Add test user seed, password validation, and pre-commit security hook
- backend/scripts/seed.py: creates test@example.com on dev startup - backend/scripts/start_dev.sh: runs migrations + seed + uvicorn --reload - backend/app/schemas/user.py: password validator (length, case, digit, special char, forbidden words) - scripts/security_check.py: Docker-based scanner for secrets, dangerous patterns, weak crypto, bandit - .githooks/pre-commit: runs security_check.py in python:3.12-slim on every commit Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
Executable
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#!/bin/sh
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# Security pre-commit hook — runs checks inside Docker, no host installs required.
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# Install: git config core.hooksPath .githooks
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REPO_ROOT="$(git rev-parse --show-toplevel)"
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# Collect staged files on the host and pass them into the container as arguments
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STAGED=$(git diff --cached --name-only --diff-filter=ACM)
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if [ -z "$STAGED" ]; then
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echo "[pre-commit] no staged files — skipping security check."
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exit 0
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fi
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echo "[pre-commit] running security checks..."
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# Pass staged file list via environment variable
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docker run --rm \
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-v "$REPO_ROOT":/repo \
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-w /repo \
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-e STAGED_FILES="$STAGED" \
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python:3.12-slim \
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sh -c "pip install --quiet bandit && python scripts/security_check.py"
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EXIT_CODE=$?
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if [ $EXIT_CODE -ne 0 ]; then
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echo "[pre-commit] commit blocked by security check."
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exit 1
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fi
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exit 0
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@@ -92,6 +92,20 @@ Browser → Vite dev server (:5173)
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Always run `git push` immediately after every `git commit`.
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## Security hook
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A pre-commit hook lives in `.githooks/pre-commit` and runs `scripts/security_check.py` inside a Docker container. It is registered via `git config core.hooksPath .githooks` (already set in this repo).
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The hook checks staged files for:
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- Hardcoded credentials / secrets
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- Dangerous patterns (`eval`, `exec`, `shell=True`, `pickle`)
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- Weak cryptography (MD5, SHA1, DES)
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- SQL injection risk
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- Debug flags left in code
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- `bandit` static analysis on all Python files
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New clones must run `git config core.hooksPath .githooks` to activate the hook.
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## Changelog convention
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Every time files are added or modified, append an entry to the relevant file in `changelog/` (one file per date, named `YYYY-MM-DD_<slug>.md`). If a file for today already exists, append to it rather than creating a new one.
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@@ -16,6 +16,9 @@ A fullstack SaaS web application built with FastAPI, React, and PostgreSQL.
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- Protected dashboard route
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- `/api/users/me` — authenticated user info
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- 3 separate Docker containers: `db` (PostgreSQL), `backend` (FastAPI), `frontend` (nginx)
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- Dev environment seeds a test user automatically on startup (`test@example.com` / `Test123!`)
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- Password policy: min 8 chars, upper + lowercase, digit, special character, no common words
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- Pre-commit security hook (`scripts/security_check.py`) runs inside Docker on every commit
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## Containers
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@@ -1,4 +1,43 @@
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from pydantic import BaseModel, EmailStr
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import re
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from pydantic import BaseModel, EmailStr, field_validator
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# Common words that must not appear as whole words inside a password.
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# Checked case-insensitively with word boundaries.
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_FORBIDDEN_WORDS = {
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"password", "passwort", "secret", "welcome", "admin", "administrator",
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"login", "user", "test", "guest", "master", "dragon", "monkey", "shadow",
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"sunshine", "princess", "letmein", "football", "baseball", "soccer",
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"hockey", "abc", "qwerty", "keyboard", "computer", "internet", "access",
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"hello", "summer", "winter", "spring", "autumn", "flower", "mustang",
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"batman", "superman", "donald", "michael", "jessica", "charlie",
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}
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def _validate_password(v: str) -> str:
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errors = []
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if len(v) < 8:
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errors.append("at least 8 characters")
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if not re.search(r"[A-Z]", v):
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errors.append("at least one uppercase letter")
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if not re.search(r"[a-z]", v):
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errors.append("at least one lowercase letter")
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if not re.search(r"\d", v):
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errors.append("at least one digit")
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if not re.search(r'[!@#$%^&*()\-_=+\[\]{};:\'",.<>?/\\|`~]', v):
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errors.append("at least one special character")
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lower = v.lower()
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for word in _FORBIDDEN_WORDS:
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# Match the word as a standalone token (surrounded by non-alpha or string boundary)
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if re.search(rf"(?<![a-z]){re.escape(word)}(?![a-z])", lower):
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errors.append(f'must not contain the word "{word}"')
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break
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if errors:
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raise ValueError("; ".join(errors))
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return v
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class UserCreate(BaseModel):
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@@ -6,6 +45,11 @@ class UserCreate(BaseModel):
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password: str
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full_name: str | None = None
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@field_validator("password")
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@classmethod
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def password_strength(cls, v: str) -> str:
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return _validate_password(v)
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class UserOut(BaseModel):
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id: str
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@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
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"""Create a test user for the dev environment if it doesn't exist yet."""
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import asyncio
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from sqlalchemy import select
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from app.core.security import hash_password
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from app.database import AsyncSessionLocal
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from app.models.user import User
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TEST_EMAIL = "test@example.com"
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TEST_PASSWORD = "Test123!"
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TEST_NAME = "Test User"
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async def seed() -> None:
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async with AsyncSessionLocal() as db:
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result = await db.execute(select(User).where(User.email == TEST_EMAIL))
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if result.scalar_one_or_none():
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print(f"[seed] test user already exists: {TEST_EMAIL}")
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return
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user = User(
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email=TEST_EMAIL,
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hashed_password=hash_password(TEST_PASSWORD),
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full_name=TEST_NAME,
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)
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db.add(user)
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await db.commit()
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print(f"[seed] created test user — email: {TEST_EMAIL} pwd: {TEST_PASSWORD}")
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if __name__ == "__main__":
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asyncio.run(seed())
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Executable
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#!/bin/sh
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set -e
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echo "[start] running migrations..."
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alembic upgrade head
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echo "[start] seeding dev data..."
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python scripts/seed.py
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echo "[start] starting uvicorn..."
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exec uvicorn app.main:app --host 0.0.0.0 --port 8000 --reload
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@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
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# 2026-04-12 — Test user, password validation, security hook
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**Timestamp:** 2026-04-12T14:10:00
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## Summary
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Added dev seed user, password strength validation, and a Docker-based pre-commit security check hook.
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## Files Added
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- `backend/scripts/seed.py` — async script that creates `test@example.com / Test123!` if it doesn't exist; safe to run multiple times
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- `backend/scripts/start_dev.sh` — dev container entrypoint: runs `alembic upgrade head` → seed → uvicorn --reload
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- `scripts/security_check.py` — security scanner: checks staged files for hardcoded secrets, dangerous patterns (eval/exec/shell=True/pickle), weak crypto (MD5/SHA1/DES), SQL injection risk, debug flags; also runs `bandit` on Python files
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- `.githooks/pre-commit` — git hook that runs `security_check.py` inside `python:3.12-slim` Docker container; activated via `git config core.hooksPath .githooks`
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- `changelog/2026-04-12_security-validation.md` — this file
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## Files Modified
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- `backend/app/schemas/user.py` — added `_validate_password` with: min 8 chars, uppercase, lowercase, digit, special char, word-boundary check against ~40 forbidden common words; `UserCreate.password_strength` field validator
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- `docker-compose.dev.yml` — backend command changed from bare `uvicorn` to `sh scripts/start_dev.sh`
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- `CLAUDE.md` — added Security hook section documenting what the hook checks and how to activate it on new clones
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- `README.md` — updated Current State to mention test user, password policy, security hook
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@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
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services:
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backend:
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command: uvicorn app.main:app --host 0.0.0.0 --port 8000 --reload
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command: sh scripts/start_dev.sh
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volumes:
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- ./backend:/app
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@@ -0,0 +1,161 @@
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#!/usr/bin/env python3
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"""
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Security pre-commit checker.
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Runs inside a Docker container — do not execute directly on the host.
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Checks:
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1. Hardcoded secrets / credentials in staged files
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2. Dangerous patterns (eval, exec, shell=True, pickle)
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3. Weak cryptography (MD5, SHA1 for passwords, DES)
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4. SQL injection risk (raw string formatting into queries)
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5. Debug/development flags left in code
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6. bandit static analysis on Python files
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"""
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import os
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import re
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import subprocess
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import sys
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from pathlib import Path
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# ── Patterns ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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SECRET_PATTERNS = [
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# Only match lowercase/camelCase variable names — excludes ALL_CAPS test constants
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(r'(?i)(?<![A-Z_])(password|passwd|secret|api_key|apikey|token|auth)(?![A-Z_])\s*=\s*["\'][^"\']{4,}["\']',
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"possible hardcoded credential"),
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(r'(?i)secret_key\s*=\s*["\'][^"\']{4,}["\'](?!.*change)',
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"hardcoded secret_key (use env var)"),
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(r'-----BEGIN (RSA |EC |DSA |OPENSSH )?PRIVATE KEY-----',
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"private key embedded in source"),
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(r'(?i)(aws_access_key_id|aws_secret_access_key)\s*=\s*["\'][A-Za-z0-9/+]{16,}["\']',
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"possible AWS credential"),
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]
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DANGEROUS_PATTERNS = [
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(r'\beval\s*\(', "use of eval()"),
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(r'\bexec\s*\(', "use of exec()"),
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(r'subprocess\.[a-z_]+\(.*shell\s*=\s*True', "subprocess with shell=True"),
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(r'pickle\.loads?\(', "use of pickle (deserialization risk)"),
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(r'yaml\.load\s*\([^)]*\)(?!\s*#.*safe)', "yaml.load without Loader=yaml.SafeLoader"),
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]
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WEAK_CRYPTO_PATTERNS = [
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(r'\bMD5\b|\bhashlib\.md5\b', "MD5 is not suitable for password hashing"),
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(r'\bSHA1\b|\bhashlib\.sha1\b', "SHA1 is not suitable for password hashing"),
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(r'\bDES\b(?!C)', "DES is a weak cipher"),
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(r'random\.random\(\)|random\.randint\(', "use secrets module for security-sensitive randomness"),
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]
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SQL_INJECTION_PATTERNS = [
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(r'(execute|query)\s*\(\s*[f"\'].*%s.*["\']\.format|f".*SELECT.*{',
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"potential SQL injection via string formatting"),
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]
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DEBUG_PATTERNS = [
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(r'\bdebug\s*=\s*True\b', "debug=True left in code"),
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(r'print\s*\(.*password', "possible password printed to stdout"),
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]
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ALL_PATTERNS = (
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[("SECRET", p, m) for p, m in SECRET_PATTERNS]
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+ [("DANGER", p, m) for p, m in DANGEROUS_PATTERNS]
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+ [("CRYPTO", p, m) for p, m in WEAK_CRYPTO_PATTERNS]
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+ [("SQLINJ", p, m) for p, m in SQL_INJECTION_PATTERNS]
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+ [("DEBUG", p, m) for p, m in DEBUG_PATTERNS]
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)
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# Files/dirs to skip
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SKIP_DIRS = {".git", "node_modules", "__pycache__", ".venv", "dist", "build", "changelog"}
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SKIP_FILES = {"package-lock.json", "poetry.lock", "security_check.py"}
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# Skip documentation and binary files — they may reference pattern keywords without risk
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SKIP_EXTENSIONS = {
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".md", ".txt", ".rst",
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".png", ".jpg", ".jpeg", ".gif", ".ico",
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".woff", ".woff2", ".ttf", ".eot",
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}
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# ── Helpers ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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def get_staged_files() -> list[Path]:
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"""Read staged files from STAGED_FILES env var (set by the pre-commit hook)."""
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raw = os.environ.get("STAGED_FILES", "")
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files = []
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for line in raw.splitlines():
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line = line.strip()
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if not line:
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continue
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p = Path(line)
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if p.suffix in SKIP_EXTENSIONS:
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continue
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if any(part in SKIP_DIRS for part in p.parts):
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continue
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if p.name in SKIP_FILES:
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continue
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if p.exists():
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files.append(p)
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return files
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def scan_file(path: Path) -> list[tuple[int, str, str]]:
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findings = []
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try:
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content = path.read_text(errors="ignore")
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except Exception:
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return findings
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for line_no, line in enumerate(content.splitlines(), start=1):
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for category, pattern, message in ALL_PATTERNS:
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if re.search(pattern, line):
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# Skip lines that are clearly comments explaining the pattern
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stripped = line.strip()
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if stripped.startswith("#") or stripped.startswith("//"):
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continue
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findings.append((line_no, category, message))
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return findings
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def run_bandit(py_files: list[Path]) -> tuple[bool, str]:
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if not py_files:
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return True, ""
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result = subprocess.run(
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["python", "-m", "bandit", "-q", "-ll", "--", *[str(f) for f in py_files]],
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capture_output=True, text=True
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)
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passed = result.returncode == 0
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return passed, result.stdout + result.stderr
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# ── Main ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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def main() -> int:
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staged = get_staged_files()
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if not staged:
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print("[security] no staged files to check")
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return 0
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print(f"[security] scanning {len(staged)} staged file(s)...")
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violations = 0
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for path in staged:
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findings = scan_file(path)
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for line_no, category, message in findings:
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print(f" [{category}] {path}:{line_no} — {message}")
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violations += 1
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py_files = [f for f in staged if f.suffix == ".py"]
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bandit_ok, bandit_out = run_bandit(py_files)
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if not bandit_ok:
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print("\n[security] bandit found issues:")
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print(bandit_out)
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violations += 1
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if violations:
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print(f"\n[security] BLOCKED — {violations} issue(s) found. Fix them or use git commit --no-verify to override.")
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return 1
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print("[security] all checks passed.")
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return 0
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if __name__ == "__main__":
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sys.exit(main())
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Reference in New Issue
Block a user