Moves phases 08–11 execution artifacts from .planning/phases/ to .planning/milestones/v0.2-phases/ to keep .planning/phases/ clean for the next milestone. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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phase, slug, status, threats_open, asvs_level, created, register_authored_at_plan_time
| phase | slug | status | threats_open | asvs_level | created | register_authored_at_plan_time |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 10 | ux-interaction | verified | 0 | 2 | 2026-06-17 | true |
Phase 10 — Security
Retroactive security contract for Phase 10: UX & Interaction.
Trust Boundaries
| Boundary | Description | Data Crossing |
|---|---|---|
| Browser window events → Vue UI handlers | Keyboard shortcuts, drag events, modal Escape handlers, and menu positioning are handled client-side only. | Event metadata; no secrets or server-side authority. |
OS file drag → OsDragOverlay → existing upload flow |
Files arrive through the browser DataTransfer API and are forwarded into the existing authenticated upload path. |
Browser-controlled File objects; existing quota/auth checks still apply on upload. |
| Route metadata → layout selection | /admin/* layout selection hides the user sidebar and shows admin chrome. |
Route metadata only; backend/admin guard remains unchanged. |
| Vue templates → user-visible text | Breadcrumbs, empty states, toasts, and dropdown labels render through Vue interpolation. | Store/view strings; Vue escaping preserved. |
Threat Register
| Threat ID | Category | Component | Disposition | Mitigation | Status |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| T-10-01 | Cross-Site Scripting | Breadcrumb, empty state, toast, and dropdown text rendering | mitigate | Vue template interpolation is used; no v-html or raw HTML injection introduced by Phase 10 UI components. |
closed |
| T-10-02 | Information Disclosure | Toast notifications | mitigate | Toast payloads are generic action results such as upload/delete/rename/revoke status; no document content, extracted text, credentials, or token material is displayed. | closed |
| T-10-03 | Tampering | OsDragOverlay file drop handling |
accept | Handler reads browser-provided dataTransfer.files, resets overlay state, and emits to the existing authenticated upload flow; no direct server write bypass is introduced. |
closed |
| T-10-04 | Elevation of Privilege | Admin route layout selection | accept | App.vue admin branch changes presentation only; router requiresAdmin guard and backend get_current_admin enforcement are unchanged. |
closed |
| T-10-05 | Spoofing | Keyboard shortcut dispatch through current route instance | accept | Shortcuts call methods on the mounted Vue route component only; no URL parameter or user-supplied string selects privileged behavior. | closed |
| T-10-06 | Denial of Service | Global keyboard and drag listeners | mitigate | Event listeners are added once at component mount and removed on unmount; drag overlay uses a bounded dragDepth counter and ignores non-file drags. |
closed |
| T-10-07 | Supply Chain | Phase 10 frontend changes | accept | No new runtime packages were introduced by Phase 10; changes are Vue components, tests, and existing Tailwind/Vitest usage. | closed |
| T-10-08 | Supply Chain | Vite/esbuild dev dependency audit | mitigate | npm audit --audit-level=high found GHSA-gv7w-rqvm-qjhr through vite@6.4.3/esbuild@0.25.12; Vite was upgraded to ^8.0.16, then audit, tests, and build were re-run. |
closed |
Status: open · closed Disposition: mitigate (implementation required) · accept (documented risk) · transfer (third-party)
Accepted Risks Log
| Risk ID | Threat Ref | Rationale | Accepted By | Date |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| AR-10-01 | T-10-03 | The drop handler cannot bypass upload authorization or quota checks because it delegates to the existing upload flow. | project owner | 2026-06-17 |
| AR-10-02 | T-10-04 | Layout selection is presentation-only; authorization remains in router/backend gates. | project owner | 2026-06-17 |
| AR-10-03 | T-10-05 | Route-instance method lookup is local Vue state, not user-controlled input. | project owner | 2026-06-17 |
| AR-10-04 | T-10-07 | No new dependency was added in Phase 10. | project owner | 2026-06-17 |
Audit Evidence
| Source | Finding |
|---|---|
10-01-SUMMARY.md through 10-12-SUMMARY.md |
Threat flags are either "None" or document UI-only behavior with no new auth/network/schema surface. |
10-13-PLAN.md |
Contains a STRIDE register for the UAT gap-closure plan; all threats have accepted dispositions. |
10-13-SUMMARY.md |
Confirms gap-closure changes are display-only template/event-handler updates with no new network endpoints, auth paths, or schema changes. |
10-VERIFICATION.md |
Confirms 15/15 Phase 10 requirements passed after gap closure and no anti-patterns remain. |
10-VALIDATION.md |
Confirms Phase 10 validation coverage for UX and interaction requirements. |
npm audit --audit-level=high |
Initially found a high-severity esbuild advisory through Vite; after upgrading to Vite ^8.0.16, npm reported 0 vulnerabilities. |
Security Audit Trail
| Audit Date | Threats Total | Closed | Open | Run By |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-06-17 | 8 | 8 | 0 | Codex (milestone audit remediation) |
Sign-Off
- All threats have a disposition.
- Accepted risks documented.
- No Phase 10 change introduces backend routes, auth changes, DB schema changes, or direct storage writes.
- Existing upload/auth/admin enforcement remains the authority boundary.
- High-severity npm audit finding resolved by Vite 8 upgrade.
threats_open: 0confirmed.
Approval: verified 2026-06-17