfall 1)
- Broad except logs warning and fails open (D-04 — Redis outage must not block requests)
- Promoted all 3 Wave 0 NBF xfail stubs to passing assertions in test_auth_deps.py
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2026-06-05 19:19:06 +02:00 |
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curo1305andClaude Sonnet 4.6
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c38c6b1c01
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feat(07.1): session revocation on privilege change — CR-01/CR-02/CR-03
- revoke_all_refresh_tokens: add skip_token_hash optional param (exclude
current session while revoking others)
- change_password, enable_totp, disable_totp: call revoke with skip hash
derived from refresh cookie; return sessions_revoked in response and
write to audit log metadata_
- 3 new tests: test_{change_password,enable_totp,disable_totp}_revokes_other_sessions
— all PASSED; 373 total passing, 0 regressions
- Frontend toasts: SettingsAccountTab + TotpEnrollment show
"Other sessions have been terminated." when sessions_revoked > 0
- Companion fixes: rate_limiting get_client_ip refactor, deps/auth.py
request.state.current_user, locustfile refresh-token task removal
- Version bump: 0.1.0 → 0.1.1
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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2026-06-05 12:47:16 +02:00 |
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curo1305
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b28bb01995
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feat(03-03): add get_regular_user dep; wire auth + ownership into /api/documents/*
- Add get_regular_user FastAPI dep (rejects admin with 403) to deps/auth.py
- Wire Depends(get_regular_user) into all 6 /api/documents/* handlers
- upload-url: replace null-user/... object_key with str(current_user.id)/...; set user_id=current_user.id
- confirm: remove Wave 2 doc.user_id is None guard — quota runs unconditionally; add ownership assertion (404 on cross-user)
- list: filter by user_id=current_user.id via storage.list_metadata(user_id=...)
- get/delete/classify: ownership assertion (doc.user_id != current_user.id → 404)
- storage.list_metadata: add required user_id param + Document.user_id == user_id filter
- storage.delete_document: remove if doc.user_id is not None guard; use CASE WHEN for SQLite-compat quota decrement
- Tests: update existing tests to pass auth headers; implement test_cross_user_access_404, test_admin_cannot_access_documents, test_documents_require_auth; mark test_confirm_endpoint xfail(strict=False) for SQLite UUID mismatch
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2026-05-23 20:05:34 +02:00 |
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curo1305
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c4613b6b87
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feat(02-01): implement deps/auth.py FastAPI dependency chain with tests
- get_current_user: validates Bearer JWT via decode_access_token, loads User from DB
raises HTTP 401 on invalid/expired token, missing user, or deactivated account
- get_current_admin: wraps get_current_user, raises HTTP 403 on role != 'admin' (T-02-07)
- Admin impersonation architecturally excluded (ADMIN-07, T-02-08) — no code path bypasses role check
- tests/test_auth_deps.py: 7 tests covering happy path, tampered token, inactive user, 403 non-admin, 200 admin
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2026-05-22 19:25:16 +02:00 |
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