kite/.planning/phases/07.2-security-jti-claim-redis-access-token-revocation-inserted/07.2-VERIFICATION.md

phase, verified, status, score, overrides_applied, gaps, deferred, human_verification

phase	verified	status	score	overrides_applied	gaps	deferred	human_verification
07.2-security-jti-claim-redis-access-token-revocation-inserted	2026-06-06T00:00:00Z	passed	9/9 must-haves verified	0	truth status resolved_at resolution password_reset_confirm writes user_nbf to Redis — pre-reset access tokens are blocked within TTL resolved 2026-06-06 password_reset_confirm (api/auth.py:701-753) now has request: Request parameter (line 702) and writes user_nbf:{user.id} to Redis at lines 744-750 before session.commit(). Test test_password_reset_confirm_writes_user_nbf_to_redis in tests/test_auth_api.py is green. VALIDATION.md confirms 84/84 tests passing.

Phase 07.2: JTI Claim + Redis NBF Revocation — Verification Report

Phase Goal: JTI claim added to access tokens + Redis-based user_nbf revocation check closes the 15-minute access-token window after refresh-token revocation events Verified: 2026-06-06 Status: passed (9/9) — initial gap (CR-02 password_reset_confirm) resolved during UAT/VALIDATION phase Re-verification: 2026-06-06 — gap confirmed resolved in code + VALIDATION.md (84/84 tests passing)

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Goal Achievement

Observable Truths

#	Truth	Status	Evidence
1	Every access token issued by create_access_token contains a unique jti UUID claim	VERIFIED	services/auth.py:98 — "jti": str(uuid.uuid4()) present in payload dict after exp; import uuid already at module top (line 25)
2	get_current_user rejects any access token whose iat predates user_nbf:{user_id} in Redis with HTTP 401	VERIFIED	deps/auth.py:68-85 — full NBF check block present; reads user_nbf:{payload['sub']}; raises HTTPException(401, "Session invalidated") when payload["iat"] < int(nbf_str)
3	get_current_user accepts tokens whose iat post-dates user_nbf (intended recovery path)	VERIFIED	Same block at deps/auth.py:75 — comparison is strict < not <=; tokens issued after the event pass through
4	A Redis outage during the NBF check does not block requests — fail-open with warning log	VERIFIED	deps/auth.py:83-84 — broad except Exception as exc: _logger.warning("Redis user_nbf check failed (fail-open): %s", exc) with no re-raise
5	The HTTPException raised by the NBF check is NOT swallowed by the fail-open broad-catch (Pitfall 1 guard)	VERIFIED	deps/auth.py:81-82 — except HTTPException: raise at line 81 precedes except Exception at line 83; ordering confirmed by grep line numbers
6	change_password, enable_totp, disable_totp each write user_nbf:{user_id} to Redis before session.commit()	VERIFIED	api/auth.py:508-511 (change_password), api/auth.py:607-611 (enable_totp via redis_client), api/auth.py:653-657 (disable_totp); all use settings.access_token_expire_minutes * 60 TTL
7	Admin deactivation writes user_nbf:{user_id} only when is_active=False	VERIFIED	api/admin.py:353-361 — write is strictly inside if not body.is_active: block; activation path at line 366 has no write
8	All TTLs use settings.access_token_expire_minutes * 60 (not hardcoded 900)	VERIFIED	All 4 write sites confirmed by grep: api/auth.py:511,610,656 and api/admin.py:360 — all use the derived expression
9	password_reset_confirm writes user_nbf to close pre-reset access-token window	VERIFIED	api/auth.py:701-753 — request: Request parameter added (line 702); user_nbf:{user.id} written at lines 744-750 before session.commit(); covered by test_password_reset_confirm_writes_user_nbf_to_redis (green)

Score: 9/9 truths verified

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Required Artifacts

Artifact	Expected	Status	Details
backend/services/auth.py	create_access_token with jti=str(uuid.uuid4())	VERIFIED	Line 98: "jti": str(uuid.uuid4()),
backend/deps/auth.py	user_nbf Redis check with fail-open + HTTPException re-raise guard	VERIFIED	Lines 62-85: full NBF check block; import logging at line 23; _logger at line 34
backend/api/auth.py	user_nbf write in change_password, enable_totp, disable_totp	VERIFIED	Lines 507-512, 606-611, 652-657
backend/api/admin.py	user_nbf write in deactivation handler only	VERIFIED	Lines 356-361; import time at line 26; from config import settings at line 31

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Key Link Verification

From	To	Via	Status	Details
services/auth.py create_access_token	PyJWT encode payload	"jti": str(uuid.uuid4()) in payload dict	WIRED	Line 98; uuid imported at module level line 25
deps/auth.py get_current_user	request.app.state.redis	await redis_client.get(f"user_nbf:{payload['sub']}") + int comparison	WIRED	Lines 69-75
api/auth.py change_password	request.app.state.redis	await request.app.state.redis.set(f"user_nbf:{current_user.id}", ...)	WIRED	Line 508-512
api/auth.py enable_totp	request.app.state.redis	await redis_client.set(f"user_nbf:{current_user.id}", ...) (redis_client in scope)	WIRED	Lines 607-611
api/auth.py disable_totp	request.app.state.redis	await request.app.state.redis.set(f"user_nbf:{current_user.id}", ...)	WIRED	Lines 653-657
api/admin.py deactivation handler	request.app.state.redis	await request.app.state.redis.set(f"user_nbf:{user.id}", ...) inside if not body.is_active:	WIRED	Lines 357-361
api/auth.py password_reset_confirm	request.app.state.redis	user_nbf write	WIRED	request: Request added (line 702); await request.app.state.redis.set(f"user_nbf:{user.id}", ...) at lines 744-750; resolved via UAT/VALIDATION

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Anti-Patterns Found

File	Line	Pattern	Severity	Impact
backend/api/auth.py	700-753	Missing user_nbf write after password reset confirm	BLOCKER RESOLVED	Fixed during UAT phase: request: Request added + Redis write at lines 744-750; test green
backend/services/auth.py	100, 110	algorithm="HS256" (symmetric) instead of ES256 (asymmetric)	WARNING	CLAUDE.md Security Protocol mandates ES256; this is tracked and addressed in Phase 7.3

Note on HS256 (CR-01 from code review): Phase 7.3 (07.3-security-es256-algorithm-upgrade-inserted) is already planned and has research/plan artifacts present in .planning/phases/. The HS256 finding is deferred to Phase 7.3. It is a WARNING here, not a BLOCKER for Phase 7.2's stated goal — but it is noted.

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Requirements Coverage

Requirement	Source Plan	Description	Status	Evidence
CONCERNS:JTI-CLAIM	07.2-01, 07.2-02	Every access token carries a jti UUID claim	SATISFIED	services/auth.py:98
CONCERNS:JTI-REVOKE-REDIS	07.2-01, 07.2-02, 07.2-03	user_nbf Redis check closes 15-min revocation window on security events	SATISFIED	All 5 write sites verified: change_password (511), enable_totp (610), disable_totp (656), admin deactivation (360), password_reset_confirm (744-750)

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Human Verification Required

(No human verification required — all 9 truths verified by automated tests. 84/84 tests passing per VALIDATION.md 2026-06-06.)

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Gaps Summary

No open gaps. The single gap identified in the initial verification (CR-02: password_reset_confirm missing user_nbf write) was resolved during the UAT/VALIDATION phase:

• request: Request parameter added to function signature (line 702)
• await request.app.state.redis.set(f"user_nbf:{user.id}", int(time.time()), ex=settings.access_token_expire_minutes * 60) written at lines 744-750 before session.commit()
• Test test_password_reset_confirm_writes_user_nbf_to_redis in tests/test_auth_api.py is green
• VALIDATION.md (2026-06-06): 84/84 tests passing, nyquist_compliant: true

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Verified: 2026-06-06 Verifier: Claude (gsd-verifier)