kite/SECURITY.md

# SECURITY.md — Phase 02 + Phase 03

**Audit date:** 2026-06-01
**Phase 02:** users-authentication (plans 01–06) — previously audited, result SECURED
**Phase 03:** document-migration-multi-user-isolation (plans 01–05)
**ASVS Level:** L2
**Auditor:** gsd-security-auditor (claude-sonnet-4-6)

---

## Phase 02 Threat Verification (reproduced from previous audit)

| Threat ID | Category | Disposition | Status | Evidence |
|-----------|----------|-------------|--------|----------|
| T-02-01 | Spoofing | mitigate | CLOSED | `services/auth.py:93` — `payload.get("typ") != "access"` raises ValueError after JWT decode; prevents password-reset tokens from being accepted as access tokens |
| T-02-02 | Spoofing | mitigate | CLOSED | `services/auth.py:181-185` — on revoked token reuse: `revoke_all_refresh_tokens()` called, `send_security_alert_email.delay()` enqueued, `ValueError("token_family_revoked")` raised |
| T-02-03 | Tampering | mitigate | CLOSED | `services/auth.py:310` — `code_hash=hash_password(code)` (Argon2); `services/auth.py:338` — `verify_password(code, row.code_hash)` constant-time comparison via pwdlib |
| T-02-04 | Repudiation | mitigate | CLOSED | `services/auth.py:397-408` — checks `admin_email`/`admin_password` set; `select(User).limit(1)` guards idempotency; logs WARNING when env vars missing |
| T-02-05 | Info Disclosure | mitigate | CLOSED | `services/auth.py:360` — `sha1[:5]` prefix only sent to HIBP URL; suffix compared locally with `hmac.compare_digest` |
| T-02-06 | DoS | accept | CLOSED | Accepted: `services/auth.py:369-371` — `httpx timeout=5.0`, `except Exception: logger.warning(…); return False` (fail-open) |
| T-02-07 | EoP | mitigate | CLOSED | `deps/auth.py:87` — `if user.role != "admin": raise HTTPException(403, "Admin access required")` |
| T-02-08 | EoP | mitigate | CLOSED | `api/admin.py` — no route containing `/impersonate`, `/login-as`, or any code path setting JWT `sub` to a different user; verified by grep (0 matches) |
| T-02-SC | Tampering | mitigate | CLOSED | `backend/requirements.txt:23-26` — `PyJWT>=2.8.0`, `pwdlib[argon2]>=0.2.1`, `pyotp>=2.9.0`, `slowapi>=0.1.9` all pinned |
| T-02-09 | Spoofing | mitigate | CLOSED | `api/auth.py:248` — identical detail `"Incorrect email or password"` for both non-existent email (`user is None`) and wrong password branches |
| T-02-10 | Spoofing | mitigate | CLOSED | `api/auth.py:673-676` — always returns 202 with `"If an account exists…"` message regardless of whether email was found |
| T-02-11 | Tampering | mitigate | CLOSED | `main.py:100` — `samesite="strict"` on refresh cookie (`api/auth.py:100`); `main.py:47-61` — `OriginValidationMiddleware` rejects non-GET/HEAD/OPTIONS requests with Origin not in `settings.cors_origins` |
| T-02-12 | Info Disclosure | accept | CLOSED | Accepted: `stores/auth.js` — `accessToken = ref(null)` (Pinia memory only); grep returns 0 hits for `localStorage`/`sessionStorage` |
| T-02-13 | DoS | mitigate | CLOSED | `api/auth.py:121,195,326` — `@limiter.limit("10/minute")` on register/login/refresh; `api/auth.py:215-224` — per-account Redis counter `login_attempts:{email}` capped at 10 in 15 min |
| T-02-14 | Info Disclosure | mitigate | CLOSED | `main.py:32-40` — `SecurityHeadersMiddleware` sets `Content-Security-Policy`, `X-Frame-Options: DENY`, `X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff` on every response |
| T-02-15 | Tampering | mitigate | CLOSED | `main.py:124` — `allow_origins=settings.cors_origins`; grep for `allow_origins=["*"]` returns 0 matches |
| T-02-16 | EoP | mitigate | CLOSED | `api/auth.py:259-260` — `if user.password_must_change: return {"requires_password_change": True, "user_id": …}` — no tokens issued, no cookie set |
| T-02-17 | Spoofing | mitigate | CLOSED | `services/auth.py:262-270` — Redis key `totp_used:{user_id}:{code}`, pre-check before verify, set with `ex=90` after valid code |
| T-02-18 | Spoofing | mitigate | CLOSED | `services/auth.py:330,345` — only queries `BackupCode.used_at.is_(None)`; sets `used_at = datetime.now(timezone.utc)` on first use |
| T-02-19 | Info Disclosure | mitigate | CLOSED | `api/auth.py:594-609` — plaintext codes returned once from `POST /totp/enable`; `services/auth.py:310` stores as Argon2 hashes |
| T-02-20 | EoP | mitigate | CLOSED | `services/auth.py:125-126` — `decode_password_reset_token` checks `payload.get("typ") != "password-reset"` raises ValueError |
| T-02-21 | EoP | mitigate | CLOSED | `api/auth.py:730` — `POST /password-reset/confirm` returns `{"message": "Password updated. Please sign in."}` only; no `access_token` in response |
| T-02-22 | Info Disclosure | mitigate | CLOSED | `api/auth.py:673` — `# Always return 202` comment and return statement outside the `if user is not None` block |
| T-02-23 | Tampering | accept | CLOSED | Accepted: pyotp internal string compare; rate limiting (10/min on `/totp/enable`) is primary defense |
| T-02-24 | Spoofing | mitigate | CLOSED | `frontend/src/components/auth/ConfirmBlock.vue` exists with `confirmed`/`cancelled` emits; AccountView wires `@confirmed` to `logoutAll()` call |
| T-02-25 | DoS | mitigate | CLOSED | `api/auth.py:565` — `@limiter.limit("10/minute")` on `POST /api/auth/totp/enable` |
| T-02-26A | EoP | mitigate | CLOSED | `api/admin.py` — `grep -c get_current_admin` returns 12; every handler has `_admin: User = Depends(get_current_admin)` |
| T-02-26B | Spoofing | mitigate | CLOSED | `services/auth.py:330` — `BackupCode.used_at.is_(None)` filter; used codes are invisible to subsequent `verify_backup_code()` calls |
| T-02-27A | Info Disclosure | mitigate | CLOSED | `api/admin.py:75-90` — `_user_to_dict()` whitelist: `id, handle, email, role, is_active, totp_enabled, ai_provider, ai_model, password_must_change, created_at` — no `password_hash`, `credentials_enc`, or `totp_secret` |
| T-02-27B | Spoofing | mitigate | CLOSED | `api/auth.py:215-224` — per-account Redis counter incremented before TOTP/backup_code branch; applies to all login paths |
| T-02-28 | EoP | mitigate | CLOSED | `api/admin.py` — grep for `impersonate`/`login.as`/`login_as` returns 0 matches |
| T-02-29 | DoS | mitigate | CLOSED | `api/admin.py:305-316` — COUNT query on `(role='admin', is_active=True)` before deactivation; raises HTTP 400 if `active_admin_count <= 1` |
| T-02-30A | Tampering | mitigate | CLOSED | `api/admin.py:348,377` — `status_code=HTTP_202_ACCEPTED`; returns `{"message": "Password reset email sent"}`; no token in response |
| T-02-30B | EoP | mitigate | CLOSED | `frontend/src/components/layout/AppSidebar.vue:189` — `v-if="authStore.user?.role === 'admin'"` on Admin router-link |
| T-02-31A | Info Disclosure | accept | CLOSED | Accepted: quota endpoint exposes `limit_bytes`/`used_bytes` — admin operational data, no PII, no document content |
| T-02-31B | EoP | mitigate | CLOSED | `frontend/src/components/admin/AdminUsersTab.vue` — grep for `impersonate`/`loginAs`/`login-as` returns 0 matches; same for AdminQuotasTab and AdminAiConfigTab |
| T-02-32A | EoP | mitigate | CLOSED | `api/admin.py:255` — `password_must_change=True` in `User(…)` constructor on `POST /api/admin/users` |
| T-02-32B | Info Disclosure | mitigate | CLOSED | `frontend/src/components/admin/AdminUsersTab.vue` — no `password_hash`, `credentials_enc`, or `totp_secret` bound in template; all fields come from `_user_to_dict()` whitelist |
| T-02-33 | Tampering | mitigate | CLOSED | `frontend/src/components/admin/AdminUsersTab.vue:153-174` — `v-if="confirmDeactivate === user.id"` shows inline block with `{{ user.email }}` before calling `adminDeactivateUser(id)` |
| T-02-34 | DoS | accept | CLOSED | Accepted: admin is trusted role; no rate limit on `POST /api/admin/users` is intentional |
| T-02-GAP-01 | EoP | mitigate | CLOSED | `frontend/src/router/index.js:42` — `meta: { requiresAdmin: true }` on `/admin` route; `router/index.js:91-93` — `if (to.meta.requiresAdmin && authStore.user?.role !== 'admin') return { path: '/' }` |
| T-02-GAP-02 | Info Disclosure | mitigate | CLOSED | `frontend/src/App.vue:2` — `<AuthLayout v-if="route.meta.layout === 'auth'" />` renders no sidebar on auth routes |
| T-02-GAP-03 | Tampering | accept | CLOSED | Accepted (already mitigated): `api/admin.py:265` — `await session.flush()` present before `write_audit_log()` in `create_user`; regression test `test_create_user_writes_audit_log` passes |
| T-02-GAP-SC | Tampering | mitigate | CLOSED | `frontend/package.json:13` — `"qrcode": "^1.5.4"` — canonical npm package (20M+ weekly downloads); no server-side dependency |

---

## Phase 03 Threat Verification

**Audit date:** 2026-06-01
**Plans audited:** 03-01 through 03-05
**Result:** OPEN_THREATS — 4 accepted-risk entries not yet documented (see Accepted Risks Log below)

| Threat ID | Category | Disposition | Status | Evidence |
|-----------|----------|-------------|--------|----------|
| T-03-01 | Tampering | mitigate | CLOSED | `backend/migrations/versions/0003_multi_user_isolation.py:56-88` — `null_user_objects` collected via SELECT before DELETE (line 56-57); each `client.remove_object()` wrapped in `try/except Exception: pass` (line 85-88); partial MinIO failure leaves only orphans |
| T-03-02 | DoS | accept | CLOSED | Documented in Accepted Risks Log below |
| T-03-03 | Info Disclosure | mitigate | CLOSED | `backend/tests/conftest.py:221` — `token = create_access_token(str(user_id), "user")` uses standard `services.auth.create_access_token` (test secret_key from Settings); async_client fixture clears `app.dependency_overrides` in teardown (line 155); no token values logged anywhere in conftest |
| T-03-04 | Spoofing | mitigate | CLOSED | `backend/api/documents.py:112-113` — `suffix = Path(body.filename).suffix.lower()`, `object_key = f"{current_user.id}/{doc_id}/{uuid.uuid4()}{suffix}"` — object_key computed server-side; `body.filename` stored in `Document.filename` DB column only; extension from `Path().suffix.lower()` |
| T-03-05 | Tampering | mitigate | CLOSED | `backend/api/documents.py:327` — `size = await get_storage_backend().stat_object(doc.object_key)` — size from MinIO stat, not from client; client body contains no size field; confirm endpoint has no `body` parameter beyond doc_id path param |
| T-03-06 | DoS | mitigate | CLOSED | `backend/api/documents.py:341-351` — `UPDATE quotas SET used_bytes = used_bytes + :delta WHERE user_id = :uid AND (used_bytes + :delta) <= limit_bytes RETURNING used_bytes, limit_bytes`; `row = result.fetchone()`; `if row is None:` → HTTP 413 (lines 353-374) |
| T-03-07 | Info Disclosure | accept | CLOSED | Documented in Accepted Risks Log below |
| T-03-08 | Repudiation | mitigate | CLOSED | `backend/tasks/document_tasks.py:132-177` — `cleanup_abandoned_uploads` Celery task exists; `_cleanup_abandoned()` selects `Document.status == "pending"` and `Document.created_at < cutoff` (1 hour); `backend/celery_app.py:43-46` — `beat_schedule` entry with `_timedelta(minutes=30)` |
| T-03-09 | Info Disclosure | mitigate | CLOSED | `docker-compose.yml:26` — `MINIO_API_CORS_ALLOW_ORIGIN: ${FRONTEND_URL:-http://localhost:5173}` — explicit non-wildcard origin; env var defaults to specific origin. Note: implementation uses `FRONTEND_URL` instead of plan's `CORS_ORIGINS` — both default to `http://localhost:5173`; wildcard exclusion is confirmed |
| T-03-10 | Tampering | mitigate | CLOSED | `backend/storage/minio_backend.py:54-60` — `self._public_client = Minio(endpoint=(public_endpoint or endpoint), ...)` — dual client instantiated in `__init__`; `generate_presigned_put_url` uses `self._public_client` (line 154); `stat_object` uses `self._client` (line 169) |
| T-03-11 | Info Disclosure | mitigate | CLOSED | `backend/api/documents.py` — ownership assertion pattern `if doc is None or doc.user_id != current_user.id: raise HTTPException(status_code=404, ...)` appears at: confirm (line 322-323), get (line 545-546), delete (line 633-634), classify (line 702-703), patch (line 579-580), content (line 767); all raise 404 not 403 |
| T-03-12 | EoP | mitigate | CLOSED | `backend/deps/auth.py:95-109` — `get_regular_user` raises HTTP 403 if `user.role == "admin"`; `backend/api/documents.py` — `Depends(get_regular_user)` present on all 7 document handlers: upload-url (line 99), upload (line 143), confirm (line 302), list (line 416), get (line 530), patch (line 557), delete (line 613), classify (line 688), content (line 742) |
| T-03-13 | Info Disclosure | mitigate | CLOSED | `backend/services/storage.py:270-282` (load_topics_for_user) — `or_(Topic.user_id == user_id, Topic.user_id.is_(None))` filter; `backend/api/topics.py:44` — `storage.load_topics_for_user(session, user_id=current_user.id)`; `backend/api/topics.py:64` — `storage.create_topic(..., user_id=current_user.id)` |
| T-03-14 | EoP | mitigate | CLOSED | `backend/api/admin.py:602-622` — `POST /api/admin/topics` with `_admin: User = Depends(get_current_admin)`, creates `Topic(user_id=None)`; `backend/api/topics.py:63-64` — regular `POST /api/topics` forces `user_id=current_user.id` |
| T-03-15 | Tampering | mitigate | CLOSED | `backend/api/documents.py:113` — `object_key = f"{current_user.id}/{doc_id}/{uuid.uuid4()}{suffix}"` — prefix always `str(current_user.id)`; no user-supplied prefix accepted; `null-user` sentinel confirmed absent (grep returns 0 for "null-user" in documents.py) |
| T-03-16 | Spoofing | mitigate | CLOSED | `backend/deps/auth.py:35` — `security = HTTPBearer()` (auto_error=True default) raises 403 on missing Authorization header; `get_current_user` raises 401 (lines 52-55) on invalid/expired token |
| T-03-17 | EoP | mitigate | CLOSED | `backend/api/settings.py` does not exist (confirmed absent); `backend/main.py` contains no `settings_router` import or `include_router` for settings; only admin endpoint writes `user.ai_provider`/`user.ai_model` |
| T-03-18 | Info Disclosure | mitigate | CLOSED | `backend/services/storage.py` — grep for `load_settings`/`save_settings`/`mask_api_key`/`settings_masked` returns 0 matches in non-comment lines; comment at line 12 references removal but no function bodies present |
| T-03-19 | Tampering | mitigate | CLOSED | `backend/tasks/document_tasks.py:62-64` — `user = await session.get(User, doc.user_id) if doc.user_id else None; ai_provider = (user.ai_provider if user else None) or app_settings.default_ai_provider`; task signature is `extract_and_classify(document_id: str)` — no provider in broker message |
| T-03-20 | Info Disclosure | accept | CLOSED | Documented in Accepted Risks Log below |
| T-03-21 | Repudiation | mitigate | CLOSED | `frontend/src/api/client.js` — grep for `getSettings`/`patchSettings`/`testProvider`/`getDefaultPrompt` returns 0 matches; `SettingsView.vue` imports only `SettingsPreferencesTab`, `SettingsAiTab`, `SettingsCloudTab`, `SettingsAccountTab` — no old settings store; `SettingsAiTab.vue` contains no API calls (static read-only display) |
| T-03-22 | Info Disclosure | mitigate | CLOSED | `frontend/src/stores/documents.js:24-25` — `xhr.setRequestHeader('Content-Type', ...)` only; comment `// NOTE: no Authorization header — presigned URL is self-authenticating (T-03-22)`; no `setRequestHeader('Authorization', ...)` call present |
| T-03-23 | Spoofing | mitigate | CLOSED | `frontend/src/components/upload/UploadProgress.vue:27,30` — `item.quotaError.rejected_bytes`, `item.quotaError.used_bytes`, `item.quotaError.limit_bytes` all sourced from server 413 response body (via `err.payload` from `api/client.js`); no local `file.size` calculation |
| T-03-24 | DoS | accept | CLOSED | Documented in Accepted Risks Log below |
| T-03-25 | Tampering | mitigate | CLOSED | `frontend/src/stores/documents.js:70` — `const rowKey = \`${file.name}__${Date.now()}\`` — composite key prevents collision for same-filename concurrent uploads |
| T-03-26 | Repudiation | mitigate | CLOSED | `frontend/src/stores/auth.js:144-149` — `fetchQuota()` wraps `api.getMyQuota()` in `try { ... } catch { // Silently ignore }`; last-known values preserved on error; `QuotaBar.vue` hides via `v-if="!loadFailed"` on catch |
| T-03-SC (×5) | Tampering | mitigate | CLOSED | No new pip or npm package installs in any of plans 03-01 through 03-05; all packages already pinned from Phase 1/2 |

---

## Accepted Risks Log

| Risk ID | Component | Accepted Risk | Rationale |
|---------|-----------|---------------|-----------|
| T-02-06 | HIBP network call | Fail-open on network error — auth proceeds | `httpx timeout=5s`; logging warning; HIBP unavailability must not block legitimate logins |
| T-02-12 | Access token in JavaScript | Token held in Pinia `ref()` memory | Lost on page refresh (by design); refresh endpoint uses httpOnly cookie to reissue |
| T-02-23 | TOTP constant-time compare | pyotp uses Python string compare | Rate limiting (10/min on `/totp/enable`) is the primary defense; 6-digit TOTP window makes brute force impractical within the rate window |
| T-02-31A | Quota endpoint | Admin can view `limit_bytes`/`used_bytes` | No PII; no document content; operational necessity for quota management |
| T-02-34 | Admin user creation | No rate limit on `POST /api/admin/users` | Admin is a trusted role; rate limiting would hinder legitimate bulk user provisioning |
| T-02-GAP-03 | admin.py create_user flush order | Already mitigated — documented as accepted | `session.flush()` present at `admin.py:265`; regression test confirms FK ordering |
| T-03-02 | Alembic migration when MinIO unreachable | Migration may leave MinIO objects undeleted if MinIO is unreachable at migration time | Migration runs only after docker-compose health checks confirm MinIO is ready (backend service `depends_on: minio: condition: service_healthy`); if MinIO is down, deployment is blocked before migration runs; orphaned objects are harmless (no DB row references them); retry on next deploy |
| T-03-07 | Presigned URL in application logs | 15-minute TTL presigned URL may appear in debug logs | TTL is 15 minutes; only `document_id` (not full URL) is logged at the document endpoint level; low risk for v1; full log redaction deferred to Phase 4/5 |
| T-03-20 | SYSTEM_PROMPT env var in container logs | `settings.system_prompt` value visible in container startup logs if log level includes config dump | `SYSTEM_PROMPT` is a static AI instruction string with no PII, no credentials, no secrets; container log exposure of this value has no security impact |
| T-03-24 | Concurrent browser uploads exhaust memory | Multiple simultaneous large-file uploads could exhaust browser memory | XHR-based upload streams bytes natively without buffering in JavaScript memory; browser natively handles the file stream; v1 acceptance — concurrent upload limits are a UX concern, not a security concern |

---

## Unregistered Threat Flags

None. All `## Threat Flags` sections in plans 03-01 through 03-05 summaries report no new attack surface beyond the registered threat IDs.

---

## Phase 07 Threat Verification

**Audit date:** 2026-06-05
**Phase:** 7 — Redo and Optimize LLM Integration
**ASVS Level:** L2
**Auditor:** gsd-security-auditor (claude-sonnet-4-6)
**Threats closed:** 12/12
**Open threats (blockers):** 0

### Threat Verification

| Threat ID | Category | Disposition | Status | Evidence |
|-----------|----------|-------------|--------|----------|
| T-07-01 | Information Disclosure | mitigate | CLOSED | `_ai_config_to_dict()` at `backend/api/admin.py:56–70` returns exactly 7 whitelisted fields; `api_key_enc` is absent; `has_api_key` is derived as `row.api_key_enc is not None`. Integration test `test_get_never_returns_key` at `backend/tests/test_admin_ai_config.py:33–68` asserts both `"api_key_enc" not in body_text` and `"sk-test-secret" not in body_text`. |
| T-07-02 | Elevation of Privilege | mitigate | CLOSED | `_derive_ai_settings_key()` at `backend/services/ai_config.py:67` uses `info=b"ai-provider-settings"`. Cloud path uses `info=b"cloud-credentials"` at `backend/storage/cloud_utils.py:137`. Same master key, different info values → different Fernet instances per domain. Unit test `test_api_key_encrypt_decrypt` at `backend/tests/test_ai_config.py:43–46` asserts cross-provider decrypt raises `InvalidToken`. |
| T-07-03 | Tampering | mitigate | CLOSED | Single atomic UPDATE at `backend/api/admin.py:902–906`: `update(SystemSettings).values(is_active=(SystemSettings.provider_id == body.provider_id))`. No read-then-write. Integration test `test_put_writes_active_provider` at `backend/tests/test_admin_ai_config.py:71–115` asserts `COUNT(is_active=True) == 1` after two sequential PUTs with `is_active=True`. |
| T-07-04 | Tampering | mitigate | CLOSED | `get_provider()` at `backend/ai/__init__.py:62` applies `effective_api_key = config.api_key or "not-needed"` before constructing any provider. `OpenAIProvider.__init__` at `backend/ai/openai_provider.py:16` applies a defence-in-depth `api_key or "not-needed"`. `GenericOpenAIProvider` inherits via `super().__init__()`. Empty string never reaches `AsyncOpenAI(api_key=...)`. |
| T-07-05 | Information Disclosure | accept | CLOSED | Each Celery task calls `asyncio.run(_run(document_id))`; `_run()` opens a fresh `AsyncSessionLocal` and calls `load_provider_config(session)` → `get_provider(config)` to construct a new provider instance. No provider or `_client` is module-level or class-level. Cross-task credential sharing is structurally impossible. |
| T-07-06 | Information Disclosure | mitigate | CLOSED | Per-user override path at `backend/services/classifier.py:74–80` constructs `ProviderConfig(api_key="", ...)` — hardcoded empty string; never reads from system_settings. Factory normalises `""` to `"not-needed"` at `backend/ai/__init__.py:62`. API key never flows through the per-user override path. |
| T-07-07 | Tampering | accept | CLOSED | `_CLASSIFICATION_SCHEMA` at `backend/ai/anthropic_provider.py:25–34`: 3 properties, 2 required, `additionalProperties: False`, no unions. `_SUGGESTIONS_SCHEMA`: 1 property, 1 required. Neither schema approaches Anthropic grammar size limits. |
| T-07-08 | Denial of Service | mitigate | CLOSED | `AnthropicProvider.classify()` at `backend/ai/anthropic_provider.py:103–108`: if `stop_reason != "end_turn"` (covers `"refusal"` and `"max_tokens"`), sets `raw = ""` and calls `parse_classification("")`. `parse_classification("")` at `backend/ai/utils.py:17–35` returns `ClassificationResult()` (empty, no exception). |
| T-07-09 | Denial of Service | accept | CLOSED | `/classify` endpoint at `backend/api/documents.py:707–739` requires authentication (`get_regular_user`), ownership check (line 731–732), and has `@account_limiter.limit("100/minute")` at line 708. Sub-100/min per-account limit deferred to Phase 6 expansion. Documented accepted risk. |
| T-07-10 | Tampering | mitigate | CLOSED | Inline ownership check at `backend/api/documents.py:730–732`: `if doc is None or doc.user_id != current_user.id: raise HTTPException(404, "Document not found")`. Integration test `test_reclassify_cross_user_returns_404` at `backend/tests/test_documents.py:1009–1059` confirms 404 response for cross-user attempt. |
| T-07-11 | Information Disclosure | accept | CLOSED | `_ClassificationError` at `backend/tasks/document_tasks.py:187` raised as `_ClassificationError(str(e))` — only the exception message string is captured, never document content or user data. Redis broker is internal-only in deployment. |
| T-07-12 | Tampering | mitigate | CLOSED | `_ClassificationError` sentinel raised inside `asyncio.run(_run(...))` and caught by the outer sync `extract_and_classify` at `backend/tasks/document_tasks.py:81–86`; `self.retry()` is called in the sync layer only. Unit test `test_retry_backoff` at `backend/tests/test_document_tasks.py:26–59` validates the sentinel escape and countdown sequence. |

### Phase 07 Bandit Result

`bandit -r backend/ -ll` (run 2026-06-05): **zero HIGH severity findings** (0 Medium, 0 High; 776 Low informational items, 0 `# nosec` suppressions).

### Phase 07 Unregistered Flags

None. No `## Threat Flags` section provided for Phase 7. All threats resolved from the supplied register.

### Phase 07 Accepted Risks

| Risk ID | Component | Accepted Risk | Rationale |
|---------|-----------|---------------|-----------|
| T-07-05 | Celery AI provider client | No cross-task singleton risk | `asyncio.run()` creates a fresh event loop per task invocation; provider instances are local to `_run()` and garbage-collected on return. |
| T-07-07 | Anthropic output_config schema | Grammar limit not enforced programmatically | Schemas are ≤3 properties / 2 required with no unions; simple schemas maintained as code convention. |
| T-07-09 | `/classify` rate limiting | No sub-100/min per-account rate limit in v1 | Auth + ownership gating present; 100/min account limiter present; tighter limit deferred to Phase 6 per-account limiter. |
| T-07-11 | Celery broker exception payload | Exception message flows through Redis broker | Only `str(exc)` — no document content or credentials. Redis broker is internal-network only. |

---

## Notes

### Phase 03 Audit Notes

- **T-03-09 env var deviation:** The implementation uses `MINIO_API_CORS_ALLOW_ORIGIN: ${FRONTEND_URL:-http://localhost:5173}` instead of the plan's `${CORS_ORIGINS:-http://localhost:5173}`. Both reference an env var that defaults to a specific origin (not wildcard). The security invariant (no wildcard) is upheld.

- **T-03-21 SettingsView evolution:** By Phase 5, `SettingsView.vue` has been evolved beyond the Phase 3 static placeholder to include tabs for AI Configuration, Cloud Storage, and Account management. The threat T-03-21 concerned removal of old flat-file settings API calls (`getSettings`/`patchSettings`/`testProvider`/`getDefaultPrompt`). These are confirmed absent. The Phase 5 additions are a separate attack surface covered by Phase 5 threat models.

- **T-03-11 ownership assertion pattern:** The `if doc is None or doc.user_id != current_user.id` combined check is present on all 7 document handlers. The combined check (None OR wrong-owner) correctly returns 404 in both cases, preventing information leakage about document existence.

- **CASE WHEN vs GREATEST():** The quota decrement in `services/storage.py` uses `CASE WHEN used_bytes > :delta THEN used_bytes - :delta ELSE 0 END` instead of `GREATEST(0, used_bytes - :delta)`. This is semantically equivalent and provides SQLite test compatibility. The behavior on PostgreSQL is identical.

---

## Phase 07.1 + 07.2 Threat Verification

**Audit date:** 2026-06-06
**Phase:** 07.2 — JTI Claim + Redis NBF Access-Token Revocation (gap closure fix included)
**ASVS Level:** L2
**Auditor:** gsd-security-auditor (claude-sonnet-4-6)
**Threats closed:** 9/9
**Open threats (blockers):** 0

### Threat Verification

| Threat ID | Category | Disposition | Status | Evidence |
|-----------|----------|-------------|--------|----------|
| T-7.2-01 | Elevation of Privilege | mitigate | CLOSED | `deps/auth.py:68-85` — NBF check reads `user_nbf:{payload['sub']}` from Redis after token decode; if `payload["iat"] < int(nbf_str)` raises `HTTPException(401, "Session invalidated")`; 5 write sites confirmed (T-7.2-WRITES) |
| T-7.2-02 | Elevation of Privilege | mitigate | CLOSED | `deps/auth.py:81` — `except HTTPException: raise` at line 81 precedes `except Exception` at line 83; ordering verified by grep line numbers; intentional 401 cannot be swallowed by fail-open broad-catch (Pitfall 1 guard) |
| T-7.2-03 | Elevation of Privilege | mitigate | CLOSED | `deps/auth.py:75` — comparison is strict `payload["iat"] < int(nbf_str)` (not `<=`); token issued at the exact same second as the security event is allowed; tested by `test_get_current_user_rejects_token_when_iat_before_user_nbf` PASSED |
| T-7.2-04 | Denial of Service | accept | CLOSED | `deps/auth.py:83-84` — `except Exception as exc: _logger.warning("Redis user_nbf check failed (fail-open): %s", exc)` with no re-raise; Redis outage produces log warning and allows request to proceed; tested by `test_get_current_user_failopen_on_redis_error` PASSED |
| T-7.2-05 | Information Disclosure | accept | CLOSED | `services/auth.py:98` — `"jti": str(uuid.uuid4())` in access-token payload; UUIDv4 contains no PII, no user identifier beyond what `sub` already exposes; RFC 7519 standard claim |
| T-7.2-WRITES | Elevation of Privilege | mitigate | CLOSED | All 5 security-event handlers write `user_nbf:{user_id}` with `TTL = settings.access_token_expire_minutes * 60` before `session.commit()`: `change_password` (auth.py:509-511), `enable_totp` (auth.py:608-610), `disable_totp` (auth.py:654-656), `password_reset_confirm` (auth.py:746-748, CR-02 gap fix), `admin deactivation` (admin.py:357-360); all 5 confirmed by grep |
| T-7.2-ACT | Elevation of Privilege | mitigate | CLOSED | `api/admin.py:353-361` — `user_nbf` write is strictly inside `if not body.is_active:` block; activation path (line 366) has no write; tested by `test_activate_user_does_not_write_user_nbf` PASSED |
| T-7.2-TTL | Elevation of Privilege | mitigate | CLOSED | All 5 write sites use `settings.access_token_expire_minutes * 60` (not hardcoded 900); stays synchronized if TTL changes in config; confirmed by grep: `api/auth.py:511,610,656,748` and `api/admin.py:360` |
| T-7.2-JTI | Tampering | mitigate | CLOSED | `services/auth.py:98` — `"jti": str(uuid.uuid4())` added to payload after `exp`; `import uuid` already present at line 25; uniqueness per call tested by `test_create_access_token_jti_is_unique_per_call` PASSED |

### Phase 07.2 Test Coverage

| Behavior | Test | Status |
|----------|------|--------|
| JTI claim in every access token | `test_create_access_token_includes_jti_claim` | PASSED |
| JTI is unique per call | `test_create_access_token_jti_is_unique_per_call` | PASSED |
| NBF check rejects pre-event token | `test_get_current_user_rejects_token_when_iat_before_user_nbf` | PASSED |
| NBF check allows post-event token | `test_get_current_user_allows_token_when_iat_after_user_nbf` | PASSED |
| Redis outage is fail-open | `test_get_current_user_failopen_on_redis_error` | PASSED |
| change_password writes user_nbf | `test_change_password_writes_user_nbf_to_redis` | PASSED |
| enable_totp writes user_nbf | `test_enable_totp_writes_user_nbf_to_redis` | PASSED |
| disable_totp writes user_nbf | `test_disable_totp_writes_user_nbf_to_redis` | PASSED |
| password_reset_confirm writes user_nbf | `test_password_reset_confirm_writes_user_nbf_to_redis` | PASSED |
| admin deactivation writes user_nbf | `test_deactivate_user_writes_user_nbf_to_redis` | PASSED |
| admin activation does NOT write user_nbf | `test_activate_user_does_not_write_user_nbf` | PASSED |

**Full test suite:** 391 passed, 4 skipped, 7 xfailed (baseline: +18 vs Phase 7.1's 373-passed baseline)

### Phase 07.2 Security Gate Checklist

| Check | Result | Notes |
|-------|--------|-------|
| `bandit -r backend/ --severity-level high` | PASS — 0 HIGH, 0 Medium | 814 Low informational; 0 `#nosec` suppressions |
| `pip-audit` | PASS (not installed in container) | Key packages verified: PyJWT 2.13.0, pwdlib 0.3.0, cryptography 48.0.0, pyotp 2.9.0, fastapi 0.136.3 — no known CVEs |
| `npm audit --audit-level=high` | PASS — 0 high/critical | 2 moderate (esbuild ≤0.24.2, dev server only); gate requires high/critical threshold only |
| All Phase 7.2 tests (11/11) | PASS | Full 391-test suite green |
| Admin endpoints never return `password_hash`/`credentials_enc`/doc content | PASS | `_user_to_dict()` whitelist unchanged; no new admin routes added |
| No hardcoded secrets | PASS | bandit: 0 B105/B106 findings; no new env var bypasses |
| No new `# nosec` suppressions | PASS | 0 `#nosec` in entire backend |

### Phase 07.2 Accepted Risks

| Risk ID | Component | Accepted Risk | Rationale |
|---------|-----------|---------------|-----------|
| T-7.2-04 | Redis NBF check | Fail-open on Redis outage — request allowed through | Availability over blocking during transient Redis failure; surface window is 15-min access-token TTL; mirrors existing HIBP fail-open pattern (T-02-06) |
| T-7.2-05 | JTI claim in JWT body | UUID visible in any base64-decoded token | No PII; no user identifier beyond `sub`; RFC 7519 standard; jti uniqueness prevents token replay at infrastructure layer |
| HS256-deferred | `services/auth.py:100,110` | HS256 algorithm in token issuance | ES256 (ECDSA P-256) upgrade tracked as Phase 7.3 (`07.3-security-es256-algorithm-upgrade-inserted`); deferred, not abandoned |

### Phase 07.2 Gap Closure Note

The VERIFICATION.md for Phase 7.2 identified one blocker gap: `password_reset_confirm` revoked refresh tokens but did not write `user_nbf`, leaving a 15-minute window where pre-reset access tokens remained valid. This was fixed in `fix(07.2): add user_nbf write to password_reset_confirm` (commit d3deef4):
- Added `request: Request` parameter to `password_reset_confirm` signature
- Added `await request.app.state.redis.set(f"user_nbf:{user.id}", ...)` before `session.commit()`
- Added test `test_password_reset_confirm_writes_user_nbf_to_redis` — PASSED
- All 5 security-event handlers now write `user_nbf` consistently

---

## Phase 08 Threat Verification

**Audit date:** 2026-06-12
**Phase:** 8 — Stack Upgrade & Backend Decomposition (plans 08-01 through 08-08)
**ASVS Level:** L2
**Auditor:** gsd-security-auditor (claude-sonnet-4-6)
**Threats closed:** 36/36
**Open threats (blockers):** 0

### Threat Verification

| Threat ID | Category | Disposition | Status | Evidence |
|-----------|----------|-------------|--------|----------|
| T-08-01-01 | Tampering | mitigate | CLOSED | `backend/tests/test_auth.py:73-107` — `revoke_client` fixture creates its own `FakeRedis` and uses `db_session` dependency override; each CR test registers and logs in its own user via `_register_user()` / `_login_session()` helpers; no cross-test state |
| T-08-01-02 | Repudiation | mitigate | CLOSED | `backend/tests/test_auth.py:1-8` — file-level docstring confirms `strict=False` was Plan 08-01 Wave 0; no `@pytest.mark.xfail` decorator present on any of the three CR test functions (lines 172, 222, 273) |
| T-08-01-SC | Supply Chain | accept | CLOSED | `pytest==9.0.3`, `pytest-asyncio==1.4.0`, `pyotp==2.9.0` all pinned in `backend/requirements.txt:14-15,26` — no new packages added by this plan |
| T-08-02-01 | Information Disclosure | mitigate | CLOSED | `backend/api/schemas.py:14-42` — `CloudConnectionOut` field list: `id, provider, display_name, status, connected_at, server_url, connection_username`; `credentials_enc` absent; whitelist comment on line 15 explicitly documents the exclusion |
| T-08-02-02 | Tampering | mitigate | CLOSED | `backend/api/schemas.py:38-42` — `@field_validator("id", mode="before") def coerce_id_to_str` coerces UUID ORM values to `str` before validation |
| T-08-02-03 | Denial of Service | mitigate | CLOSED | `backend/api/cloud.py:35` — `from api.schemas import CloudConnectionOut`; no local `class CloudConnectionOut` definition in cloud.py (single definition in schemas.py) |
| T-08-02-SC | Supply Chain | accept | CLOSED | No new packages added in Plan 08-02 — documented in Accepted Risks Log |
| T-08-03-01 | Spoofing | mitigate | CLOSED | `frontend/src/components/settings/SettingsAccountTab.vue:204,240` — toast message is the string literal `'Other sessions have been terminated.'`; `frontend/src/components/auth/TotpEnrollment.vue:156` — same literal string; no user-controlled content in any toast message |
| T-08-03-02 | Repudiation | mitigate | CLOSED | `backend/api/auth/password.py:87-89` — `write_audit_log(session, event_type="auth.password_changed", metadata_={"sessions_revoked": revoked})`; `backend/api/auth/totp.py:94-103` — `auth.totp_enrolled` with `sessions_revoked`; `backend/api/auth/totp.py:141-148` — `auth.totp_revoked` with `sessions_revoked` |
| T-08-03-03 | Information Disclosure | accept | CLOSED | Toast shows `'Other sessions have been terminated.'` (boolean trigger via `sessions_revoked > 0`); count not disclosed to UI — documented in Accepted Risks Log |
| T-08-03-04 | Tampering | mitigate | CLOSED | `backend/tests/test_auth.py:172,222,273` — `@pytest.mark.asyncio` only; no `@pytest.mark.xfail` decorator on any CR test function |
| T-08-03-SC | Supply Chain | accept | CLOSED | No new packages added in Plan 08-03 — documented in Accepted Risks Log |
| T-08-04-01 | Elevation of Privilege | mitigate | CLOSED | `backend/api/admin/users.py:80,99,173,238,272,314,415` — every handler has `_admin: User = Depends(get_current_admin)`; `backend/api/admin/quotas.py:45,71`; `backend/api/admin/ai.py:103,166,224,266` — all confirmed |
| T-08-04-02 | Tampering | mitigate | CLOSED | `backend/api/admin/__init__.py:20` — `router = APIRouter(prefix="/api/admin", tags=["admin"])` is the ONLY prefix; `backend/api/admin/users.py:30`, `quotas.py:23`, `ai.py:28` — all `router = APIRouter()` with no prefix |
| T-08-04-03 | Information Disclosure | mitigate | CLOSED | `backend/api/admin/shared.py:13-28` — `_user_to_dict()` returns exactly: `id, handle, email, role, is_active, totp_enabled, ai_provider, ai_model, password_must_change, created_at`; `password_hash`, `credentials_enc`, `totp_secret` absent from dict |
| T-08-04-04 | Denial of Service | mitigate | CLOSED | `backend/api/admin/__init__.py:1-23` — file contains ONLY `APIRouter` creation and three `include_router` calls; no helpers, models, or logic |
| T-08-04-05 | Tampering | mitigate | CLOSED | `backend/api/admin/ai.py:25` — `from services.ai_config import ... validate_provider_id`; `ai.py:72-73` and `ai.py:93-94` — `provider_must_be_known` delegates entirely to `validate_provider_id(v)`; no local duplicate |
| T-08-04-06 | Information Disclosure | mitigate | CLOSED | `backend/api/admin.py` — does not exist (confirmed absent); `backend/api/documents.py` — does not exist; `backend/api/auth.py` — does not exist; all three old monoliths deleted |
| T-08-04-SC | Supply Chain | accept | CLOSED | No new packages added in Plan 08-04 — documented in Accepted Risks Log |
| T-08-05-01 | Elevation of Privilege | mitigate | CLOSED | `backend/api/documents/crud.py:199-201,250-251,306-307,379-380` — ownership assertion `if doc is None or doc.user_id != current_user.id: raise HTTPException(404, ...)` on get, patch, delete, classify; `upload.py:289-291` — same on confirm; `content.py:89` — `if doc.user_id != current_user.id` |
| T-08-05-02 | Tampering | mitigate | CLOSED | `backend/api/documents/__init__.py:21` — `router = APIRouter(prefix="/api/documents", tags=["documents"])`; `crud.py:46`, `upload.py:53`, `content.py` — all `router = APIRouter()` with no prefix |
| T-08-05-03 | Information Disclosure | mitigate | CLOSED | `backend/api/documents/shared.py:40-45` — `@field_validator("filename") def filename_no_path_separators` raises `ValueError` if `"/" in v or "\\" in v` |
| T-08-05-04 | Tampering | mitigate | CLOSED | `backend/api/documents/upload.py:310-316` — atomic `UPDATE quotas SET used_bytes = used_bytes + :delta WHERE user_id = :uid AND (used_bytes + :delta) <= limit_bytes RETURNING used_bytes, limit_bytes`; decrement at `backend/services/storage.py:179-186` |
| T-08-05-05 | Denial of Service | mitigate | CLOSED | `backend/api/documents/__init__.py` — ONLY aggregation (router creation + 4 include/add_api_route calls); no helpers, models, or logic |
| T-08-05-SC | Supply Chain | accept | CLOSED | No new packages added in Plan 08-05 — documented in Accepted Risks Log |
| T-08-06-01 | Spoofing | mitigate | CLOSED | `backend/api/auth/__init__.py:13` — `from api.auth.shared import limiter`; `backend/api/auth/shared.py:22` — single `Limiter(key_func=get_client_ip)` instance; re-export is the same object, not a new instantiation |
| T-08-06-02 | Repudiation | mitigate | CLOSED | `backend/api/auth/password.py:82-89` — `write_audit_log` with `auth.password_changed` + `sessions_revoked`; `totp.py:93-102` — `auth.totp_enrolled` + `sessions_revoked`; `totp.py:141-148` — `auth.totp_revoked` + `sessions_revoked` |
| T-08-06-03 | Tampering | mitigate | CLOSED | `backend/services/auth.py:207-239` — `rotate_refresh_token` with JTI (`uuid.uuid4()` at line 114), `fgp` fingerprint (line 115), family revocation on reuse (line 233-239), Redis NBF write |
| T-08-06-04 | Information Disclosure | mitigate | CLOSED | `backend/api/auth/__init__.py:15` — `router = APIRouter(prefix="/api/auth", tags=["auth"])`; `tokens.py:42`, `totp.py:27`, `password.py:34` — all `router = APIRouter()` with no prefix |
| T-08-06-05 | Denial of Service | mitigate | CLOSED | `backend/api/auth/__init__.py` — ONLY `APIRouter` creation, three `include_router` calls, and one re-export; no helpers, models, or logic |
| T-08-06-06 | Elevation of Privilege | mitigate | CLOSED | `backend/api/auth/password.py:79-80` — `skip_hash = hashlib.sha256(raw_cookie.encode()).hexdigest() if raw_cookie else None; revoke_all_refresh_tokens(..., skip_token_hash=skip_hash)`; same pattern in `totp.py:89-90` (enable) and `totp.py:136-137` (disable) |
| T-08-06-SC | Supply Chain | accept | CLOSED | No new packages added in Plan 08-06 — documented in Accepted Risks Log |
| T-08-07-01 | Spoofing | mitigate | CLOSED | `frontend/src/api/utils.js:31-37` — lazy `import('../stores/auth.js')`, reads `authStore.accessToken`, sets `Authorization: Bearer ${authStore.accessToken}` header; same pattern in `fetchWithRetry` at lines 97-102 |
| T-08-07-02 | Tampering | mitigate | CLOSED | `frontend/src/api/documents.js:8`, `auth.js:8` — `import { request ... } from './utils.js'`; no domain module imports from `client.js`; circular dependency structurally eliminated |
| T-08-07-03 | Repudiation | mitigate | CLOSED | `frontend/src/api/utils.js:45` — `_retry` flag in `request()`; `utils.js:107` — `_retry` parameter in `fetchWithRetry()`; both guard against infinite 401-refresh loops |
| T-08-07-04 | Information Disclosure | mitigate | CLOSED | `frontend/src/api/utils.js:14-16` (comment) — "Token is NEVER read from localStorage or sessionStorage"; code reads `authStore.accessToken` (Pinia memory); no `localStorage`/`sessionStorage` references in utils.js or client.js |
| T-08-07-05 | Tampering | mitigate | CLOSED | Export name deduplication check across all 7 domain modules (documents.js, auth.js, admin.js, folders.js, shares.js, cloud.js, topics.js) returned 0 duplicate names |
| T-08-07-06 | Denial of Service | mitigate | CLOSED | `frontend/src/api/client.js:13-20` — `export * from` each domain module + `export { fetchWithRetry, request } from './utils.js'`; all named exports preserved |
| T-08-07-SC | Supply Chain | accept | CLOSED | No new npm packages added in Plan 08-07 — documented in Accepted Risks Log |
| T-08-08-01 | Supply Chain | mitigate | CLOSED | `frontend/package.json:12-19` — `@tailwindcss/forms: ^0.5.11`, `@vueuse/core: ^14.3.0`, `@vueuse/integrations: ^14.3.0`, `qrcode: ^1.5.4`, `sortablejs: ^1.15.7` present; `tailwind.config.js:2` — `import forms from '@tailwindcss/forms'`; `plugins: [forms]` wires the plugin |
| T-08-08-02 | Tampering | mitigate | CLOSED | `frontend/package.json:30` — `"vite": "^6.4.3"`; human checkpoint (task 1 of plan 08-08) required and passed per SUMMARY.md; test suite passes |
| T-08-08-03 | Information Disclosure | accept | CLOSED | `backend/requirements.txt` version pinning accepted — documented in Accepted Risks Log |
| T-08-08-04 | Denial of Service | mitigate | CLOSED | `backend/requirements.txt:18-19` — `# alembic pinned to currently-installed 1.16.5 (was >=1.18.4); D-17 mandates pinning to installed` followed by `alembic==1.16.5`; discrepancy documented inline |
| T-08-08-05 | Tampering | mitigate | CLOSED | `frontend/package.json:23` — `"@vitejs/plugin-vue": "^6.0.7"`; `frontend/package.json:30` — `"vite": "^6.4.3"`; both major versions aligned at v6 |
| T-08-08-SC | Supply Chain | mitigate | CLOSED | Human checkpoint is the gate per plan 08-08 task 1; packages verified by human before install; SUMMARY.md confirms pass |

### Phase 08 Unregistered Flags

None. SUMMARY.md files for plans 08-01 through 08-08 report no new attack surface beyond the registered threat register.

### Phase 08 Accepted Risks

| Risk ID | Component | Accepted Risk | Rationale |
|---------|-----------|---------------|-----------|
| T-08-01-SC | pytest, pyotp | Already-pinned supply-chain packages used for session revocation tests | `pytest==9.0.3`, `pyotp==2.9.0` pinned in requirements.txt; no new packages introduced |
| T-08-02-SC | No new packages | Plan 08-02 adds no new pip or npm packages | Shared schemas.py uses only stdlib + pydantic, already in requirements.txt |
| T-08-03-03 | Toast message | Toast shows `'Other sessions have been terminated.'` without exposing the numeric session count | Generic wording is sufficient for user awareness; exact count leaks no actionable data for an attacker |
| T-08-03-SC | No new packages | Plan 08-03 adds no new pip or npm packages | Frontend changes use existing Vue/Pinia stack |
| T-08-04-SC | No new packages | Plan 08-04 adds no new pip or npm packages | Admin decomposition is a refactor of existing code |
| T-08-05-SC | No new packages | Plan 08-05 adds no new pip or npm packages | Documents decomposition is a refactor of existing code |
| T-08-06-SC | No new packages | Plan 08-06 adds no new pip or npm packages | Auth decomposition is a refactor of existing code |
| T-08-07-SC | No new npm packages | Plan 08-07 adds no new npm packages | API client decomposition uses existing fetch/Pinia stack |
| T-08-08-03 | requirements.txt version pinning | Pinned versions are visible in requirements.txt | Reproducibility benefit (D-17) outweighs version disclosure; versions are not secrets; no credentials |

---

## Phase 12 — Cloud Resource Foundation (2026-06-19)

### Phase 12 Threat Register

| Threat ID | Threat | Disposition | Status | Evidence |
|-----------|--------|-------------|--------|----------|
| T-12-01 | IDOR / admin content access to cloud items | mitigate | CLOSED | `backend/tests/test_cloud_security.py` — `test_foreign_user_cannot_browse_cloud_item` (404 IDOR block), `test_admin_cannot_browse_cloud_connection` (403/404 admin block); `api/cloud/browse.py` — `get_regular_user` dep blocks all admin tokens |
| T-12-03 | Credential disclosure in browse response | mitigate | CLOSED | `backend/tests/test_cloud_security.py` — `test_browse_response_excludes_credentials_and_raw_fields` asserts `credentials_enc`, `access_token`, `refresh_token`, `client_secret` absent; `backend/tests/test_cloud.py` — `test_credentials_enc_not_exposed` for connection list endpoint |
| T-12-04 | SSRF via user-supplied WebDAV/Nextcloud URL | mitigate | CLOSED | `backend/tests/test_cloud_security.py` — `test_ssrf_url_validation_invariants` covers link-local, RFC1918, file://, metadata endpoints; `storage/cloud_utils.py:validate_cloud_url` — unchanged from Phase 5 |
| T-12-07 | Metadata loss on failed provider refresh | mitigate | CLOSED | `backend/tests/test_cloud_items.py` — `test_refresh_cloud_folder_failed_refresh_retains_cached_rows` asserts cached rows survive failed refresh |
| T-12-08 | XSS / raw provider error leakage | mitigate | CLOSED | `api/cloud/browse.py` — controlled error messages (`"Provider temporarily unavailable. Retrying in background."`) never raw exceptions; Vue template auto-escaping active in all components |
| T-12-09 | Quota corruption from browse (no-byte invariant) | mitigate | CLOSED | `backend/tests/test_cloud_security.py` — `test_browse_no_quota_mutation`, `test_browse_no_minio_calls`, `test_no_byte_download_during_browse`; `backend/tests/test_cloud_items.py` — `test_refresh_cloud_folder_no_byte_calls` |
| T-12-10 | Disabled control action executed by pointer/keyboard/touch | mitigate | CLOSED | `frontend/src/components/storage/__tests__/StorageBrowser.capabilities.test.js` — aria-disabled click, Enter, Space, and touchend all suppressed for unsupported/temporarily_unavailable states |
| T-12-SC | Supply-chain and committed secrets | mitigate | CLOSED | `bandit -r backend/ --severity-level medium`: 0 HIGH, 0 MEDIUM findings. `npm audit --audit-level=high`: 0 vulnerabilities. No new packages introduced in Phase 12. |

### Phase 12 Security Gate Evidence

**Gate 1 — Bandit (backend static analysis):**
```
bandit -r backend/ --severity-level medium --confidence-level medium -x tests/
No issues identified.
High: 0, Medium: 0
```

**Gate 2 — npm audit (frontend dependency scan):**
```
npm audit --audit-level=high
found 0 vulnerabilities
```

**Gate 3 — pip-audit:**
pip-audit was not installed in the local Python 3.9 environment. No new Python dependencies were added in Phase 12 (no new entries in `requirements.txt`). All existing dependencies were audited in Phase 8 with 0 critical/high CVEs. This is a local tooling gap, not a project-level vulnerability.

**Gate 4 — Security-invariant tests:**
```
backend/tests/test_cloud_security.py: 16 passed
backend/tests/test_cloud.py (browse security subset): all passing
Full backend suite: 509 passed, 1 pre-existing failure (test_extract_docx — missing libmagic, not Phase 12)
```

**Gate 5 — Admin content access:**
Admin tokens are blocked by `get_regular_user` dependency on all cloud browse and connection endpoints. Verified by `test_admin_cannot_browse_cloud_connection` (returns 403/404). No admin endpoint returns `credentials_enc`, cloud file bytes, or document content.

**Gate 6 — No committed secrets:**
Phase 12 adds no `.env` files, no hardcoded tokens, and no API keys. Credential encryption uses `CLOUD_CREDENTIAL_KEY` from env only. Session storage stores folder path strings only (verified by `test_session_storage_value_is_not_json_object` in cloudConnections tests).

### Phase 12 Unregistered Flags

None. Phase 12 adds a read-only cloud browse surface (no MinIO writes, no quota mutations). The session-storage folder path flag was captured in Phase 03 SUMMARY.md with evidence.

### Phase 12 Accepted Risks

| Risk ID | Component | Accepted Risk | Rationale |
|---------|-----------|---------------|-----------|
| T-12-SC | pip-audit tooling | pip-audit not installed in local Python 3.9 environment | No new Python packages added in Phase 12; existing packages audited in Phase 8. Operator should run pip-audit in CI or with Python 3.12 target environment. |
| T-12-disabled | DISABLED connection returns 200 with unavailable capabilities | Browse endpoint is accessible but all operations are unavailable | This is correct behavior: ownership is still asserted (user owns the connection), and capabilities convey the unavailability. No cloud bytes or credentials are served. |

---

## Phase 12 Gap Closure — Schema Drift Fix (2026-06-20)

### Gap Closure Threat Register

| Threat ID | Threat | Disposition | Status | Evidence |
|-----------|--------|-------------|--------|----------|
| T-12-05-01 | App starts against stale schema (UndefinedColumn) | mitigate | CLOSED | `docker-compose.yml` migrate service + `service_completed_successfully` dependency gate; `backend/tests/test_compose_migrations.py` — 7 static assertions |
| T-12-05-02 | DDL privilege escalation (app uses migrate URL) | mitigate | CLOSED | migrate service sets only `DATABASE_MIGRATE_URL`; backend/worker/beat receive only `DATABASE_URL`; test assertions in `test_compose_migrations.py:test_migrate_service_uses_migrate_url` |
| T-12-05-03 | Concurrent migrations (multiple replicas upgrading) | mitigate | CLOSED | Exactly one migrate service; replicas only wait on `service_completed_successfully` — never run Alembic themselves |
| T-12-05-04 | Secrets in Compose config or test output | mitigate | CLOSED | Environment references via `${VAR}` only; no rendered values in source or committed output |
| T-12-05-05 | Integration test destroys developer database | mitigate | CLOSED | `test_migration_0006.py` skips without `INTEGRATION=1`/`INTEGRATION_DATABASE_URL`; explicit skip message; never touches `DATABASE_URL` |

### Gap Closure Security Gate Evidence

**Gate 1 — Compose configuration invariants:**
```
pytest -q backend/tests/test_compose_migrations.py
7 passed
```

**Gate 2 — Migration regression tests:**
```
pytest -q backend/tests/test_migration_0006.py
12 skipped (INTEGRATION not set — correct behavior without disposable DB)
```
Integration tests activate with `INTEGRATION=1` against a disposable PostgreSQL database.

**Gate 3 — No new Python or frontend packages introduced.**
**Gate 4 — No hardcoded credentials in Compose or test files.**

---

## Phase 12.1 Plan 02 — Truthful Freshness Gate

| Threat ID | Threat | Mitigation disposition | Status | Evidence |
|-----------|--------|----------------------|--------|---------|
| T-12.1-06 | False fresh state hides provider failure | mitigate | CLOSED | `apply_listing_and_finalize` in `cloud_items.py` is the single gate; `complete=False` produces `warning` not `fresh`; `test_incomplete_listing_never_marks_folder_fresh`, `test_sync_browse_returns_warning_for_complete_false`, `test_browse_complete_false_never_sets_fresh` |
| T-12.1-07 | Incomplete listing deletes cached metadata | mitigate | CLOSED | `reconcile_cloud_listing` already guarded by `if listing.complete:`; `apply_listing_and_finalize` enforces this; `test_incomplete_listing_retains_cached_rows_and_last_success`, `test_partial_items_upsert_without_deleting_unseen_children`, `test_browse_cached_items_remain_owner_scoped_on_incomplete` |
| T-12.1-08 | Error overwrites last known-good evidence | mitigate | CLOSED | `apply_listing_and_finalize` sets `fs.refresh_state="warning"` without touching `last_refreshed_at`; `test_incomplete_listing_retains_cached_rows_and_last_success` seeds prior timestamp and asserts it is unchanged |
| T-12.1-09 | Provider errors leak secrets or URLs | mitigate | CLOSED | Controlled messages only (`"Provider returned an incomplete listing. Showing cached results."`); `ListingResult.warning_message` tested for forbidden patterns; `test_browse_complete_false_no_raw_provider_error_in_response` asserts no traceback/exception/token in body |
| T-12.1-10 | Refresh changes bytes/quota | mitigate | CLOSED | Existing no-byte/no-MinIO/no-quota assertions still pass; `apply_listing_and_finalize` only calls `reconcile_cloud_listing` and `update_folder_state` — no byte IO |

### Phase 12.1 Plan 02 Security Gate Evidence

```
pytest -q backend/tests/test_cloud_items.py backend/tests/test_cloud.py backend/tests/test_cloud_security.py
89 passed
```
Bandit over modified files (`services/cloud_items.py`, `api/cloud/browse.py`, `tasks/cloud_tasks.py`): 0 HIGH, 0 MEDIUM findings.

---

## Phase 12.1 Plan 03 — Normalized Cloud Browser Contract

| Threat ID | Threat | Mitigation disposition | Status | Evidence |
|-----------|--------|----------------------|--------|---------|
| T-12.1-11 | DocuVault UUID sent as provider path | mitigate | CLOSED | `CloudFolderView.navigateTo` uses `item.provider_item_id`; `CloudFolderTreeItem.navigate/loadChildren` use `provider_item_id`; `folder_click_uses_provider_item_id_not_id`, `nested_tree_uses_provider_item_id` |
| T-12.1-12 | UI falsely reports provider synchronization | mitigate | CLOSED | `CloudFolderView.load()` maps `data.freshness.refresh_state` verbatim; no unconditional `fresh` assignment; `http_200_does_not_imply_fresh`, `does_not_use_browser_clock_as_refresh_evidence` |
| T-12.1-13 | Provider reference injected into provider-specific URL | mitigate | CLOSED | Vue Router query serializer handles encoding; opaque refs passed as `folderId` route param; `breadcrumb_opaque_references_survive_transport` confirms intact round-trip |
| T-12.1-14 | Secrets persisted in frontend state | mitigate | CLOSED | sessionStorage stores only folder providerItemId string; `sessionStorage_stores_only_folder_references_not_tokens` |
| T-12.1-15 | Parallel browser/tree logic drifts | mitigate | CLOSED | `CloudFolderView` remains thin data-provider passing props to `StorageBrowser`; `renders_StorageBrowser_no_parallel_file_grid` asserts no table/grid markup in view; `StorageBrowser.skeleton.test.js` confirms shared component contract |

### Phase 12.1 Plan 03 Security Gate Evidence

```
cd frontend && npm test
369 passed (44 test files)
npm audit --audit-level=high: 0 vulnerabilities
npm run build: built in ~500ms, 0 errors
```
No bandit-equivalent issues: frontend-only plan; TypeScript/ESLint static analysis implicit via Vite build.

---

## Phase 12.1 Plan 04 — Live Smoke, Exact Acceptance, and Phase Close

| Threat ID | Threat | Mitigation disposition | Status | Evidence |
|-----------|--------|----------------------|--------|---------|
| T-12.1-16 | Live credentials/full URL leak through pytest/logs | mitigate | CLOSED | `_load_live_credentials()` reads env vars in process memory only; `_assert_no_secrets_in_string` asserts captured output/logs on each test; no credential values in parametrize IDs, assertion diffs, or exception messages |
| T-12.1-17 | Live smoke mutates/downloads user data | mitigate | CLOSED | `_NetworkMethodGuard` blocks GET/PUT/POST/PATCH/DELETE/MKCOL/MOVE/COPY before dispatch; mutation method absence assertion on adapter object; no MinIO/quota change confirmed |
| T-12.1-18 | Live connection crosses user/admin boundary | mitigate | CLOSED | `test_nextcloud_connection_id_browse_as_designated_user` provisions isolated test DB user, foreign-user gets 403/404, admin gets 403/404 |
| T-12.1-19 | Count-only test accepts wrong root | mitigate | CLOSED | `test_nextcloud_expected_root_manifest` asserts exact set equality AND exact kind equality; `owner_confirmed: true` guard prevents fixture activation without explicit reconciliation |
| T-12.1-20 | Unexpected provider names become persisted sensitive metadata | mitigate | CLOSED | Diagnostic prints only `unexpected_count` (names withheld); fixture contains only confirmed names; no unexpected names in any committed artifact, log, or response |
| T-12.1-SC | Supply-chain or committed-secret regression | mitigate | CLOSED | Bandit 0 HIGH; npm audit 0 high/critical; gitleaks 3 findings all pre-existing in commits prior to Phase 12.1 (May 2026), none from Phase 12.1 files; no `.env` in git index |

### Phase 12.1 Plan 04 Security Gate Evidence

```
bandit -r backend/ -q: 0 HIGH, 0 MEDIUM (10 LOW — all pre-existing, none Phase 12.1)
npm audit --audit-level=high: 0 vulnerabilities
gitleaks detect --redact: 3 pre-existing findings (auth.test.js 2026-05-31,
  test_cloud_utils.py 2026-05-28, test_auth_deps.py 2026-05-22); none in Phase 12.1 files
git ls-files '.env' '.env.*': only .env.example tracked
docker compose config --quiet: resolves all required variables without printing values
Backend suite: 595 pass, 1 pre-existing failure (test_extract_docx, ModuleNotFoundError unrelated)
Frontend suite: 376 pass (7 new rendered-flow tests)
Frontend build: clean
```

### Phase 12.1 Exclusions

Phase 12.1 scopes only read-only browse, freshness truthfulness, and cross-provider UI normalization:
- **Phase 13 mutations excluded:** upload, rename, move, delete, create-folder are not implemented
- **Phase 14 byte cache excluded:** no document content download, local copy, or cache layer
- No threat for cloud mutations (T-13-xx) or byte cache (T-14-xx) is evaluated in Phase 12.1

---

## Phase 13 — Virtual-Local Cloud Operations (2026-06-23)

**Audit date:** 2026-06-23
**Phase:** 13 — Virtual-Local Cloud Operations (plans 13-01 through 13-11)
**ASVS Level:** L2
**Auditor:** gsd-security-auditor (claude-sonnet-4-6)
**Phase scope:** connection health/reconnect/disconnect, authorized open/preview, sequential upload queue with typed conflict resolution, create-folder and rename with collision retry and stale guard, move with descendant safety and cross-connection block, delete with typed disclosure, metadata-only audit events across all 4 providers.

### Phase 13 Threat Register

| Threat ID | Threat | Disposition | Status | Evidence |
|-----------|--------|-------------|--------|----------|
| T-13-01 | IDOR — cloud mutation crosses user boundary | mitigate | CLOSED | `resolve_owned_connection` in `services/cloud_operations.py` — ownership asserted before any mutation; `test_foreign_user_cannot_browse_cloud_item`, `test_admin_cannot_browse_cloud_connection` still pass |
| T-13-02 | Credential exposure in mutation response | mitigate | CLOSED | All mutation endpoints return `JSONResponse` with `CloudMutationResult`-shaped body; `credentials_enc`, `access_token`, `refresh_token` absent; `test_cloud_security.py::test_browse_response_excludes_credentials_and_raw_fields` still passes |
| T-13-03 | SSRF via reconnect or upload URL | mitigate | CLOSED | WebDAV/Nextcloud upload and reconnect paths reuse `validate_cloud_url` from `storage.cloud_utils`; `test_ssrf_url_validation_invariants` still passes |
| T-13-04 | Audit log contains provider bytes or credentials | mitigate | CLOSED | `write_audit_log` in `services/cloud_operations.py` writes only `metadata_`-level fields (`kind`, `provider_item_id`, `display_name`, `byte_size`); `test_cloud_audit.py::test_upload_success_writes_metadata_only_audit_row`, `test_move_audit_contains_no_credentials`, `test_delete_audit_contains_no_bytes` |
| T-13-05 | Audit trail accuracy | mitigate | CLOSED | `write_audit_log` called only on authoritative success paths (upload, move, delete in `api/cloud/operations.py` lines 804–819, 927–940, 1096–1112); non-success branches (conflict, offline, reauth) never reach `write_audit_log`; `test_cloud_audit.py::test_upload_conflict_does_not_write_false_overwrite_audit`, `test_rename_stale_does_not_write_false_rename_audit`, `test_delete_failed_does_not_write_false_audit_event` |
| T-13-06 | Cloud health UI — no background probe on navigation | mitigate | CLOSED | `CloudFolderView.vue` comment at line 86 "D-13: navigateTo does NOT probe provider health"; `testConnection` store action called nowhere from `navigateTo`, `load`, `loadFolder`, `handleBreadcrumbNavigate`, or `onMounted`; `CloudFolderRenderedFlow.test.js::no_health_probe_on_folder_navigate_D13` |
| T-13-07 | Preview and download UI — no raw provider URLs | mitigate | CLOSED | `CloudFolderView.vue::onFileOpen` calls `api.openCloudFile` (DocuVault-authorized endpoint); comment at line 379 "D-02: Never calls window.open() with a raw provider URL"; unsupported preview falls back to `api.downloadCloudFile` (also DocuVault-proxied, not a direct provider URL); `test_cloud_mutations.py::test_open_file_returns_authorized_download_url` asserts URL is a DocuVault-scoped endpoint |
| T-13-08 | Queue conflict decisions — explicit pause/resume | mitigate | CLOSED | `StorageBrowser.vue` conflict dialog requires explicit `upload-queue-resolve` emit for all five actions: `keep_both`, `replace`, `skip`, `cancel_all`, `retry`; no implicit or silent path exists; `StorageBrowser.capabilities.test.js::test_queue_requires_explicit_resolution` |
| T-13-09 | Reconnect/consent UX — Google Drive broader scope | mitigate | CLOSED | `SettingsCloudTab.vue` lines 249-280: `data-test="gdrive-scope-notice"` with copy "DocuVault requests access to all files in your Google Drive so you can browse, open, …"; reconnect affordance present; `SettingsCloudTab.health.test.js::test_gdrive_scope_notice` |
| T-13-10 | Mutable contract layer — centralized kind/reason vocabulary | mitigate | CLOSED | `storage/cloud_base.py` lines 259–292: `MUT_KIND_*` and `MUT_REASON_*` constants defined as module-level strings; `MUT_KINDS = frozenset({…})` seals the vocabulary; all provider adapters import these constants; `test_cloud_provider_contract.py` exercises the contract |
| T-13-11 | Credential plaintext at provider boundary | mitigate | CLOSED | Credentials decrypted inside `_resolve_and_get_adapter` only (operations.py lines 103–132); decrypted value never returned in any mutation result dict; `test_cloud_reconnect.py::test_reconnect_response_excludes_credentials` asserts no credential fields in response |
| T-13-12 | Reconciliation path — all writes via cloud_items.py | mitigate | CLOSED | Provider backends (google_drive_backend.py, onedrive_backend.py, webdav_backend.py, nextcloud_backend.py) contain zero calls to `upsert_cloud_item`, `reconcile_cloud_listing`, or `update_folder_state`; those functions are called exclusively from `api/cloud/operations.py` and `services/cloud_items.py`; grep confirms no provider-layer ORM writes |
| T-13-13 | Health check exposes connection status to wrong user | mitigate | CLOSED | `POST /connections/{id}/test` asserts ownership via `resolve_owned_connection`; returns `{"state": ..., "error_code": ..., "error_message": ...}` only (no credentials); `test_cloud_reconnect.py::test_health_check_wrong_owner_403` |
| T-13-14 | Reconnect stores tokens in browser/response | mitigate | CLOSED | `run_reconnect` persists refreshed credentials via `encrypt_credentials`; response is `{"status": "active"}` only; `test_cloud_reconnect.py::test_reconnect_persists_token_not_exposes_it` |
| T-13-15 | Drive broader-scope consent missing from UI | mitigate | CLOSED | `SettingsCloudTab.vue` contains `data-test="gdrive-scope-notice"` with "all files in your Google Drive" copy (D-17); `SettingsCloudTab.health.test.js::test_gdrive_scope_notice` |
| T-13-16 | Silent overwrite on name conflict | mitigate | CLOSED | All 4 provider upload implementations return `conflict` kind with `reason: "name_conflict"` when a file exists at the target name; StorageBrowser pauses queue for user resolution; `test_cloud_backends.py::*_upload_conflict_*` |
| T-13-17 | Raw provider URL returned from open/download | mitigate | CLOSED | `GET /connections/{id}/open/{item_id}` and `/download/{item_id}` proxy bytes through DocuVault and return `application/octet-stream` or `application/pdf`; no `Location` header with provider URL; `test_cloud_mutations.py::test_open_file_never_returns_provider_url` |
| T-13-18 | WebDAV SSRF bypass through upload path | mitigate | CLOSED | `WebDAVBackend.upload` calls `validate_cloud_url` on the resolved upload target before submission; `test_webdav_backend.py::test_upload_rejects_ssrf_url` |
| T-13-19 | Upload reconciliation bypass | mitigate | CLOSED | `run_upload` in `services/cloud_operations.py` calls `upsert_cloud_item` then `update_folder_state` only on `MUT_KIND_UPLOADED`; non-success branches bypass reconciliation; `test_cloud_mutations.py::test_upload_conflict_skips_reconcile` |
| T-13-20 | Audit payload secrecy (upload) | mitigate | CLOSED | `metadata_` dict contains only `kind`, `provider_item_id`, `display_name`, `byte_size`; `test_cloud_audit.py::test_upload_success_writes_metadata_only_audit_row` asserts no token/url/content |
| T-13-21 | False success audit event on failure path | mitigate | CLOSED | Conflict, offline, and reauth_required branches in `run_upload` return before `write_audit_log`; `test_cloud_audit.py::test_upload_conflict_writes_no_audit_row` |
| T-13-22 | Queue resume flow implicit | mitigate | CLOSED | StorageBrowser requires explicit `upload-queue-resolve` event for all five resolution actions; no implicit or silent paths; `StorageBrowser.capabilities.test.js::test_queue_requires_explicit_resolution` |
| T-13-23 | Preview/download UI exposes provider URL | mitigate | CLOSED | `onFileOpen` calls `api.openCloudFile` (DocuVault-authorized endpoint); `window.open()` to provider URL is forbidden by rule (D-02/T-13-07); `CloudFolderRenderedFlow.test.js::test_open_uses_open_cloud_file_api` |
| T-13-24 | Collision naming unbounded | mitigate | CLOSED | `run_create_folder` and `run_rename` use bounded retry loop (≤5 attempts) with `keep_both_name()`; collision exhaustion returns typed error; `test_cloud_mutations.py::test_create_folder_collision_exhaustion` |
| T-13-25 | Stale mutation creates duplicate on external change | mitigate | CLOSED | Stale guard in `run_create_folder`, `run_rename` calls `update_folder_state(refresh_state="warning")` and returns `stale` kind before provider submission; `test_cloud_mutations.py::test_create_folder_stale_guard_*`, `test_rename_stale_guard_*` |
| T-13-26 | Identity reconciliation missing after create/rename | mitigate | CLOSED | `run_create_folder` and `run_rename` call `upsert_cloud_item` with returned provider_item_id before returning success; `test_cloud_mutations.py::test_create_folder_reconciles_item`, `test_rename_reconciles_item` |
| T-13-27 | Move to descendant or cross-connection | mitigate | CLOSED | `run_move` checks descendant chain + self-move + connection-id equality before provider submission; `test_cloud_mutations.py::test_move_rejects_descendant_destination`, `test_move_rejects_cross_connection` |
| T-13-28 | Stale move operates on changed item | mitigate | CLOSED | Stale guard in `run_move` stops mutation, refreshes source folder state, returns `stale` kind; `test_cloud_mutations.py::test_move_stale_guard_*` |
| T-13-29 | Delete audit leaks bytes or credentials | mitigate | CLOSED | Typed delete results carry `is_folder`/`item_kind`; audit metadata contains no token or byte; `test_cloud_audit.py::test_delete_audit_contains_no_bytes` |
| T-13-30 | Health UX auto-probes on navigate | mitigate | CLOSED | `testConnection` is a store action never called from navigation; `CloudFolderRenderedFlow.test.js::no_health_probe_on_folder_navigate_D13` asserts `testCloudConnection` never called during browse |
| T-13-31 | Destructive cloud action without disclosure | mitigate | CLOSED | Delete requires `is_folder`/`supports_trash` disclosure to UI before confirmation; StorageBrowser renders permanent-delete warning for non-trash providers; `CloudFolderRenderedFlow.test.js::test_delete_shows_folder_warning` |
| T-13-32 | Google Drive broader scope no consent copy | mitigate | CLOSED | `data-test="gdrive-scope-notice"` with "all files in your Google Drive" copy confirmed in SettingsCloudTab; `SettingsCloudTab.health.test.js::test_gdrive_scope_notice` |
| T-13-33 | Closeout docs claim unshipped features | mitigate | CLOSED | Phase 13 closeout plan is isolated to documentation/version/gate tasks only; no implementation work in plan 13-11 |
| T-13-34 | Secret scan skipped at release | mitigate | CLOSED | Secret scan via `gitleaks detect --redact` run locally; 3 pre-existing findings (all from before Phase 13, none from Phase 13 files); no hardcoded API keys, tokens, or credentials in any Phase 13 file |

### Phase 13 Security Gate Evidence

**Gate 1 — Full backend test suite:**
```
docker compose run --rm backend pytest -q --tb=no
766 passed, 17 skipped, 4 deselected, 10 xfailed
(1 pre-existing failure: test_extract_docx — ModuleNotFoundError: No module named 'docx', libmagic/python-docx not installed in container; unrelated to Phase 13)
```

**Gate 2 — Frontend test suite:**
```
cd frontend && npm run test
429 passed (48 test files)
```

**Gate 3 — Bandit (backend static analysis):**
```
python3 -m bandit -r backend/ --exclude backend/tests
Total issues (by severity): Undefined: 0, Low: 11, Medium: 0, High: 0
Total issues (by confidence): Undefined: 0, Low: 0, Medium: 2, High: 9
(All High-confidence findings are Low-severity — pre-existing pattern; 0 HIGH severity findings)
```

**Gate 4 — npm audit (frontend dependency scan):**
```
cd frontend && npm audit --audit-level=high
found 0 vulnerabilities
```

**Gate 5 — pip-audit (backend dependency scan):**
pip-audit not installable via local Python 3.9 (requirements.txt targets Python 3.12). No new Python packages added in Phase 13 plans 03 through 11. Existing packages audited in Phase 8 (0 critical/high CVEs). Security-critical packages remain pinned: PyJWT 2.12+, pwdlib[argon2], cryptography, pyotp, slowapi. This is the same local tooling gap documented in Phase 12.

**Gate 6 — Hardcoded-secret scan:**
```
gitleaks detect --redact
3 findings — all pre-existing in commits from before Phase 13 (auth.test.js 2026-05-31, test_cloud_utils.py 2026-05-28, test_auth_deps.py 2026-05-22). No findings in any Phase 13 file.
```
Additionally: `git ls-files '.env' '.env.*'` returns only `.env.example` (no `.env` tracked).

**Gate 7 — Owner/admin/credential-secrecy invariants:**
- `test_cloud_security.py::test_foreign_user_cannot_browse_cloud_item` — PASS (IDOR block)
- `test_cloud_security.py::test_admin_cannot_browse_cloud_connection` — PASS (admin block)
- `test_cloud_security.py::test_browse_response_excludes_credentials_and_raw_fields` — PASS (no credentials in response)
- `test_cloud_security.py::test_ssrf_url_validation_invariants` — PASS (SSRF protection)
- `test_cloud_audit.py::test_upload_success_writes_metadata_only_audit_row` — PASS (audit secrecy)
- `CloudFolderRenderedFlow.test.js::no_health_probe_on_folder_navigate_D13` — PASS (no-probe invariant)

**Gate 8 — docker compose config:**
```
docker compose config --quiet
(no output — all required environment variables resolve without error)
```

### Phase 13 Accepted Risks

| Risk ID | Component | Accepted Risk | Rationale |
|---------|-----------|---------------|-----------|
| T-13-SC-pip | pip-audit local tooling | pip-audit not runnable against Python 3.12 requirements in Python 3.9 local env | No new Python packages added in Phase 13; existing packages audited in Phase 8; same accepted gap as Phase 12 |
| T-13-docx | test_extract_docx failure | ModuleNotFoundError: python-docx/libmagic not in container image | Pre-existing; unrelated to Phase 13; all Phase 13 test coverage passes |

### Phase 13 Unregistered Flags

None. Phase 13 adds a write surface (mutations) but all mutation endpoints are owner-scoped, credential-free in responses, SSRF-protected on WebDAV/Nextcloud paths, and produce metadata-only audit events. No unregistered attack surfaces were discovered during plan execution.

---

## Phase 14 — Selective Analysis and Byte Cache (2026-06-23)

**Audit date:** 2026-06-23
**Phase:** 14 — Selective Analysis and Byte Cache (plans 14-01 through 14-09)
**ASVS Level:** L2
**Auditor:** gsd-security-auditor (claude-sonnet-4-6)
**Phase scope:** Cloud analysis scope estimate without byte download, idempotent Celery jobs with cooperative cancellation and bounded retry, durable byte cache with LRU eviction and per-user quota accounting, ownership-scoped cache pinning in finally block, stale guard before provider byte fetch, open/preview/download routed through the byte cache lifecycle, admin blocked from all analysis/cache routes, object_key never in API responses.

### Phase 14 Threat Register

| Threat ID | Threat | Disposition | Status | Evidence |
|-----------|--------|-------------|--------|----------|
| T-14-01 | IDOR — analysis job or cache entry crosses user boundary | mitigate | CLOSED | `resolve_owned_connection` in all analysis orchestration functions; `get_analysis_job`/`list_job_items` raise `AnalysisJobNotFound` for foreign job IDs; `pin_cache_entry`/`release_cache_entry` assert user_id ownership; `test_cloud_security.py` — `test_admin_cannot_estimate`, `test_foreign_user_cannot_read_job_status`, `test_cache_entries_are_owner_scoped` |
| T-14-02 | Credential/object_key disclosure in analysis or cache response | mitigate | CLOSED | `CacheStatusOut` schema excludes `object_key` at design level (no field declared); `AnalysisJobOut`/`AnalysisJobItemOut` exclude `credentials_enc`, `access_token`, `object_key`; `test_cloud_security.py::test_job_response_excludes_credentials`, `test_cache_status_excludes_object_key` |
| T-14-03 | Hidden provider file mutation during analysis | mitigate | CLOSED | `process_job_item` uses `adapter.get_object` only; `test_cloud_analysis_contract.py::test_processing_never_calls_provider_mutation_methods` — `FakeCloudAdapter.mutation_call_count == 0` after full pipeline execution |
| T-14-04 | Provider bytes downloaded during estimate | mitigate | CLOSED | `estimate_scope` reads durable `cloud_items` metadata only; no adapter call in estimate path; `test_cloud_analysis_contract.py::test_estimate_no_byte_download` — `FakeCloudAdapter.byte_call_count == 0` after estimate |
| T-14-05 | Cache quota corruption | mitigate | CLOSED | `increment_quota_for_cache` and `decrement_quota_for_cache` use atomic `UPDATE quotas SET used_bytes = used_bytes + :delta WHERE …` pattern; `test_cloud_cache.py` — increment/decrement seam tests; quota failure is non-fatal (processing proceeds without cache entry) |
| T-14-06 | Cross-user cache entry access | mitigate | CLOSED | `retain_or_reuse_cache_entry` enforces `user_id` equality before any pin/read operation; `test_cloud_cache.py::test_retain_or_reuse_isolates_foreign_users`, `test_pin_raises_for_foreign_entry` |
| T-14-07 | Analysis job remains visible to admin | mitigate | CLOSED | All analysis routes use `get_regular_user` dependency — admin tokens receive 403; `test_cloud_security.py::test_admin_cannot_estimate`, `test_admin_cannot_enqueue` |
| T-14-08 | Cache status endpoint exposes object_key or credentials_enc | mitigate | CLOSED | `CacheStatusOut` schema lists only 6 aggregate fields; `GET /analysis/cache` returns `CacheStatusOut` only; `test_cloud_cache.py::test_cache_status_excludes_object_key`, `test_cloud_security.py::test_cache_response_excludes_object_key` |
| T-14-09 | Eviction deletes bytes for pinned active job | mitigate | CLOSED | `evict_lru_entries` filters `pin_count == 0`; pinned entries are never candidates for eviction; `test_cloud_cache.py::test_eviction_skips_pinned_entries` |
| T-14-10 | Provider credentials in Celery broker payload | mitigate | CLOSED | `process_cloud_analysis_item` task parameters are `job_id, item_id, user_id, connection_id, cloud_item_id` (UUIDs only); credentials decrypted inside the worker after ownership revalidation via `decrypt_credentials`; `test_cloud_analysis_contract.py::test_celery_broker_payload_contains_ids_only` |
| T-14-11 | Provider mutation during Celery processing | mitigate | CLOSED | Worker uses `adapter.get_object` only; `test_cloud_analysis_contract.py::test_processing_never_calls_provider_mutation_methods` |
| T-14-12 | Cache pin leak on processing failure/cancellation | mitigate | CLOSED | `release_cache_entry` called in `finally` block after `pin_cache_entry`; applies on success, exception, and cooperative cancellation; `test_cloud_analysis_contract.py::test_processing_cache_pin_released_on_cancellation` |
| T-14-13 | Stale analysis result presented when provider metadata changed | mitigate | CLOSED | Version key re-computed from current `CloudItem` metadata before byte fetch; if different, item marked `"stale"` and processing stops without get_object; final stale check after classification for late concurrent changes; `test_cloud_analysis_contract.py::test_processing_unchanged_version_skips_before_provider_byte_fetch` |
| T-14-14 | Byte cache used for analysis delivers stale/wrong bytes | mitigate | CLOSED | Cache key is `(user_id, connection_id, cloud_item_id, version_key)` — version key includes etag/version_id/fingerprint; wrong-version cache entries cannot match the current version_key |
| T-14-15 | Cache status endpoint exposes per-entry metadata | mitigate | CLOSED | `CacheStatusOut` is aggregate-only (entry_count, total_bytes, cache_limit_bytes, tier_cap_bytes, analysis_progress_detail, analysis_failure_behavior) — no per-entry rows, file names, or provider IDs in the response |

### Phase 14 Security Gate Evidence

**Gate 1 — Full backend test suite:**
```
cd backend && python3 -m pytest -q --tb=no
856 passed, 18 skipped, 4 deselected, 7 xfailed, 73 warnings in 109.48s
(1 pre-existing failure: test_extract_docx — ModuleNotFoundError: libmagic/python-docx not installed locally; unrelated to Phase 14)
```

**Gate 2 — Frontend test suite:**
```
cd frontend && npm run test
471 passed (50 test files) — 0 failures
```

**Gate 3 — Bandit (backend static analysis):**
```
python3 -m bandit -r backend/ --exclude backend/tests --severity-level high
Total issues (by severity): High: 0, Medium: 0, Low: 23
(All 23 Low-severity findings are pre-existing; 0 HIGH or MEDIUM findings; 0 #nosec suppressions)
```

**Gate 4 — npm audit (frontend dependency scan):**
```
cd frontend && npm audit --audit-level=high
found 0 vulnerabilities
```

**Gate 5 — pip-audit (backend dependency scan):**
pip-audit not installable in local Python 3.9 environment (requirements.txt targets Python 3.12). No new Python packages added in Phase 14 plans 01 through 09. Existing packages audited in Phase 8 with 0 critical/high CVEs. Security-critical packages remain pinned: PyJWT 2.12+, pwdlib[argon2], cryptography, pyotp, slowapi. Same tooling gap accepted in Phase 12 and Phase 13.

**Gate 6 — Hardcoded-secret scan:**
```
gitleaks detect --redact
3 findings — all pre-existing in commits from before Phase 14:
  - auth.test.js:92 (2026-05-31) — test fixture access_token string
  - test_cloud_utils.py:116 (2026-05-28) — test fixture credentials dict
  - test_auth_deps.py:94 (2026-05-22) — tampered JWT test token
No findings in any Phase 14 file.
git ls-files '.env' '.env.*': only .env.example tracked
```

**Gate 7 — Owner/admin/credential-secrecy invariants:**
- `test_cloud_security.py::test_foreign_user_cannot_browse_cloud_item` — PASS (IDOR block)
- `test_cloud_security.py::test_admin_cannot_browse_cloud_connection` — PASS (admin block)
- `test_cloud_security.py::test_admin_cannot_estimate` — PASS (analysis admin block)
- `test_cloud_security.py::test_admin_cannot_enqueue` — PASS (enqueue admin block)
- `test_cloud_security.py::test_job_response_excludes_credentials` — PASS (no credentials in job response)
- `test_cloud_security.py::test_cache_response_excludes_object_key` — PASS (no object_key in cache status)
- `test_cloud_analysis_contract.py::test_estimate_no_byte_download` — PASS (zero byte calls)
- `test_cloud_analysis_contract.py::test_processing_never_calls_provider_mutation_methods` — PASS
- `test_cloud_cache.py::test_eviction_skips_pinned_entries` — PASS

**Gate 8 — docker compose config:**
```
docker compose config --quiet
(no output — all required environment variables resolve without error)
```

### Phase 14 Accepted Risks

| Risk ID | Component | Accepted Risk | Rationale |
|---------|-----------|---------------|-----------|
| T-14-SC-pip | pip-audit local tooling | pip-audit not runnable against Python 3.12 requirements in Python 3.9 local env | No new Python packages added in Phase 14; existing packages audited in Phase 8; same accepted gap as Phases 12 and 13 |
| T-14-docx | test_extract_docx failure | ModuleNotFoundError: python-docx/libmagic not in local test environment | Pre-existing; unrelated to Phase 14; all Phase 14 test coverage passes |
| T-14-quota-nonfatal | Quota increment failure is non-fatal for analysis | When quota increment fails (limit exceeded), processing continues and cache entry is skipped | Quota refusal does not block text extraction or classification; only the MinIO cache storage step is omitted; extracted_text and topics are still durably persisted |

### Phase 14 Unregistered Flags

None. Phase 14 adds read-only analysis (no provider mutation, no provider URL exposure) and a byte cache keyed by version/etag (no cross-user data path). All new routes are owner-scoped, admin-blocked, and credential-free by schema design. No unregistered attack surfaces were discovered during plan execution.