curo1305
27b32cb4d1
CLAUDE.md: architecture table, security rules, all module descriptions, roadmap Stages 1-5, adding-provider guide, commit convention. README.md: quick start, provider table, command reference, security overview. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
130 lines
5.2 KiB
Markdown
130 lines
5.2 KiB
Markdown
# Pyra — Developer Guide
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## What Is This
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Pyra is a personal AI assistant CLI combining a multi-provider AI chat interface with
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an automation/skills system (Stage 2+) and an encrypted vault (Stage 3+).
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## Project Roadmap
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### Stage 1 — Core CLI (current)
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Working `pyra` executable with provider setup wizard, streaming chat REPL, .md-based
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memory in `~/.pyra/memory/`, and hard security boundaries around the vault.
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### Stage 2 — Skills / Automations
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Shell (.sh), PowerShell (.ps1), and Python (.py) scripts in `~/.pyra/skills/`. The AI
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can suggest running a skill, but execution requires explicit user approval (y/n prompt).
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No skill can access the vault. Skills are discovered by the pyra CLI, not by the AI.
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### Stage 3 — Vault Encryption
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Encrypt `~/.pyra/vault/secrets/` using `age` (or GPG fallback). Pyra decrypts in memory
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at call time only — no plaintext ever written to disk after initial setup. Secret
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rotation support. Per-key passphrases optional.
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### Stage 4 — Security Audit Sub-agent
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A separate `pyra security audit` command that spins up a sandboxed AI agent whose sole
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job is scanning for vulnerabilities: prompt injection in memory files, unexpected vault
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access attempts in `security.log`, outdated dependency CVEs, permission drift on `~/.pyra/`.
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Report written to `~/.pyra/security_audit.md` (not AI-readable during normal chat).
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### Stage 5 — Web UI / Advanced Features
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Optional local web interface (FastAPI + HTMX or similar). Embedding-based memory search
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(ChromaDB or sqlite-vec). Scheduled automations via cron-style skill scheduling.
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Multi-profile support (work vs personal).
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---
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## Architecture
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### Source: `src/pyra/`
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| Module | Purpose |
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|--------|---------|
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| `cli.py` | Click entrypoint. Subcommands: `setup`, `chat`, `memory` |
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| `setup/providers.py` | Provider registry — pure data, no I/O |
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| `setup/wizard.py` | questionary-based interactive setup wizard |
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| `config/schema.py` | Pydantic v2 models — no API keys, only `provider_id/model/base_url` |
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| `config/manager.py` | ruamel.yaml round-trip config read/write, chmod 600 enforced |
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| `config/dirs.py` | `bootstrap()` — creates `~/.pyra/` tree, checks vault sentinel every startup |
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| `chat/session.py` | prompt_toolkit REPL loop, slash commands, calls vault reader inline |
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| `chat/renderer.py` | Live streaming markdown via rich, injection warning panel, key redaction |
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| `chat/history.py` | Conversation list, token budget trimming, system prompt construction |
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| `memory/reader.py` | `list_memories()`, `read_memory()`, `load_context_for_session()` |
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| `memory/writer.py` | `write_memory()`, `append_memory()` — relative names only, no traversal |
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| `memory/index.py` | Auto-regenerate `MEMORY_INDEX.md` on every write |
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| `vault/reader.py` | `get_key(provider_id)` — sole accessor of `vault/secrets/api_keys.json` |
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| `vault/writer.py` | `set_key()`, `delete_key()` — only called from setup wizard |
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| `security/boundaries.py` | `assert_safe_path()`, `check_vault_lock()`, `BLOCKED_PREFIXES` |
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| `security/injection.py` | `scan_response()` — 15 regex patterns, 4 categories, logs to `security.log` |
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| `utils/paths.py` | `pyra_home()`, `ensure_dir()`, `safe_chmod()`, `expand()` |
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### Runtime: `~/.pyra/`
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```
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~/.pyra/
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├── config.yaml chmod 600 ← provider_id, model, base_url ONLY
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├── security.log chmod 600 ← injection event log
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├── memory/ chmod 700
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│ ├── user/profile.md
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│ ├── context/
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│ ├── knowledge/
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│ └── MEMORY_INDEX.md
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├── skills/ chmod 700 ← Stage 2
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│ ├── bash/
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│ ├── powershell/
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│ └── python/
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└── vault/ chmod 700 ← AI CANNOT ACCESS
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├── .vault_lock chmod 400 ← sentinel; missing = refuse to start
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└── secrets/
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└── api_keys.json chmod 400 ← ALL API keys
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```
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---
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## Security Rules (never break these)
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1. **Never pass config file contents into a system prompt** — config may reveal provider/model
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2. **Never bypass `assert_safe_path()`** — not even in tests (use `tmp_pyra_home` fixture instead)
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3. **Always `chmod 600/400`** after writing any file in `~/.pyra/`
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4. **No shell execution from AI-generated text** — ever (Stage 2 uses explicit approval gates)
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5. **`vault/reader.py` and `vault/writer.py` are the only modules that import from `pyra.vault`**
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6. **API key retrieved inline at call time** — never stored as an instance variable or logged
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## Adding a New Provider
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Edit `src/pyra/setup/providers.py`. Add a new `Provider` dataclass entry with all required fields.
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litellm handles dispatch automatically via the `litellm_prefix` field.
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Add a test in `tests/unit/test_providers.py` to verify the new entry.
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## Installing for Development
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```bash
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uv venv && source .venv/bin/activate
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uv pip install -e ".[dev]"
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pyra setup
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```
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Or with pip:
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```bash
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python -m venv .venv && source .venv/bin/activate
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pip install -e ".[dev]"
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pyra setup
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```
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## Running Tests
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```bash
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pytest tests/ -v # all unit + security tests
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pytest tests/integration/test_lmstudio.py # requires LM Studio at localhost:1234
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```
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## Commit Convention
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```
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feat(module): short description
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fix(module): short description
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test: description
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docs: description
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chore: description
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```
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