""" FastAPI authentication dependency chain for DocuVault. Provides two reusable FastAPI dependencies: - get_current_user: validates the Bearer JWT and returns the User ORM object - get_current_admin: requires user.role == 'admin' (T-02-07) Usage in route handlers: from deps.auth import get_current_user, get_current_admin from db.models import User @router.get("/me") async def get_me(current_user: User = Depends(get_current_user)): return {"id": str(current_user.id), "email": current_user.email} @router.get("/admin/users") async def list_users( _admin: User = Depends(get_current_admin), session: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db), ): ... """ import hmac import logging import uuid from fastapi import Depends, HTTPException, Request, status from fastapi.security import HTTPAuthorizationCredentials, HTTPBearer from sqlalchemy.ext.asyncio import AsyncSession from db.models import User from deps.db import get_db from services import auth as auth_service _logger = logging.getLogger(__name__) # HTTPBearer parses the Authorization: Bearer header. # auto_error=True (default) raises 403 if no Authorization header is present. security = HTTPBearer() async def get_current_user( request: Request, credentials: HTTPAuthorizationCredentials = Depends(security), session: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db), ) -> User: """Validate the Bearer JWT and return the active User ORM object. Raises HTTP 401 if: - Token is missing, expired, or tampered (handled by HTTPBearer + decode) - User does not exist in the database - User account is deactivated (is_active=False) """ try: payload = auth_service.decode_access_token(credentials.credentials) except ValueError as exc: raise HTTPException( status_code=status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED, detail="Invalid or expired token", headers={"WWW-Authenticate": "Bearer"}, ) from exc # ── user_nbf check (D-02, D-03, D-04) ────────────────────────────────────── # Reject tokens issued before a security event (password change, TOTP enroll, # deactivation). The user_nbf:{user_id} key is written by Wave 2 (Plan 03). # Fail-open on Redis errors (D-04): a Redis outage must never deny service. # CRITICAL: the `except HTTPException: raise` guard MUST precede the broad # `except Exception` — otherwise the intentional 401 is swallowed (T-7.2-02). try: redis_client = request.app.state.redis nbf_bytes = await redis_client.get(f"user_nbf:{payload['sub']}") if nbf_bytes is not None: # Tolerate both bytes and str returns (FakeRedis in tests may return # either depending on what was stored; real aioredis returns bytes). nbf_str = nbf_bytes.decode() if isinstance(nbf_bytes, (bytes, bytearray)) else nbf_bytes if payload["iat"] < int(nbf_str): raise HTTPException( status_code=status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED, detail="Session invalidated", headers={"WWW-Authenticate": "Bearer"}, ) except HTTPException: raise # re-raise the 401 we just constructed (T-7.2-02: Pitfall 1 guard) except Exception as exc: _logger.warning("Redis user_nbf check failed (fail-open): %s", exc) # ── end user_nbf check ────────────────────────────────────────────────────── # ── fgp check (D-06, Phase 7.4) ──────────────────────────────────────────── # Validates the fgp claim embedded by create_access_token. Empty claim means # the token predates Phase 7.4 — allow gracefully (migration window, D-06). # NOT wrapped in try/except: _compute_fgp is pure computation with no I/O. fgp_claim = payload.get("fgp", "") if fgp_claim: fgp_actual = auth_service._compute_fgp( request.headers.get("User-Agent", ""), request.headers.get("Accept-Language", ""), ) if not hmac.compare_digest(fgp_claim, fgp_actual): raise HTTPException( status_code=status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED, detail="Token fingerprint mismatch", headers={"WWW-Authenticate": "Bearer"}, ) # ── end fgp check ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── try: user_uuid = uuid.UUID(payload["sub"]) except (KeyError, ValueError) as exc: raise HTTPException( status_code=status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED, detail="Invalid token subject", headers={"WWW-Authenticate": "Bearer"}, ) from exc user = await session.get(User, user_uuid) if user is None or not user.is_active: raise HTTPException( status_code=status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED, detail="User not found or deactivated", headers={"WWW-Authenticate": "Bearer"}, ) # Set on request.state so the per-account rate-limiter key_func (_account_key) # can read it. The dependency resolves before @account_limiter.limit() calls # key_func, so this must live here — not in the handler body (too late). request.state.current_user = user return user async def get_current_admin( user: User = Depends(get_current_user), ) -> User: """Require admin role; raises HTTP 403 otherwise (T-02-07). Admin impersonation is architecturally excluded (ADMIN-07, T-02-08): no code path sets a JWT sub to a different user's id. This dependency only checks that the authenticated user's role is 'admin'. """ if user.role != "admin": raise HTTPException( status_code=status.HTTP_403_FORBIDDEN, detail="Admin access required", ) return user async def get_regular_user( user: User = Depends(get_current_user), ) -> User: """Reject admin accounts on all /api/documents/* endpoints (D-16, SC4). Admin accounts cannot access document content (CLAUDE.md + SEC-04). Returns 403 (not 404) — the admin knows document endpoints exist. Regular users are passed through unchanged. """ if user.role == "admin": raise HTTPException( status_code=status.HTTP_403_FORBIDDEN, detail="Admin accounts cannot access document content", ) return user